Update: I’ve corrected this diary. A source I had relied on posted incorrect information, which I repeated. The source has since updated and corrected that information, and I have edited this diary to remove the bad info. — pwoodford
One of several USAF mishap investigations I oversaw as chief of flight safety for Pacific Air Forces was a 1993 runway collision between two F-16 fighters at Kunsan Air Base in Korea. Each jet was occupied by a single pilot. One pilot was on the runway, preparing to take off. The second pilot was landing. The collision occurred in daylight, but ceilings were low and visibility was somewhat hampered by rain showers. The landing F-16, coming from above and behind, hit the F-16 on the runway as it began its takeoff roll. The pilot taking off was killed; the pilot landing ejected after the collision and survived. Both aircraft were destroyed. Mistakes by tower controllers and the landing pilot were listed as primary causes of the mishap.
There are similarities between that mishap and Tuesday's runway collision between a Japan Airlines Airbus A350 and a Japan Coast Guard DeHavilland Dash 8 at Haneda Airport near Tokyo. The JAL airliner had been cleared to land and was approaching the runway from the south. The Coast Guard aircraft, apparently without clearance, had taken the runway. The JAL airliner, coming from above and behind, hit the Coast Guard aircraft on landing. It was dark. All but one of the crew on the Coast Guard aircraft died; everyone on the JAL airliner survived. Both aircraft were destroyed.
An obvious and immediate question in both mishaps: how did the landing pilot(s) not see the other aircraft on the runway and go around? One detail from the F-16 mishap investigation I remember is the board's attempt to answer that very question. In daylight and similar weather they sent up a two-seat F-16 to fly approaches to the same runway, with another F-16 sitting on the approach end. The two-seater was flown from the back while the pilot up front taped the approaches. I've seen the video. You can barely make out the gray F-16 on the gray runway, even with its anti-collision beacon flashing white and its afterburner lit. Still, even though tower controllers set the stage for the collision, the landing pilot should have seen the aircraft on the runway. See & avoid is Rule Number One, the primary responsibility of every pilot.
Obviously the investigation of the accident at Haneda is just beginning and no conclusions can yet be drawn, but the JAL crew reportedly say they didn't see the Coast Guard aircraft. Never mind that it was dark — the Coast Guard aircraft almost certainly had its position and anti-collision beacon on, lights that should have been clearly visible to the JAL crew. Should they have seen those lights, realized what was going on, and gone around? Yes, absolutely. But they didn't, and I think it's a safe guess the investigators will focus on the pilot of the Coast Guard aircraft, who by all accounts had not been cleared for takeoff and was supposed to be holding short of the runway.
Not related, and shame on me for making assumptions about nationalities and culture, but if the passengers on that JAL airliner had been American or European, would the emergency evacuation have been as orderly and successful? The JAL flight attendants — working in a cabin rapidly filling with smoke, unable to open some of the emergency exits, issuing calm instructions to passengers with megaphones since the intercom was down — faced the ultimate test and aced it. Kudos as well to the passengers, who followed flight attendants' instructions and didn't block the aisles trying to get carry-on luggage out of the overhead bins. Things could have turned out worse. A lot worse.