Idly poking around, I stumbled across congressional testimony from Eric Tolbert, the former Director of the Response Division at FEMA. In it, he describes the Bush administration response to Hurricane Isabel in 2003.
I am no expert in what constitutes a good response to a hurricane (though I think I know a bad response when I see it). And I'm also no expert in not getting bamboozled by deceptive official testimony to Congress. Those disclaimers aside, I have to say that it sounds like Tolbert and FEMA did a pretty good job with Isabel.
October 7, 2003:
Good morning, Chairman LaTourette and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Eric Tolbert, Director of the Response Division of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). On behalf of Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Michael Brown, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the operations of the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA in response to Hurricane Isabel.
More below the fold.
Before continuing with his testimony, look at Tolbert's
qualifications:
Before joining FEMA, Mr. Tolbert was director of the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, where he developed and managed the state's comprehensive emergency management system. He oversaw disaster response and recovery operations for North Carolina after Hurricane Floyd brought the worst flooding in the state's history in 1999. He also organized the division under the Incident Command System structure, instituted intergovernmental pre-planning to expedite the delivery of critical disaster resources, expanded the state's involvement in floodplain mapping, and managed the nation's second largest hazard mitigation grant program.
He began his emergency management career in 1976 as a paramedic in North Carolina, and later became emergency services director for that state's Caldwell County. He then was named state emergency management area coordinator, and later assistant director. Mr. Tolbert then moved to the Florida Division of Emergency Management, where he was preparedness and response bureau chief for four years before returning to North Carolina as state director of emergency management.
A career professional emergency-response coordinator, in other words. Note that although Tolbert's qualifications are still there at the FEMA website, he is no longer Director of the Response Division. He left the government this February, after Bush's reelection (sic). I could not find anything that said why he quit and I don't know what he's doing now. Here are some of his recent quotes:
Several experts said yesterday that a crucial error may have been the failure to predict that the levees holding back Lake Pontchartrain would be breached. It was an omission that appeared extraordinary given the parlous state of the defensive walls and the near certain belief among federal and state officials for years that in the aftermath of a hurricane, New Orleans would be flooded.
Eric Tolbert, a former senior official in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Fema), said that after the Asian tsunami last year: "New Orleans was the No 1 disaster we were talking about. We were obsessed with New Orleans because of the risk."
Sept. 3, 2005
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"What you're seeing is revealing weaknesses in the state, local and federal levels," said Eric Tolbert, who until February was FEMA's disaster response chief. "All three levels have been weakened . . . by diversion into terrorism."
Sept. 1, 2005
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"It's going to be bad," said Eric Tolbert, former chief of disaster response for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. "I have to believe this one (recovery operation) will be larger than Andrew. We're talking about a very intense three- to five-year recovery operation."
Aug. 30, 2005
Since February, the
Acting Director of the Response Division has been Edward Buikema. I checked around a bit--he doesn't seem at first glance to be a horse lawyer or GOP Pioneer (though I confess I'm not good at these sorts of searches). His
qualifications:
Prior to coming to FEMA, Mr. Buikema was Director of the Emergency Management Division of the Michigan State Police. He was responsible for the administration of the state's emergency management system and served as the State Coordinating Officer for presidential disaster declarations. He was an officer with the Michigan State Police for more than 26 years, with responsibilities ranging from law enforcement to serving as the governor's authorized representative for nine presidential-declared disasters.
Thin, but adequate, I guess. Perhaps skewed a little more than I'd like (especially given recent events) toward the police-state/counterterrorism aspects of the job. I don't want to dwell on Buikema though, because "now is not the time to point fingers etc." (Not that I don't encourage anybody who has a google itch to look around.)
Back to his predecessor's testimony about the FEMA response to Hurricane Isabel. Before the "meat," this not-so-brief aside (from the testimony) about FEMA philosophy, history, and a tiny little division of its budget.
Our success in responding to disasters has always depended on our ability to organize and lead a community of local, State, and Federal agencies and volunteer organizations in providing relief.
[...]
The evidence of strong State and local preparations and response to Hurricane Isabel can also be attributed to our long-standing efforts in support of building State and local response capabilities. Ongoing FEMA preparedness initiatives include approximately $165 million in FY 2003 in Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) for State and local government all hazards preparedness and emergency management activities. The EMPG has been critical in improving the effectiveness of State and local emergency management and first responder organizations through planning, training, exercises, and support of operational facilities in sustaining response operations. The EMPG has also been key in supporting mitigation program activities designed to reduce the vulnerability of communities to all hazards.
"$165 million in FY 2003" sounds low to me for all that stuff. This comes up in a quick search for
EMPGs:
[Emergency Management Performance Grant] Obligations
(Grants) FY 02 $132,284,762; FY 03 est $14,921,725; and FY 04 est not available.
Range and Average of Financial Assistance
$410,000 to $10,600,000; $2,377,000.
If those numbers are still correct, a $165 million budget for EMPGs would appear to cover about
seventy average grant awards. That's not too many, if you ask me. I couldn't find a list of the EMPGs that had been awarded, but I also didn't look too hard.
End of that aside. Now, to the meat of Tobert's testimony, which I provide with no further commentary. Since this is a longass quote and we're all busy, I'll boldface what I consider some interesting bits (a form of commentary, I suppose):
Tropical Storm Isabel developed September 6, 2003, some 600 miles west of the Southern Cape Verde Islands. The next day the storm was upgraded to a hurricane and on September 11, 2003, Isabel was upgraded to the first Category 5 Hurricane in the Atlantic basin since Hurricane Mitch in 1998.
Our efforts to place greater emphasis on being more proactive and forward-looking in our preparedness and response operations, with added focus on situational awareness, helped us significantly in preparations for the landfall of Hurricane Isabel. We recognized early on that Isabel would evolve into a significant multi-regional response so we issued an Operations Order on September 15, 2003, four days before landfall, to step up coordination and action planning activities in advance of the predicted landfall. My intent was to make FEMA totally prepared and in the best possible position to rapidly and effectively execute disaster response operations, as directed by the President, in support of State and local jurisdictions.
Operations at our National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) were augmented with activation of the Emergency Support Team (EST) on September 15, 2003, to help coordinate preparation for and response to the disaster. At that time, advance elements of the Emergency Response Team-National (ERT N) were dispatched to FEMA Regions III and IV, and regular schedule of video- teleconferences were initiated with all of the East Coast States from Florida to New England that we anticipated could potentially be impacted by the hurricane. The purpose of the video-teleconferences was to provide storm information and predictions and to facilitate coordination, action planning, and preparations among the States and the District of Columbia, DHS and FEMA Headquarters elements, the White House, the Hurricane Liaison Team at the National Hurricane Center, our Regional Operations Centers (ROC) in FEMA Regions I, II, III, and IV, the FEMA Mobilization Centers, and the Emergency Support Function (ESF) departments and agencies.
The Hurricane Liaison Team, which operated around the clock, was invaluable in coordinating real time meteorological updates and predictions from the National Hurricane Center, the Hydrometeorological Prediction Center, the Southeast River Forecast Center, the Mid-Atlantic Forecast Center, and other National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration components. Beginning September 15th and continuing through the post disaster period, video-teleconferences were conducted at least twice daily to give the affected States and the District of Columbia an open line of communications and the opportunity to raise questions, express concerns, coordinate information, and most importantly, request assistance and resources to respond to the disaster. Advanced elements of our Emergency Response Teams and State Liaisons were dispatched before the storm to the affected States and the District of Columbia to coordinate disaster response activities. Our proactive stance allowed us to largely complete our preparedness activities for the storm, including pre-positioning assets, by Wednesday, September 17th.
Action planning was initiated prior to and continued after landfall of the hurricane. Our priorities focused on developing contingency plans for life support and mass care including sheltering, feeding, and medical care, especially for isolated communities; providing ice, water, generators, and electrical power for critical facilities; arranging mobile feeding sites; establishing Disaster Field Offices and Disaster Recovery Centers; implementing individual and public assistance activities; and removing potential sunken vessels and assessing coastal erosion.
In preparation for the disaster, FEMA Logistics continuously monitored the availability of supplies to ensure that levels on hand would be adequate to meet immediate response requirements. Before Isabel made landfall, FEMA pre-positioned hundreds of tons of emergency disaster supplies in mobilization centers in the disaster areas. Five "Advanced Initial Response Resources Deployment (AID) Packages" were available and three were pre-positioned. Each AID package consisted of 10 trailers containing cots, blankets, emergency meals, portable toilets, plastic sheeting, bottled water and generators. Our Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) capabilities played a critical role in supporting the disaster response mission: MERS assets from Thomasville, Georgia were deployed to support activities in North Carolina; and the Denver, Colorado and Denton, Texas MERS supported activities in Virginia.
We established mobilization centers at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, and Edison, New Jersey, and staging areas at Ft. A.P. Hill, Virginia, and Columbus, Ohio. Ft. A.P. Hill was subsequently converted to a mobilization center and when operations were discontinued there a mobilization center was established at Ft. Eustis, Virginia to continue operations. Many of the other assets which we pre-positioned came from throughout the eastern United States and were also critical to launching an effective response including: Rapid Needs Assessment Teams; the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Disaster Medical Assistance Teams; Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces; Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Materials Teams; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Energy, and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Teams; and other assets.
In addition to all of the pre-positioned assets mentioned above, we provided a FEMA liaison, an EPA Hazardous Materials Team, five HHS Teams, a Regional Emergency Transportation Coordinator Team, five U.S. Forest Service Teams, a Department of Energy Team, and multiple GSA assets to support Washington, D.C. Two EPA Hazardous Materials Teams were pre-positioned at the Maryland State EOC in Reisterstown, Maryland, along with FEMA liaisons and elements of FEMA's Emergency Response Team and a Rapid Needs Assessment Team. Three EPA Hazardous Materials Teams, two HHS Teams, a U.S. Forest Service Team, a Department of Energy Team, and seven U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Teams were dispatched to Richmond, Virginia, to support the Commonwealth of Virginia.
DHS, through FEMA, the Coast Guard, and other emergency response elements, coordinated a massive Federal response to millions of citizens throughout the mid-Atlantic region impacted by Hurricane Isabel. The greatest need in this disaster was for power, ice, and water. The response demonstrates our successful integration of numerous assets, once used for a specific, more narrowly defined mission, for an all-hazards purpose. The Hurricane Isabel response illustrates that the asset integration and coordination has improved the Department's ability to protect the American people in time of crisis. For example:
- The U.S. Coast Guard supported FEMA and State and local agencies with aircraft, boats, and personnel flying missions in support of recovery efforts. Vessels and aircraft assessed aids to navigation and damage to ports and waterways, and were used to detect and respond to pollution incidents.
- The DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) provided imaging support through its surveillance planes that enabled us to survey the extent of damage, and better plan for and target the restoration in heavily damaged areas. For example, the NC Highway 12 breach was identified. The BICE Office of Air and Marine Interdiction provided airplanes for aerial remote sensing and infrared imaging damage assessment missions in the Outer Banks area immediately following the hurricane. This allowed a quick assessment of isolated populations and facilitated our life saving and safety missions and our assessment of damages/breaches to the barrier islands, property, and infrastructure. Having access to the BICE and Coast Guard capabilities gave us for the first time ever management planning and support for air operations.
- Four Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces were deployed as "Type III" Light Task Forces with 28 personnel each, designed for rapid deployment to a hurricane-impacted area. Task Forces from Ohio and Indiana were pre-positioned in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and Task Forces from Tennessee and Missouri were pre-positioned at Ft. A.P. Hill in Virginia. One of three USAR Incident Support Teams deployed to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and USAR Rapid Needs Assessment liaisons were dispatched to the North Carolina State Emergency Operations Center in Raleigh, North Carolina, and the Virginia State Emergency Operations Center in Richmond, Virginia.
- As part of the NEOC operations, DHS officials continuously monitored 15 sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, including the most vulnerable critical infrastructures such as electricity, telecommunications, water, and transportation and supported private sector efforts to resume critical power and water services in all the impacted areas.
- The U. S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service supplied food to disaster relief organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army.
- In coordination with FEMA, the HHS emergency response teams deployed to damaged areas to assist State and local officials evaluate the status and accessibility of hospitals, check water and sanitation quality, and monitor public health needs. FEMA's National Disaster Medical System teams provided critical medical assistance to isolated populations on the Outer Banks.
When Hurricane Isabel made landfall on North Carolina's Outer Banks on the morning of September 18, 2003, it was a very powerful Category 2 hurricane. The storm packed winds close to 100 mph accompanied by heavy rain and storm surges of up to 11 feet above normal tidal levels. The winds, rain, and storm surge from Isabel created a huge area of destruction that includes extensive coastal flooding and lowland flooding, more than a million customers without power, damaged homes and businesses and tens of thousands of displaced residents. Forty deaths have been attributed to the Hurricane.
OK. It seems I can't resist a little commentary in the form of questions.
Was any of this preparation and proactive response stuff done for Katrina? If it was done, why didn't it work? If it wasn't done, why not?! Is the difference in response, if any, related to having a policeman as the Acting Director for Response at FEMA? Or with the fact that Isabel hit the east coast (the Outer Banks!) and Katrina hit the Gulf? Doesn't reading that testimony make you kinda wish that Tolbert was in charge?
[Updated for paragraph breaks--what's the deal with paragraph breaks?! a few minutes after posting. I hope I got them all right.]