The only reason Bush has any chance of winning in November is because people think he's "strong on terror." But that couldn't be further from the truth.
In reality, Bush is incredibly weak on terrorism. For example, as Bob Graham lays out in his new book, when the conditions were optimal for us to catch Osama and the rest of the Al Queda leadership, Bush started pulling our assets out of Afghanistan to get them ready for Iraq. In effect, Bush let Osama and the rest of the bad guys go.
Bush is also impotent at fighting wars, as the worsening situations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate.
We need to hammer away by exposing the truth - Bush is weak on terrorism, weak in war.
This is a long, but great article from October's Atlantic Monthly talking about how Bush wasted 2002 and significantly blew our chances of fighting an effective war on terror.
Bush's Lost Year
By deciding to invade Iraq, the Bush Administration decided not to do many other things: not to reconstruct Afghanistan, not to deal with the threats posed by North Korea and Iran, and not to wage an effective war on terror. An inventory of opportunities lost
by James Fallows
Summary:
To govern is to choose, and the choices made in 2002 were fateful. The United States began that year shocked and wounded, but with tremendous strategic advantages. Its population was more closely united behind its leadership than it had been in fifty years. World opinion was strongly sympathetic. Longtime allies were eager to help; longtime antagonists were silent. The federal budget was nearly in balance, making ambitious projects feasible. The U.S. military was superbly equipped, trained, and prepared. An immediate foe was evident--and vulnerable--in Afghanistan. For the longer-term effort against Islamic extremism the Administration could draw on a mature school of thought from academics, regional specialists, and its own intelligence agencies. All that was required was to think broadly about the threats to the country, and creatively about the responses.
The Bush Administration chose another path. Implicitly at the beginning of 2002, and as a matter of formal policy by the end, it placed all other considerations second to regime change in Iraq. It hampered the campaign in Afghanistan before fighting began and wound it down prematurely, along the way losing the chance to capture Osama bin Laden. It turned a blind eye to misdeeds in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and to WMD threats from North Korea and Iran far more serious than any posed by Saddam Hussein, all in the name of moving toward a showdown with Iraq. It overused and wore out its army in invading Iraq--without committing enough troops for a successful occupation. It saddled the United States with ongoing costs that dwarf its spending for domestic security. And by every available measure it only worsened the risk of future terrorism. In every sense 2002 was a lost year.