The year was 1956, one of the most momentous of the Cold War era. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser was riding the rising wave of Arab nationalism to consolidate his hold on power by confronting various Western and Israeli interests — supporting the NLF in Algeria against the French, the Palestinian Fedayeen raids from Sinai and Gaza against Israel while blockading Israeli shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba, and confronting the British over ownership of the Suez Canal.
Things really came to a head when the US and UK pulled out of a proposed agreement to fund the Aswan Dam project in July. Shortly afterward Nasser decided to unilaterally nationalize the Suez Canal (the last British troops having just been withdrawn the previous month), leading the British and French to secretly conspire with Israel to both seize the Sinai and regain control of the Canal under the transparent fiction of “separating the combatants.”
The biggest flaw in their “cunning plan” was trying to keep the US in the dark as to what they were really up to, since Eisenhower’s State Department was still trying to keep Nasser from leaning too far in the direction of the Soviet Union and was not at all keen to be seen as supporting an act of overt aggression by Western and/or Israeli military power against Arab nationalists. Nonetheless, they hoped that when confronted by a fait accompli, Washington would end up acquiescing.
That’s not how things played out of course. Eisenhower was outraged that his supposed French and British allies had gone behind his back to conspire with Israel in their attack against Egypt, and even though the UN Security Council once again failed to deter or punish aggressive military action against a sovereign state (since both the UK and France could and did veto any such measures), Eisenhower used the unmatched economic and diplomatic strength of the US in the post-WW2 world to force a Franco-British (and eventually Israeli) withdrawal.
From the Suez Crisis in wikipedia:
considering the grave situation created by the actions against Egypt, and with lack of unanimity among the permanent members preventing it from exercising its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council passed Resolution 119; it decided to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly for the first time, as provided in the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" resolution, in order to make appropriate recommendations to end the fighting.[203]
The emergency special session was convened 1 November; the same day Nasser requested diplomatic assistance from the U.S., without requesting the same from the Soviet Union; he was at first sceptical of the efficacy of U.S. diplomatic efforts at the UN, but later gave full credit to Eisenhower's role in stopping the war.[204]
In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the United States' proposal for Resolution 997 (ES-I); the vote was 64 in favour and 5 opposed (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel) with 6 abstentions.[205] It called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was now blocked. The Secretary-General was requested to observe and report promptly on compliance to both the Security Council and General Assembly, for further action as deemed appropriate in accordance with the UN Charter.[203]
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The United States also put financial pressure on the UK to end the invasion. Because the Bank of England had lost $45 million between 30 October and 2 November, and Britain's oil supply had been restricted by the closing of the Suez Canal, the British sought immediate assistance from the IMF, but it was denied by the United States. Eisenhower in fact ordered his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, to prepare to sell part of the US Government's Sterling Bond holdings. The UK government considered invading Kuwait and Qatar if oil sanctions were put in place by the US.[224]
Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, advised his Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, that the United States was fully prepared to carry out this threat. He also warned his Prime Minister that Britain's foreign exchange reserves simply could not sustain the devaluation of the pound that would come after the United States' actions; and that within weeks of such a move, the country would be unable to import the food and energy supplies needed to sustain the population on the islands.
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In concert with U.S. actions, Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France. The U.S. refused to fill the gap until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. Other NATO members refused to sell oil they received from Arab nations to Britain or France.[226]
This just goes to show what a determined US can still do to get its erstwhile allies to fall in line with its declared policies, and perhaps it's now long past the time when President Biden summons up his own inner Eisenhower to confront both Netanyahu and Israel with some “tough love” over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
