So much of the debate over the idea of Libertarian Democrats has focused on the individual wants and desires of commentators and responders. People who are opposed to the idea of Libertarian Democrats lash out at the discussion and state their strong opposition to such an agenda, even when such an agenda is not yet defined. For this diary, I would like to step back from the personal opinions and try to determine if there are any trends we can uncover that reveal the plausibility of future Libertarian Democrats.
Part I: Foreign Policy Today
According to recent surveys from the Pew Research Center, "Foreign affairs assertiveness now almost completely distinguishes Republican-oriented voters from Democratic-oriented voters; this was a relatively minor factor in past typologies."
This new phenomenon replaces an older system. According to Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center, "When we did this 1987, it was mostly about the ways Republicans and Democratic groups differed on attitude towards government; now it's more consistently on how they differ on foreign policy - on an assertive foreign policy."
This is bad news for politicians who find themselves on the wrong side of the divide (Lieberman and maybe Hagel). But it should be good news for the idea of Libertarian Democrats, as libertarianism is an ideology opposed to the initiation of the use of force. As opponents of the Iraq War and the entire military-industrial complex (Oh, if only Democrats had ads like this!), we'd expect that the libertarian-leaning voters who don't settle for the Libertarian Party to look favorably on candidates opposed to the Iraq War. Too bad we blew it with John Kerry as our nominee. Hopefully we'll learn our lesson for 2006 and 2008.
Part II: The Changing Economic Divide
So maybe you'll admit that in the short term, libertarians may find a temporary home in the Democratic Party as they ally with us against the neoconservative agenda of militarism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. But to play devil's advocate, maybe the rise of foreign policy as a divide is just a cover for the deeper divide between the two parties on the economy. We'll turn to the Pew Research Center again.
For the Democrats, this is still generally true. We find that the Democratic coalition (Liberals, Conservative Democrats, and Disadvantaged Democrats) are united by supporting government intervention in the economy. What divides these are social and personal values. So it seems that the Democratic Party is united by economic liberalism, but divided between a socially liberal wing and a socially conservative wing. At least for now . . .
On to the Republicans. You'd think that if the Democrats were united by economic issues, the same would be true for the Republicans. Right? Not so fast. The Republican base is divided into Enterprisers, Social Conservatives, and Pro-Government Conservatives. According to the Pew, "The Republican base is split over beliefs about the role of government, not surprising given the fact that we have Pro-government Conservatives. The GOP bigger tent now includes many poor people who favor an activist government. We looked to back in 1987: There were very few poor people in two Republican groups, Enterprisers and Moralists. We now have a significant number of poor people on the Republican side."
So we have a Republican Party united by social issues and a Democratic Party united by economic issues. We wouldn't be surprised to find that the Democratic Party has a liberal wing (socially and economically liberal) and the Republican Party has a conservative wing (socially and economically conservative). What is perhaps surprising is that both parties have a populist wing (socially conservative and economically liberal) but neither party has a libertarian wing (socially liberal and economically conservative).
What this means is that the foreign policy divide is not covering up an economic divide.
Part III: The 2004 Election
OK, so how does all of this translate to the 2004 election. Well, the Pew also has a more recent study out that lumps Americans into four ideologies and a centrist category.
No surprise, John Kerry won the liberal group 88% to 8%. George W. Bush won the conservative group 80% to 17%. On the surface, good news for Kerry, especially since liberals are 18% of voters (matching up nicely with the other study from the Pew that says that Liberals are 19% of voters and 92% of them are Democrats or Lean Democrats) and conservatives are only 15%.
The largest category were the centrists, or ambivalents, at 42%. They went to Bush narrowly 52% to 47%.
So each party seems to be ignoring libertarians and focusing on populists. And even I will admit that there's a case to be made that this makes sense; populists are 16% while libertarians are only 9%. But what was the result of this system? Bush won both populists and libertarians (two polar opposite groups) by almost the same margin! Populists went to Bush 57% to 41%, while libertarians went to Bush 57% to 40%.
If the idea that both parties have a populist wing, but neither party has a libertarian wing, didn't blow your mind, than Bush's ability to win landslides in two totally opposite groups should.
John Kerry ran a campaign that attempted to reach out to populists by focusing on economic self-interest. We can see from the start that he was focusing on them as a swing vote, from his early VP list (John Edwards or Dick Gephardt) to his campaign's emphasis on health care and rolling back the Bush tax cuts. Nevertheless, he lost them in a landslide.
Eventually, it's time to admit failure.
Part IV: What's the Matter with Kansas? And South Carolina? And Indiana? YEAARGH!!
So what do we do when we come up with a group of voters who seem to have the options of voting based on their economic self interest (Democrats) or their values (Republican) and they pick the latter by strong margins?
We admit that maybe, just maybe, that even if foreign policy is a big divide between the parties, partisanship is also strongly determined by social identity. As the Pew observes, "[W]hen it comes to explaining partisan affiliation, income is a relatively weak demographic indicator. It is only about half as important as church attendance, and just a third as important as race." Chris Bowers ties this all up nicely by finding connections between partisanship, social identity, and foreign policy.
This helps explain the rise of the Pro-government Conservatives. It is the natural product of the culture war being waged today. Conservative Democrats, socially conservative but economically liberal, represent a dieing breed in American politics.
Part V: The Libertarian Future?
Is a populist revival within the Democratic Party possible? Perhaps, but the party may wish to first look at generational trends. Within the 18 to 29 age cohort, populists make up the smallest percent (14%) while libertarians are the largest (33%). Democrats would be swimming against the stream to convert populists to the party, and doing so may paint themselves into a corner in the future. Populists may out number libertarians now, but not forever.
What we may be watching in American politics is a two-part dance. The first part was the rise of the Pro-government Conservatives, which has many Republican-leaning libertarians very unhappy. The fiscal record of the Bush Administration is a joke, a total joke. Libertarians who once leaned to the Republican Party are unhappy, but so far the Democratic Party hasn't reached out to them. Faced with John Kerry, a Democrat that not only ignored them but didn't even seem to provide a contrast with Bush on the War or the Patriot Act, they held their noises and voted for Bush 57% to 40%.
But imagine if the Democrats actually nominated someone who reached out to libertarians. It wouldn't take much. Just uphold social liberalism when the Religious Right begins to attack. Oppose the Iraq War and the Patriot Act. And maybe, just maybe, talk about ways you'll cut wasteful government spending. After 8 years of Bush, there's plenty of pork to cut. Part two of the dance, the shift of libertarians into the Democratic Party, would begin.
Part VI: The Logic of Libertarian Democrats
Voters that lean toward libertarianism are already on the same side of the foreign policy divide as liberals. They also are on the same side of the culture war. The evidence at hand indicates that these two divides typically trump economic issues. The lack of a large number of Libertarian Democrats so far may be due to the recent development of these two divides, within the last twenty years. They have yet to have their full impact on American politics.
I haven't mentioned other trends, but I will one last one briefly. The decline of manufacturing and the rise of service industries is reducing class consciousness. As people move to work in offices or other high-skilled service jobs, they are more likely to identify with the management of their company and less likely to view the economy as a class war. This may make them more open to an emphasis on the common good and broad base economic growth, but it makes them less receptive to the old rhetoric of the New Deal Democratic Party. The Democratic Party must adapt to this and the result is more likely to be an economic agenda mixing liberalism and libertarianism than a populist revival.