From OU Prof. Keith Gaddie of soonerpolitics.com
[editor's note, by Bledsoe]
I was so impressed with this article, I wanted to post it for all. Gaddie is a Republican political consultant, but runs a non-partisian blog. I am sorry if this post is too long or if there are copyright issues. I looked to see if there was a copyright notation and could not find one.
Greg Bledsoe, Tulsa, OK
August 3 2004
What Would Churchill Do?
Is it permissible to change horses in midstream of war? And, if war is
made the primary political issue of the season, is it permissible to
campaign on it? E. J. Dionne raises this question in his most recent
column, dated August 3, noting that John Kerry will campaign in a
reactive environment of terror alerts, wherein the incumbent
administration will make the War on Terror its centerpiece issue.
At the same time, the incumbent administration will also argue: (a) one
should not change administrations in the midst of a war, and (b) that
one should not criticize the conduct of a war by the government,
because it is unpatriotic to do so. The history of human existence
demonstrates otherwise, however, and when war is not effectively or
competently waged, it is not only permissible but obligatory to both
criticize and to effect change.
For the purpose of our discussion here, I'll pull from an old case and
some old players held in great esteem in our folklore: Great Britain
and Winston Churchill .
However, the Great Britain I will speak of is
not the Island That Stood Alone in 1940, and the Churchill I will speak
of is not the old Bulldog who became Prime Minister. No, instead the
Britain is that of World War I, and the Churchill in question is the
same man, but at the time the 41-year-old First Lord of the Admiralty.
The entry of Great Britain into World War I was not necessary in the
eyes of many members of the Liberal government. However, one advocate
was Winston Churchill, the youthful First Lord of the Admiralty, second
only to the prime minister in power. Sitting on the Treasury Bench in
Parliament, Churchill advocated decisive action in support of the
French and Belgians, Belgium being the key to the security of the
English Channel and of Great Britain . He organized the defense of
Antwerp , personally overseeing this futile effort, and also organized
the innovative yet unsuccessful effort to turn the Central Powers flank
at the Gallipoli Peninsula to secure the Dardanelles . He basically
invented the tank, but met resistance to its effective deployment.
These plans did not succeed because the government provided
insufficient resources and support. Churchill was ultimately ousted at
the Admiralty.
Throughout the first three years of World War I, the incumbent
government of Herbert Asquith was under increased pressure to do more
than it was on the Western front, including pressure from within his
government by Churchill and War Secretary David Lloyd George. The
military and the media conspired to keep information about casualties
out of the hands of the public, leading to allegations that they
"sneaked the bodies of fallen men into London so as to not provoke the
ire of the public." Legitimate reports in the foreign press were
criticized as propaganda, to the extent of the denial of the deaths of
hundreds of thousands of men in arms. Asquith's government, while
verbally committed to success in the war, was unwilling to innovate or
fully commit to a draft; was allowing John French and later Douglas
Haig to throw away men and material using Napoleonic tactics; and
teetered on the brink of capitulation to the Germans. The existing
reserves were exhausted. Any effort to publicly criticize Asquith and
his government was deemed inappropriate in time of war and unpatriotic.
Any public critics were treated as Churchill, covered in mud by the
smear machine and driven from politics.
Asquith's government would ultimately fall when a group of Liberals led
by David Lloyd George conspired with the Conservatives to fell the
Asquith government and to instead raise a unity government composed of
Conservatives and Liberals. Churchill, in disgrace, nonetheless
supported this move in part as an opportunity to regain power (indeed,
at the Admiralty he had been positioning himself to fell Asquith before
Asquith felled him). Part of the impetus for the fall of the government
was a special commission report that absolved Churchill of any
negligence or guilt related to the Dardanelles , and instead fixed the
blame on the government. Eventually the Tories would even agree to the
return of Churchill to the cabinet as Minister of Munitions, and a
variety of policy changes would be effected to institute a more
efficient execution of World War I (though not as efficient as
Churchill envisioned, as old generals were hard to change).
World War I was a fundamentally new war, glimpses of which had been
viewed in the Boer War of 1898-1902 and the Russo-Japanese conflict of
1905. It was a war wherein technology trumped old tactics, and the
establishment military was called on to change, ever so reluctantly and
not very successfully, to accommodate and react to the new technology
of war. However, when the war was faltering, and confidence was
eroding in a secretive and stubborn government, the minority party and
other dissidents challenged that party, openly and at risk to their
very political survival. And Great Britain likely survived in part
because of the change (the arrival of 1 million American troops also
played no small role, and again David Lloyd George did his part as he
got along much better with Woodrow Wilson than Asquith ever did, or
indeed could have hoped to).
There is a lesson for us all. No incumbent administration in a
representative Democracy is above criticism for its conduct of foreign
affairs, or, indeed, any conduct. In times of war especially, a
vigorous debate can save lives, displace ineffective or wrong-headed
leadership, and provide new innovations to a speedy resolution of the
conflict. The current administration in Washington is campaigning on
the conduct of war, in an environment of uncertainty and perceived
insecurity. The Bush Administration is very touchy about criticism of
the conduct of war, though there is ample cause to be critical.
There is no precedent for not being critical in time of war, and there
are many precedents for changing leadership in war when the leadership
isn't getting the job done. But the new guy must have a better plan.
When the time came again to challenge leadership in his own party,
Churchill, alone in the wilderness of Tory majority of the 1930s, would
build his case for defense and vigorous conduct against Germany. He
posed plans, alternatives, and solutions, and was relentless in his
intrigue and his efforts. He turned the House of Commons into a
battleground for saving Anglo-Saxon civilization as he knew it, and was
rewarded first with a return to power (the Admiralty again), and then
with the Prime Minister's post when Neville Chamberlain's government
fell after the May 1940 German offensive (a second case of mid-stream,
war-time change in leadership). Mr. Kerry has yet to demonstrate how
his ideas are more innovative, better, or will be more successful than
those of the incumbent administration. And this is the lesson that Mr.
Churchill learned from himself that Mr. Kerry needs to learn if he
wants to succeed.