As I write this, I think Ukraine holds the upper hand in this war tactically. However, I am concerned about the long-term outlook, and I think we (the U.S. and our allies) may be a little too complacent on what can come next.
Putin obviously miscalculated badly when he invaded the Ukraine. He expected to roll right over the Ukrainian army and conquer the whole country in a romp, much like he seized the Crimea in 2014. He even called it a “Special Military Operation”, implying it would be over in no time. That wasn’t the case, of course. The Ukrainians learned from their debacle in 2014, and had reformed their army. As a result, they were able to stop the Russians, although not before the Russians had taken a chunk of Ukrainian territory.
Of course, when they were invaded, Ukraine immediately initiated a full mobilization to expand their army. There was no question about the need for this, as they were faced with a threat to their country’s very existence. For Putin it was more complicated. Since he had declared it was not a war, but a “Special Military Operation”, it would have been awkward, and potentially dangerous politically, for him to initiate a general mobilization. As a result, he did not call upon an increase in the armed services until many months later as Russian casualties climbed and Ukrainian resistance stiffened, and then it was only a partial mobilization. This gave Ukraine a head start in building up their forces. As a result, at this time I think the Ukrainian army is at least at parity and might very well outnumber their Russian adversaries. Ukraine’s successful counteroffensives near Kharkiv and Kherson give some credence to this possibility. However, since Ukraine retook Kherson the front has been pretty static, with neither side making much headway.
Europe has had one of the mildest winters in the past century this season. From the standpoint of the war, this has proven to be a mixed blessing. On the positive side, it has made it easier for Europe to wean itself away from Russian oil and gas. That has benefitted Ukrainian civilians as well, as those who are refugees and those without power due to Russian missile attacks are better able to cope due to the milder temperatures. However, the mild winter means there hasn’t been a hard freeze of the ground. Autumn and spring in the Ukraine are the mud season there. Once vehicles get off paved roads they get stuck in the mud. This goes even for tracked vehicles such as tanks. The German army’s offensive against Moscow in the fall of 1941 ground to a halt due to the mud. Only when the ground hardened with the winter freeze could they continue. And one reason Putin’s attack on Kyiv failed is the army was stuck on the roads unable to maneuver in the mud, and was vulnerable to attacks from Ukrainian light infantry, airplanes, and artillery.
I have been expecting a major winter offensive from the Ukrainians by now. But when I look at the weather reports in that area the temperatures are still above freezing for much of the day, meaning there is still lots of mud. Without a hard freeze a major offensive with deep penetrations like their Kharkiv offensive becomes impossible. Unless there is a hard freeze soon, they will have to wait until after the spring thaw, which could be a few months from now.
Time is an important aspect of this war. Right now I think Ukraine has the upper hand. And for the short to intermediate time period (say, the next 6 to 8 months) I think things favor Ukraine. They are still receiving new weapons from their allies and are learning to use them. I think there will be a spring offensive by Ukraine, and it is not impossible to have a winter offensive if the ground gets hard in the near future. But it is the long term that worries me. Russia has well over three times the population of the Ukraine and a bigger economy, and if they can mobilize their resources they can field a much larger army. If that happens they could turn the tables and go on the offensive, grinding the Ukraine down. That is Russia’s traditional way of winning a war - mobilize superior resources and overwhelm their enemy with sheer mass.
Wars are unpredictable, and when you have an enemy on the run you want to take maximum advantage. You don’t want to give your enemy time to recover. When Ukraine takes the offensive, I hope they can deliver a haymaker. If they are unsuccessful in liberating their country, Russia can still recover and turn the tables. It is imperative that Ukraine gets ALL the weapons it needs for coming offensives.
Because of this need, I am frustrated at the Germans for their unwillingness to provide Leopard tanks to Ukraine, or to give their allies who have Leopards permission to supply them to the Ukraine. Chancellor Scholz has resisted giving Ukraine these tanks, for reasons I don’t understand. Those tanks are needed ASAP while the Ukraine still has the upper hand - and before Russia can fully mobilize.
Scholz’s latest position is Germany will allow the use of Leopard tanks only if we send Abrams tanks to the Ukraine as well. That is a false equivalence. Our Abrams tank is not a good fit for this situation. We would have to train the Ukrainians how to use this tank from scratch. The Abrams also uses a lot more fuel than a Leopard tank, and also uses jet fuel rather than diesel, which adds one more logistical problem. And there are no repair or supply facilities for the Abrams anywhere near the Ukraine. Poland already uses the Leopard tank, as do other NATO countries in the area. And Leopard tanks can be repaired, refitted, and resupplied from Poland. Also, the Poles could train the Ukrainians in the use of the tank. There is an added benefit here - the Polish and Ukrainian languages are very closely related, enough so that interpreters aren’t required. They can talk to each other! We have enough problems getting translators to teach the Ukrainians to use our other weapons, so it would help if someone else could train them in using new weapons. I think Chancellor Scholz’s position is just an excuse to avoid doing what he should do.
I’m hammering Germany here, but we should also open up some here. Ukraine wants modern F-16 airplanes from us. We should supply them these, or something equivalent. The Ukrainians could use something that would give them air superiority. (I would also like to see us give them A-10’s as well. I think these would be a good fit for the type of war they are fighting, but I admit that I haven’t heard about the Ukrainians requesting these, so I may be wrong here.)
At the moment, Ukraine is doing pretty well. They have stopped the Russian invasion. They are more than holding their own against the Russians. They have successfully integrated many of our weapons into their inventory, and some of these, like the HIMARS rocket artillery, have been spectacular successes. They have also launched two significant counteroffensives, and I think they are well positioned to initiate more offensive operations. But I am worried about us getting complacent. I have seen many articles saying the Ukrainians can win, and perhaps even retake the Crimea. I hope that is true. However, we can’t assume that. We need to make sure the Ukraine gets everything it needs for successful counteroffensives. That includes tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, artillery, and air power. And we need to get it to them in the next six to eight months before the Russians can turn the tables. Let’s don’t get complacent. We would all hate to think, if the war is still raging a year from now, and with the Russians on the offensive, that we missed an opportunity. It would be terrible if we thought that, if only we had given them tanks and modern airplanes when they requested them, Ukraine might have been able to achieve a decisive victory this year. The opportunity might not come again.
