Back on March 10th I wrote Part 1 detailing how Ukraine would free Kyiv and then proceed to clear out the north. The Russians, in one of the few intelligent decisions they have made, decided to clear out before all their forces got cut off, but still not before losing a significant amount. They left enough material that Ukraine reportedly now has more tanks in country than Russia does, a stat that does not bode well for a country that continues to press an offensive at the worst possible time. So what happens next?
When the ground dries up, the Ukrainians are going to steam-roll Russia right out of the country. The Ukrainians currently continue to display patience and appropriate caution while counter-attacking at appropriate times. They have not launched any major offenses yet, nor should they. The Russians continue to make things easier for Ukraine by attacking into prepared defenses along roads bordered by impassible mud. Attacking is more dangerous than defending. Why go on the attack when the enemy throws themselves at defendable positions at the worst possible time of the year? The gains Russia is making is mostly due to them attacking in enough places that at least some of the attacks will succeed. While a few places Russia has taken has caused me a little unease, none of them are critical enough to signify a change in fortune. Ukraine is in a good spot at the moment (these things being relative of course).
Ukraine’s big counter-offensive will wait for dry ground. For those unclear how the mud affects things, imagine the following. The fighting is mostly taking place in large farm fields with occasional towns and small forests. For the most part, things are flat and wide open. This is considered tank country and highly favors armored forces. So why hasn’t Russia been more successful when they had the advantage in armor? Amongst the many other things Kos and Mark have detailed, mud changes tank country into a large swamp which heavily flips the script and makes it far more advantageous to the defender. Why?
When dry, the front lines are generally defined by small towns, tree lines, and small rises in the otherwise flat area. Defenders choose to defend an area with some cover and large open fields in front of them. With just infantry vs infantry, those large fields are kill zones from snipers, machine guns, and artillery. It takes forever for infantry to cross in the wide open with little chance for surprise. Once tanks are brought into the picture, the tank has a heavily armored front making it impervious to most anything other than enemy tanks and high quality anti-tank systems. The attacker can quickly move its tanks and personnel carriers to any point up and down the lines where they think they can achieve an advantage.
It starts with artillery hitting the defender’s line as armor units poke forward hitting likely anti-tank positions with high explosive rounds. The tanks then start moving toward the enemy lines with infantry hiding behind them. At some point, the defenders anti-tank assets will fire, usually exposing their position. If the attackers did their job right and chose a point of attack with fewer defenders, then even if they lose a few tanks, the remaining tanks and artillery wipe out the units that exposed themselves. Once the defender’s anti tank assets are used up, the tanks then rule the battlefield throwing high explosive rounds at defending infantry either killing or effectively suppressing them until the attacking infantry crosses the open and close assaults the defenders lines. Once the line is breached, the tanks and armored personnel carriers stream through the hole attempting to exploit the breach by rushing ahead to important objectives that are not yet properly defending, or turning down the line and attacking defending positions from directions that the defense was not designed to defend from.
What mud does is it makes these large open fields impassible to large vehicles. The tanks can’t get across these fields to create a breakout. Instead, they are confined to roads where the defender can concentrate their forces, particularly the anti-tank assets. If the road is narrow enough, it doesn’t even take many hits on enemy tanks to clog the road with wrecks. Because the defender doesn’t have to worry about tanks crossing muddy fields, those areas become far more easy to defend as the attacker has no good way to cross the kill zone quickly.
So why will Ukraine succeed in spectacular fashion when things dry up and not the Russians? First, the Russians continue to attack in the worst possible conditions when they should be waiting. Russian’s attacking forces will be spent by then. The Ukrainians will most likely be keeping their forces meant for the counter attack off of the front lines keeping them fresh, supplied, and ready. If needed, this force can be used as a mobile reserve if things go badly somewhere. But otherwise, it’s job is to train and prepare.
Second, the Russians have shown no capacity for concentrating force and coordinating large numbers of units. They have shown little ability to exploit any breakthroughs they might have had. They simply don’t move quickly and their leadership is constrained limiting their ability to change tactics quickly. Ukraine has none of these problems. They have been training with US forces learning US style combined arms. They won’t have US air superiority, but they will concentrate their drone assets for the offensive pushes effectively simulating air superiority.
Third, the Ukrainians have US advisors teaching them logistics. An armored push by Ukraine will be far more effective supplying the front units keeping them moving than anything Russia has come close to mustering.
I see Ukraine running two major offensive pushes. These will probably not happen simultaneously but the order will be dependent upon ground conditions. The more likely to be first will be an armored push from Vasylivka to Melitopol. This will serve two major purposes. First, it will cut off any supply lines going from Crimea to the Donbas region and forcing Russian forces in the Donbas to redeploy to cover this new flank. Second, it will put the troops west of the Dniper in a very bad position. They will be forced to retreat across the Dniper leaving Kherson without a fight or risk being stranded on the west side cut off and out of supply. Ukraine has been correct in not pushing Kherson too hard. Just enough to keep the Russians off guard there, but not enough to incur major casualties capturing a city that a push to Melitopol accomplish as a side benefit.
The second push will be the obvious cutting off of the Russian forces in Izyum. If the Russians keep too many forces in that pocket they will be at a huge risk once Ukraine goes on the offensive. If Ukraine closes the pocket few Russian forces will make it back. This will eliminate a large enough number of enemies that a direct assault on the Donbas trenches becomes possible. Even Crimea will come into play as Ukraine has shown us that Russian ships can not safely be near shore anymore. Russia will not enjoy a sea advantage and even the bottleneck at the isthmus will not be sufficient to save Russia. By that point Russian artillery will be much degraded and unlikely to be sufficient there to out-duel the newly upgraded Ukrainian artillery that will only continue to get better.
Russia is going to learn all about how to properly conduct a combined arms offensive. They’re going to be on the receiving end of one in May or June (weather permitting).
