The Pentagon has been stingy with details about the shipment of arms to Ukraine via Poland. This is proper, of course, but my curiosity has stirred memories of the American airlift that resupplied Israel during the Yom Kippur War, code-named Operation NICKEL GRASS.
The history that war can be studied from a wealth of sources. The airlift itself has been covered in books, magazine articles, and in numerous war college thesis papers. I’ll try to summarize as briefly as I can.
WAR BREAKS OUT
The conflict opened on October 6, 1973 with a massive assault by Egyptian forces across the Suez Canal into the Suez Peninsula, occupied by Israel since the 1967 war. At the same time, Syrian forces attacked into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from the north.
Israel had warning of the attack, and plans were made for the kind of preemptive strike that gave them victory in the Six Day War in 1967. But Israel’s occupation of Syrian and Egyptian territory in the aftermath of that conflict was not universally popular, and the threat of an Arab oil embargo was quite real. For those reasons, Washington warned Israel that American aid would be withheld If Israel were seen as the aggressor in any new hostilities.
As a result, Israel’s air force took a beating from Egyptian attacks on aircraft, air fields and radar sites. Israel had mobilized quickly, but counter-attacks on the Egyptian bridgeheads across the Suez Canal were defeated by Egyptian air power and a new generation of wire-guided anti-tank missiles supplied by Russia.
AMERICA’S RESPONSE
The Pentagon prepared plans to resupply Israel as soon as the assault was reported, but Washington’s response was tenuous.
Nixon and Kissinger
America was still extracting itself from Vietnam and President Nixon was embroiled in the Watergate Scandal. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had already been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize. and he was reluctant to jeopardize his carefully crafted détente with Russia and China… and everybody was wary of an oil embargo by OPEC.
Israel had acquired a reputation for invincibility after the Six Day War. Nixon and Kissinger expected them to prevail quickly and they wanted the U.S. to be in a neutral posture, to broker a permanent Middle East peace deal. For that reason, Tel Aviv’s initial request for material assistance was declined.
But Washington had failed to appreciate improvements in Soviet weaponry provided to the Arab armies. Two days into the war, things looked very bad for Israel. The Syrian assault had been halted, but a major counterattack had failed to stop the progress of Egyptian forces in Sinai. The conflict was deteriorating into a war of attrition that would favor the larger Arab combatants.
Washington’s response was to allow Israel’s civilian airliners to quietly pick up munitions in Norfolk and at Pease AFB in New Hampshire. The use of U.S. military transports remained strictly prohibited while Kissinger worked diplomatic channels with Egypt and Russia.
PRESSURE TO ACT
On October 8, Prime Minister Golda Meir authorized the arming of tactical nuclear weapons to be deployed on Jericho missiles and F-4 Phantom II aircraft. They were to be used only as a last resort, but the preparation was done in a way sure to be noticed by U.S. Intelligence. Administration officials later discounted the threat of nuclear escalation in Nixon’s decisions - citing instead, Egypt’s rejection of a ceasefire offer, and the start of a Soviet re-supply airlift.
Whatever the reason, President Nixon ordered the Military Airlift Command (MAC) to present him with options for the complete replacement of Israel’s losses. Even these included some cautious proposals to employ commercial air carriers, or to fly cargo to an intermediate destination, to be transferred to Israeli aircraft, covertly.
Things were greatly complicated by the fact that European nations were much more dependent on Arab oil than the U.S. NATO members individually halted shipments of arms and replacement parts to “all belligerent parties”. They also refused to allow U.S. military aircraft en route to Israel to transit their airspace or land for refueling. There were two notable exceptions: Portugal and the Netherlands.
Portugal got its oil from Angola, not the Persian Gulf, and Lisbon agreed to look the other way while U.S. planes refueled at Lajes Field in the Azores. In Amsterdam, the iconoclastic Dutch defense minister, Henk Vredeling, permitted U.S. and Israeli aircraft use of a Dutch airfield, and authorized deliveries of Dutch army parts, supplies and munitions to Israel – without informing the rest of the Dutch government. (That’s a fascinating story too).
On October 12, Golda Meier made a final personal appeal for assistance to President Nixon. He then ordered the Pentagon to begin shipping military cargo to Lajes for transfer to Israeli aircraft. The next day, that order was changed to permit U.S. aircraft to fly directly to Lod International Airport near Tel Aviv.
Aircraft, vehicles, ammunition and supplies were dispatched from 29 locations the United States and from U.S. stocks positioned in Europe, but even those had to go through the Azores.
LAJES FIELD, THE AZORES
C-5 Takes off over parked F-4 Phantoms at Lajes Field
The first U.S. aircraft to arrive at Lajes were Boeing KC-135 tankers. Most shuttled aviation fuel from the US, while others conducted aerial refueling of fighter aircraft en route to Israel.
At the peak of the airlift, Lajes was handling 30 aircraft per day. Ground crews at the air base swelled to over 1,300 personnel. Some aircrews on layovers slept on their planes because there were no accommodations left anywhere on the base.
During the first 48 hours of the airlift, Lajes Field managed 136 landings and 88 departures. Thirty-two days later, the C-5’s had sortied through the Azores 312 times, and the C-141’s had transited 845 times.
From Lajes, the U.S. airlift had to follow a precise route down the center of the Mediterranean Sea, to remain in international airspace between hostile African nations to the south and neutral European nation to the north.
Navy fighters from the U.S. 6th Fleet escorted the transport aircraft to within 150 miles of Israel, where the Israeli Air Force met them for the final leg into Ben Gurion or Lod Airports. American ships were stationed every 300 miles along the Mediterranean route, with an aircraft carrier stationed every 600 miles.
TRANSFER OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
A4 Skyhawk landing on the
USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 1973
Thirty-seven F-4 Phantom jets were drawn directly from U.S. squadrons in Europe, and flown to Israel (via the Azores) - still in their NATO “forest” camouflage. They were reflagged, refueled, armed, and sent into combat with Israeli pilots, sometimes within hours of arrival.
The US Navy and US Marine Corps provided forty-six A-4 Skyhawk attack jets, and six more were ferried, with tanker support, directly from the McDonnell Douglas factory in St. Louis.
The Skyhawks departed Lajes and were refueled by tankers before passing through Straits of Gibraltar. From there they flew to the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, near Sicily, where they stayed overnight.
They were refueled again north of Crete by tankers launched from the USS Independence, and continued on from there to Israel. At the request of the Greek government, the route was shifted to south of Crete.
Israeli fighters were rotated from front line combat to escort the U.S. transports into Israel. Their pilots regarded those missions as R & R.
DELIVERY OF MILITARY CARGO
The first U.S. Air Force cargo jet landed in Israel under the cover of night, on October 14 - just as Israeli forces turned the tide of battle, advancing into Syria and stopping the Egyptian advance in Sinai. The American airlift did not supply those engagements directly, but the promise of resupply allowed Israel to commit their entire reserve of tanks, aircraft, fuel and ammunition to offensive operations.
Transferring Sidewinder missiles from a C-141 at Lod Airport onto a 40K loader-unloader vehicle.
The first U.S. aircraft scheduled to land at Lod was a C-5 carrying a payload of specialized cargo-handling equipment and a team of Americans to operate it. That aircraft was delayed at Lajes, so the first American cargo jet to arrive (A C-5 loaded with 97 tons of artillery rounds) had be unloaded by hand. Flatbed semi-trailers were hastily fitted with palette rollers to assist.
The story of the American and Israeli airport ground crews is an epic tale in itself.
The air bridge quickly expanded to four C-5s and twelve C-141s per day. Due to the threat of air attack on the Lod and Ben Gurion airports, efforts were made to have no more than one C-5 on the ground at any time. Despite this, nearly 1,000 tons of ammunition, medical supplies, missiles, aircraft parts, helicopters, disassembled F-4 fighter jets, artillery, and armored vehicles were delivered to Israel each day. When the kinks were worked out, supplies typically got from the airport to the Syrian border in three hours, and to the Sinai front in 10 hours.
The turn-around time for a C-5 at Lod Airport ranged from 1 to 40 hours, but the average was 2.5 hours. The average time for the C-141 was 1.7 hours, but their payloads were typically 38 percent less than the C-5’s.
In 1973, the Military Airlift Command operated a fleet of 276 C-141 Starlifters, and 77 of the giant C-5A Galaxy. 177 of the Starlifters, and 51 of the C-5’s participated in NICKEL GRASS. The Starlifters could carry 28 ton of palletized cargo, but were not configured for aerial refueling at that time. Without the stopover at Lajes. they could not have made the trip to Israel.
The C-5 had been in service for only five years and had acquired a reputation as an expensive lemon due to cost overruns, aircraft fires, and premature wing fatigue that reduced its maximum safe payload by 20%. The C-5 was capable of aerial refueling, but in 1973, its crews had not yet trained for it. The big transports were capable of making the trip to Israel nonstop with reduced load of 33 tons, but refueling in the Azores allowed them to carry an average of 73 tons. They also moved tracked vehicles too large for the C-141, like the M-60 main battle tank.
C-5A Galaxy Transports at Lajes Air Base, Terceira Island, 1973
The C-130 Hercules did not take part in the overseas airlift. In fact, MAC did not have any — they all belonged to the Tactical Airlift Command. But they did shuttle military cargoes destined for Israel to collection points in the United States. Twelve aircraft were transferred to Israel where they were employed in the manner they were designed for – as “flying trucks” to ferry ammunition, fuel and supplies directly to the front lines.
The airlift peaked on October 21, but continued well after the cease-fire commenced on October 25. Rearming Israel could not replace lives lost, but it reestablished Israel’s military deterrence in the wake of hostilities. Between October 14 and November 16, MAC aircraft flew 567 missions to Israel, racking up 18,414 hours of flying time and delivering 22,318 tons of material.
Israel was also supplied by a sealift from the United States. They carried a total of 33,210 tons of materiel, but the first ships did not arrive until five days after the cease-fire.
LEGACY
NICKEL GRASS demonstrated the vital importance of long distance strategic airlift. Because the access to intermediate bases on the other side of the Atlantic had been restricted to a single airfield in the Azores. MAC’s fleet of C-141 transports were upgraded to permit in-flight refueling. The aircraft also demonstrated that it had more lift capacity than cargo volume, so almost every C-141 in USAF’s inventory was rebuilt with a longer fuselage (designated the C-141B).
NICKEL GRASS accelerated the selection and a procurement of a larger aerial tanker. The Douglas DC-10 was chosen to become the platform for KC-10 Extender which carries twice the fuel payload of the KC-135 Stratotanker.
The utility of the C-5A in NICKEL GRASS turned its skeptics into converts. The Galaxy flew only one-quarter of the missions, but delivered half the total tonnage. As a result, additional aircraft were ordered and the entire fleet was overhauled to correct the wing deficiencies.
The Military Airlift Command received much praise for its achievement, but Pentagon and GAO evaluations revealed shortcomings in readiness, integration of multiple commands, coordination with ground logistics and communication between all parties, Subsequent reforms gave MAC more authority over the entire logistic chain. Theater-specific transport commands were unified, and the Tactical Air Command was consolidated with MAC in 1977.
OBSERVATIONS
History does not repeat but it does rhyme. The events of 1973 and 2022 offer some interesting contrasts and comparisons.
1973: Israel was regarded as a western ally, and was armed by the west, but no mutual defense treaty existed between Israel and the U.S. or any European nation.
2022: Ukraine found itself in the same position prior to the Russian invasion.
1973: Military Intelligence indicated that attack was imminent, but the defensive strategy was to take the first blow, leaving no question about who was the aggressor.
2022: Ukraine had warning, but no capacity to strike first (with any significant results). Russia’s aggression was clear and obvious. That help to unify the west around swift and severe sanctions.
1973: The threat of an oil embargo caused Europe to essentially capitulate.
2022: The threat of a Russian gas cutoff in 2022 had little effect on EU resolve.
1973: America escalated cautiously, in hopes of leaving few “fingerprints” on military aid to Israel. 2022: NATO’s escalation of aid to Ukraine has been incremental, but for different reasons: to discredit Russian propaganda about who Moscow is fighting, to let Russia believe that they can win without resorting to WMD, and to undermine Putin’s rule by orchestrating a defeat of Russian aggression by Ukrainians. But NATO has not been shy about aid to Ukraine. Aside from one misunderstanding over Polish MIGs, NATO wants Russia to know who Ukraine’s friends are.
1973: The airlift did not directly turn the tide of battle, and 60% of the resupply arrived after the cease-fire. But the promise of allowed Israel to move from defense to offense by running their supplies down to critical margins.
2022: The initial supply of weapons to Ukraine appeared to be painfully slow. But the mere fact that “help was on the way” allowed UA force to defend and counterattack more aggressively.
1973: American logistics out-performed Russian logistics. MAC airlifted 25% more cargo than the Soviet airlift to Syria and Egypt, in half the number of sorties, over three time the distance.
2022: Ditto.
1973: American skittishness failed to avert an OPEC oil embargo. The embargo did not actually begin until the tenth day of the war, and did not end until March 1974, after Israeli forces withdrew from the west bank of Suez.
2022: Russia has been substantially embargoed by the west, and I expect sanctions and trade disruptions to continue long after the fighting in Ukraine ends (or bogs down into stalemate).
1973. The U.S. supported Israel with reconnaissance gathered over Sinai and Suez by the SR-71 Blackbird (Russia also performed aerial and satellite reconnaissance for Egypt and Syria).
2022: NATO radar aircraft are present near the combat theater. Kyiv has access to commercial satellite imagery and is undoubtedly getting satellite support from the NRO. They’re probably getting intel from NATO and NSA surveillance of Russian communications, too.
1973: The Yom Kippur War broke Egypt’s relationship with the Soviet Union and led to the Camp David Peace Accords.
2022: We may hope that the Russo-Ukrainan War will break Putin’s grip on the Russian people, and lead to another period of peace.
Some day, books will be written about the Ukraine Airlift, the operation will be studied at military academies, and tales will be told by the C-17 aircrews and logistics ground crews. I’m looking forward to it.
Sources:
Wikipedia: Yom Kippur War
Operation Nickel Grass: Airpower Journal, Spring 1989, Krisinger (pdf) Recommended
Nickel Grass: Air Force Magazine, December 1998, Boyne (pdf) Recommended
Operation Nickle Grass: Air Mobility Command Museum, Online article
Operation Nickle Grass: Virtual Jewish Library, Online article
Operation Nickel Grass — The Airlift That Saved Israel: Online article
Additional Reading:
Report to the Congress: Airlift Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973 Middle East War. 1975, Comptroller of the United States. This is a detailed “efficiency report” and financial audit of NICKEL GRASS by GAO bean-counters. Available as PDF
The Two O'Clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel, 2002, Walter J. Boyne, Book, available used or ebook.
Flight to Israel: Historical Documentary of the Strategic Airlift to Israel: Kenneth L Patchin, Office of Air Force History, 30 April 1974 (Military journals cite this report as the official record, but I can’t find it anywhere. It may still be waiting for a FOIA request)
