Well, I just received my copy of
Fiasco, so I guess is time to write my review of Cobra II. Luckily for me the authors resumed the administrations blunders in the epilogue. Nice touch if you ask me. Lets see what we got:
The Misreading of the Foe
According to the book Rumsfeld and his generals misread the opposition in their mad dash to decapitate the Iraqi leadership. As the authors put it:
But from the first day of the invasion the United States was not fighting a purely conventional war...The attacks by the Fedayeen...demonstrated...that the American-led coalition was contending with a decentralized enemy that was (1)fanatical, (2)not dependent on rigid command and control, and (3) and whose base of operations was dispersed throughout the towns and cities of Iraq.
COBRA II, Epilogue, page 499
So while the planners in CENTCOM and the Pentagon concentrated in defeating the Iraqi regulars and the Republican Guards, it was the Fedayeen/insurgents/irregulars that proved to be the biggest hurdle against an American victory.
The Overreliance on Technological Advancement
Rumsfeld insistence on his transformation doctrine did allow the American forces to do more with less. But as the authors point out, it was not the panacea that the Pentagon thought:
But after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the requirements were reversed: mass, not speed, was the requisite for sealing victory. Military technology was less decisive against an opponent that faded away into Iraqi cities only to fight another day.
COBRA II, Epilogue, page 500
Technology also tended to warp CENTCOM view of the battle. The ability to track individual armor units in real time gave the impression of a battlefield dominated by the god's eye view of the computer screen. The overall combat commander, Gen. McKiernan is quoted thus: "Blue Force Tracker (the name of the tracking system on board American military vehicles) drives the CINC (Gen. Tommy Franks)". On the screens CENTCOM HQ, the Army and Marine units seemed to be stuck, while the reality on the ground was that soldiers and marines where grappling with a surprisingly brave (if not always efficient) enemy, that seemed to pop out of nowhere. As another military commander noted; there was a disconnect between Qatar and the battlefield. "McKiernan wants to control the battlespace (deal with the Fedayeen and secure his rear areas). CINC says to keep moving."
The Failure to Adapt to the Developments on the Battlefield
Here lies the heart of the problem for the U.S. in Iraq. While American servicemen learned from earlier battles and adapted accordingly, their higher ups in CENTCOM and the Pentagon refused to do the same. Simply put, the "plan" was set in stone and to question it was the highest sin:
Tommy Franks never acknowledged the enemy he faced nor did he comprehend the nature of the war he was directing. He denigrated the Fedayeen as little more than a speed bumb on the way to Baghdad...Franks threatened to fire Scott Wallace, the V Corps commander, when he noted publicly that his soldiers were battling a different enemy than the one that had been featured in the military's war games.
COBRA II, Epilogue, page 501
Furthermore, Franks falsely claimed credit for winning the war, when we all know that has yet to happen, and may never happen. Rumsfeld is also blamed for talking from both sides of his mouth. On one hand he talked about preparing for the unexpected, on the other he brooked no arguments or deviations on his plans. Simply put, it was his way or the highway.
The Dysfunction of the American Military Structures
Here the authors paint a picture of a severe lack of leadership at all levels. Lack of coordination meant that the troops on the ground where left largely to fend for themselves in how they dealt with such things as the looting of Baghdad. Nobody challenged the premise that the war in Iraq would be a cake walk. It seem that the mood in Washington was to go along to get along. Even those that had issues with the plan, like Shinseki and Powell, failed to put enough pressure on the breaks to slow or even stop the runaway train.
Here is where the authors and I depart. Rumsfeld played whack-a-mole with the Pentagon leadership from day one. His infamous "snowflakes" where nothing short of bureaucratic anvils falling on the heads of those who dared to challenge him or his golden boys (Feith and Wolfowitz). Frontline detailed the way Rumsfeld fought to turn the Pentagon into his own personal fiefdom. The yes-men where in, the real operators where out. In a sadistic turn of fate, Rumsfeld became the new LBJ, the new micro manager, while Bush became a lesser version of McNamara, watching the war from afar, believing that as far as Iraq goes, there would always be a light at the end of the tunnel.
The Bush Administration's Disdain for Nation-Building
"There was no plan" was and still is a common refrain among the critics of the Bush administration's handling of occupation. However the authors believed that this was not a blunder but in fact a deliberate policy by the White House:
Many critics have assailed the administrations for lapses in planning. But it is striking how much of the United States postwar strategy was the product of careful deliberation. The failure to organize a civilian constabulary for immediate duty in Iraq was not an oversight...senior administration officials decided they would not be needed and decided to rely on the Iraqi law enforcement apparatus. The cost of reconstructing postwar Iraq was assessed at no more that $ 3 billion, which assumed that Iraq would soon be on its feet and able to pay its own way.
COBRA II, Epilogue, page 506
In other words, Bush did not believe in nation building and thought that the war could be fought on the cheap. Faith based policy won the day and led directly to the disaster that is Iraq today. It is the conclusion of Michael Gordon and General Trainor that the insurgency was not an inevitable outcome of the invasion. The effort was handicapped from the start by people who did not understand what they where getting into. The problems where compounded by the same people who willfully ignored (and continue to ignore) the realities on the ground.
On the whole the book is well written and gives loads of insight on how the war was fought. While many of us watched glimpses of firefights and reruns of "shock and awe" strikes, the real war was far different. However, in their desire to avoid the taint of partisanship, they miss the primary reason behind the war and its failure. They do come close:
The United Stats needed to more to demonstrate that there were serious consequences for mounting an attack on the U.S. and to show it would not suffer unsavory governments that where affiliated with terrorist. Rumsfeld was advocating a demonstration of American power.
COBRA II, Snowflakes from the Secretary, page 19
Yes, Iraq was meant to prove a point.