Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of February 23 to 24, mainly targeting southern and western Ukraine. Ukrainian artillery hit and destroyed 3 SU-27 fighter jets of Russian forces in a strike on Belbek Airfield in Crimea.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported on March 24 that Russian forces launched 29 Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles from Tu-95MS strategic aircraft and 28 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[8] Ukrainian air defenses reportedly downed 18 Kh-101/555 missiles and 25 Shahed drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Kyiv, Volyn, and Lviv oblasts.[9] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces launched two waves of Shahed drones and that Russian drone strikes primarily targeted port infrastructure along the Danube River, a branch whose delta forms the Ukraine-Romania border, and energy facilities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv Oblast with unspecified cruise and ballistic missiles on the evening of March 23 and the night of March 23 to 24.[11] Lviv Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck a critical infrastructure facility with two Kinzhal missiles on the morning of March 24, and Ukrainian state-owned oil and gas company Neftogaz Chairperson Oleksiy Chernyshov stated that Russian forces struck an underground gas storage facility and damaged technical equipment in Lviv oblast.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast with four S-300 missiles.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged infrastructure in western Ukraine, residential buildings in Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast, and energy infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Kharkiv City.[14] Polish Operational Command reported that a Russian cruise missile violated Polish air space on the morning of March 24 for 39 seconds before presumably returning into Ukrainian airspace.[15]
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- Ukrainian forces struck a Black Sea Fleet (BSF) communications center in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, and reportedly struck an oil depot and at least partially damaged two BSF landing ships on the night of March 23.
- Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of February 23 to 24, mainly targeting southern and western Ukraine.
- Russian forces are reportedly approaching the outskirts of Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast but are unlikely to threaten the settlement with encirclement or seizure in the coming months.
- The seizure of Chasiv Yar would offer Russian forces limited but not insignificant operational benefits if they could achieve it.
- The Islamic State’s (IS) Amaq News Agency published footage on March 23 purportedly filmed from the perspective of the attackers involved in the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.
- Russian officials proposed more anti-migrant policies in response to the Crocus City Hall attack.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed concerns about Russian ultranationalist reactions to the Crocus City Hall attack.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting along the entire line of contact on March 24.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23 establishing a legal basis for enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military’s mobilization reserve, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization and military formalization efforts.
The seizure of Chasiv Yar would offer Russian forces limited but not insignificant operational benefits if they could achieve it. The Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar and surrounding areas would further secure the southwestern flank of the Russian frontline in the Bakhmut-Soledar area, which has long been a wide salient. A Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar and advances north and south of the settlement would push Ukrainian forces further away from Russian ground lines of communication (GLOC) in the Bakhmut area. A Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would likely push Ukrainian forces out of tube artillery range of a section of the E40 highway east of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces would likely have to deploy tube artillery in immediate frontline areas to interdict Russian logistics along most of the T-05-13 (Soledar-Bakhmut-Horlivka) highway. Chasiv Yar would also offer Russian forces routes of advance to Kostyantynivka, the southern edge of a major urban agglomeration in Donetsk Oblast that Russia has long viewed as a major operational objective in Ukraine.[24] Advances through Chasiv Yar provide a more immediate route to this urban agglomeration than possible routes of advance from the south along the H-20 highway from Avdiivka or from the southwest from the Toretsk area. Russian forces attempted and failed to conduct a wide sweeping operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast in spring 2022 that focused on seizing the Ukrainian stronghold of Slovyansk (one of the largest cities in this urban agglomeration).[25] The Russian command may intend to reattempt a wide-sweeping maneuver in 2025 or beyond, and advances west of Chasiv Yar would set further conditions for this possible larger offensive operation.[26] ISW offers these observations to present the assessment that a Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would be more operationally significant than the Russian seizure of Avdiivka but reiterates that ISW does not forecast that Russian forces will take Chasiv Yar rapidly if they can take it at all.