On October 31, 2005, Canadian officials announced that viral subtype H5 was found in wild ducks in
Quebec, Manitoba and then on November 1, in
British Columbia as well. They attempt to assuage fear by pointing out that the birds in question were healthy, so the bird flu most likely isn't H5N1, neglecting to mention that ducks can be asymptomatic and thus have become the migrating carriers spreading the disease worldwide.
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In the first article, please note:
Canadian officials said additional testing of samples taken from the birds -- 28 in Quebec and five in Manitoba -- should indicate by the end of the week whether the viruses are of the H5N1 subtype or another H5 variety.
Some privately questioned why Canada went public with the findings before it could say definitively what subtype or subtypes it had found and whether they were linked in any way to the Asian H5N1 viruses.
Officials of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency said the decision was taken to go for maximum transparency. Waiting for the viruses to be fully typed would have meant keeping the findings secret for over a week, said Dr. Jim Clark, acting director of the agency's animal health and production program.
"We don't want to take that particular approach. Open and transparent, give you what we know, the best information available," he explained.
And also:
The H5N1 in Asia is a high path virus; so was the H7N3 virus that caused the massive outbreak in British Columbia's Fraser Valley in 2004.
Notice that results for the N subtype were expected within a week. Notice also that private pressure has been applied to the Canadians.
Notice also that the usual frequency of H5 in Canadian wild birds has historically been 7% or less. The frequency in the British Columbian samples is apparently 24%.
Henry Niman of Recombinomics has this to say:
The H5N1 wild bird flu has been well characterized and full sequences of genes from isolates from Qinghai Lake and Novosibirsk are publicly available, so determining the relationship between the H5 in Canada and those isolates in Asia or Europe should not be difficult.
<snip>
Thus, H5 serotypes in Canada a rare, raising concerns that the 33 H5 isolates are HPAI H5N1. Recent data suggest H5N1 wild bird flu may be linked to human infections in Hunan, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Sequencing of the HA cleavage site is routine and should be available in hours. Since RRRKKR is specific for H5N1 wild bird flu from Asia, an answer on the concerns linked to H5 in Canada should be answered soon.
Now, the samples from which the H5 subtype, which must be announced as per international agreements, were taken in August. If the birds had followed their usual migratory route south, then, as Henry Niman suggests, these birds would be in the US by now.
(Download a map of the migratory bird flightpaths here: http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/...)
So, what are the Canadians saying now about the N subtype?
"We're finding lots of different ones, including N1s. ... which is really not surprising because we've known from before that those different antigenic types are out there," Plummer said from Winnipeg.
"But knowing which goes with which is impossible from the soups that we have right now. It's just going to take some more time to sort it out."
<snip>
"The sequencing's been problematic because the RNA is mixed up," he said.
"And it makes it difficult because you get two sets - or three sets - of sequences from this one sample. And they're all jumbled up. It's very hard to sort out."
"Say if you get an H5 and an N1, and an H7 and an N3 from a sample, you don't know which H goes with which N."
Clark said final results could be some time off - and it is conceivable all the viruses may never be fully subtyped.
"It could be months. Let's face it. Trying to get that pure virus may prove to be completely elusive. We may never get it."
Which makes me wonder: if they're seeing a mix of H5s and H7s and N1s and N3s, wouldn't it make sense that the H7 goes with the N3 for the H7N3 left over from last year's outbreak (mentioned above) and the H5 goes with the N1 that flew over the usual migratory routes into the Western Hemisphere from Asia? But alas, the Canadians are preparing us to never know, as per the last sentence of the above quote.
Meanwhile, Niman isn't buying it. There are apparently several well-established ways to tease out the truth. After all, the Rumanians, the Turks, and others have been able to do it in a few days. And now there's a way to test that takes only one day.
Could it have anything to do with pressure from a $29 billion industry right before one of their blow-out holidays? Nah...
Indeed, we are seeing a sudden increase in stories on the poultry industry and their potential losses (http://www.thepoultrysite.com is full of them), and they now have their very own "Don't worry, be happy" website. After all, cooking even an infected bird to 160 degrees F. should kill the virus, hence the ever-present "properly cooked" caveat to safety reassurances. But the preparer has to handle the raw bird and could run into trouble if they have cuts on the hands or if juices or blood gets onto other foods via counters, cutting boards, utensils or hands. Indeed, in my readings of bird flu cases, preparation and eating of infected birds was a recurring theme in Asia.
The infection is spread via excreta and persists in water. Who can say when poultry flocks become infected by migrating birds?
Meanwhile, in China, the same folks that broke the SARS story unofficially are saying that there have been 310 bird flu deaths and thousands of people quarantined in China this year, a number of the cases human to human. Niman comments, saying that official Chinese reports actually lend credence to the unofficial reports of widespread fatalities. The Chinese authorities have only recently reluctantly admitted to having human cases.
Are we seeing parallels? What do you think? Should I adjust my tin foil hat?