"Political correctness" (PC) is largely a meaningless catch-all term for demonizing liberals, which came into vogue in the early 1990s, just as the collapse of the Soviet Union finally took all the wind out of the "commie" slur. But it actually originated among leftists, primarily on college campuses, to refer to the practice of humorlessly putting the minutia of form over the substance of justice—particularly by members of sectarian groups such as the American Communist Party or any of its various Trotskyite or Maoist rivals, often referred to as "the PC police."
Sometimes the politically correct had a point, but no sense of perspective. Sometimes they didn’t even have a point—beyond, of course, their real point, which was to impose a uniformity of thought and expression among the groups’ followers, and to establish a presumed moral superiority. Here at DKos, we recently had a really pernicious PC outbreak—pernicious because (1) it didn’t even have a point and (2) it served to suppress serious consideration of potentially very important, fruitful insights.
Note: I wrote my first draft of this diary almost 2 weeks ago, but a couple of viruses (one mine, one my computer’s) and work responsibilities delayed my posting till now. Although the initial incident—seemingly minor—has been overtaken by much more momentous events in the meantime, the underlying issues go directly to our ability to discuss aspects of the ongoing culture war. This, in turn, goes directly to our ability to freely discuss how capitalize on the political opening we have all worked so hard to help create. Hence, I believe it still warrants our attention.
Background
The PC attack, initiated by diarist AaronBa, was directed against an article at Huffington Post by Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist Jane Smiley (A Thousand Acres, Moo, Horse Heaven), "Jane's Bingo! Award for Most Informative Book of 2006." The attack began when I brought up Smiley’s article in the discussion of AaronBa’s diary "On Two Conservative Student Writers", and continued in a diary he posted as a followup, "Jane Smiley and the Scots-Irish" specifically directed at her article.
As Smiley explained, "My only criterion for the Bingo! Award is that, once I have read the book, I think about it every subsequent day, saying to myself--oh!" For anyone familiar with Smiley’s work, that’s high praise, indeed. Smiley’s not just an unabashed liberal from the heartland (born in Los Angeles, but raised near St. Louis, Missouri, taught for years at Iowa State), she takes heartland people and culture as her principle subject matter. Consider what she wrote last year about A Thousand Acres at Huffington Post:
In the late eighties, I wrote a novel called A Thousand Acres. Everyone thought it was about incest and "King Lear". To me, those were plot elements that I was using in service to the theme, which concerned the transformation of the midwestern American landscape from a unique, diverse, and rather fragile natural ecosystem that supported methods of European animal and grain farming imported by German, English, and Scandinavian farmers during the nineteenth century to a denuded and lifeless "food" factory in which a few crops (corn, soybeans, hogs, and beef) and the money that could be made from them pushed every other consideration of human endeavor and biodiversity to the margins, or snuffed them out entirely.
So when Smiley says that a book stays with her like that—that "I think about it every subsequent day, saying to myself--oh!"—that tends to get my attention. "By this criterion," Smiley writes, "the only book on my reading list for 2006 that qualifies is Albion's Seed, by David Hackett Fischer, Oxford University Press, 1989, 946 pages and everyone of them a pleasure to read."
Fischer’s Thesis In Albion’s Seed, and AaronBa’s PC Attack
So what’s it about? Smiley explains:
Fischer's thesis, in Albion's Seed, is that the four major emigrations from England to the US came from four distinct regions and cultures in England, set sail at four different periods of English history, and settled in four different US regions. These cultures have remained more or less distinct; they have set up the structures of American political and cultural life; and they have often rendered Americans inexplicable and hostile to one another. What is most important, from my point of view, is that one of these cultures has taken over American life, denigrating and threatening all of the others, and that it was almost inevitable that it do so. Hackett wrote the book in the eighties, when the four cultures seemed to be in balance. My view is that now, fifteen years later, if we don't come to understand how these subcultures work in American life, we will be unable to regain the democracy we have often (but not always) had in the past.
If Smiley’s right, obviously this is important stuff. This is stuff that everyone in the blogosphere ought to be talking about. So it seems only sensible to give her a fair hearing, at the very least.
But not for AaronBa.
You see, one of the four cultures—the one Smiley says "has taken over American life" is one he owes his allegiance to, although in a somewhat different, narrower version. And he is not happy to have outsiders talking about it. Even if—as Smiley makes clear—what she’s writing about and what he’s defensive about are actually two different, though related, things. AaronBa is defensive about Scots-Irish Appalachian culture, which is the origin point for one the four cultures Fischer describes. But, as Smiley explains:
"It is important to remember that these cultures are no longer inheritance-based or even regionally-based. They have become affinity groups, and Americans define themselves, increasingly, by their allegiances. They also use their cultural allegiances to define "America" and the right and proper form that patriotism must take.
The form of AaronBa’s allegiance is quite different from George W. Bush’s—but not in one respect: it fiercely resists any hint of self-examination. And that’s a bad thing, IMHO.
As Smiley makes clear, she’s talking about self-defined affinity groups, with a specific emphasis on their political implications, while AaronBa is talking about blood and culture—particularly the folk culture of Appalachia. The two are not unrelated, of course. But Smiley goes out of her way to make the point that the cultures today are adoptive, having dispersed far from their original roots—that Appalachian Al Gore has adopted the New England-based Puritan culture, while New Englander George W. Bush has adopted the Appalachian-based Scotch-Irish culture. AaronBa will have none of this, though. He clings to an affront that is not there, willfully misreading Smiley—ignoring her, in fact—because, one hazards, he is insecure and conflicted about his own cultural heritage. Welcome to the club. It’s a common condition in America today.
Aaron Ba couches his resistance in typical PC terms. What if it were Jews we were talking about, he asks me several times. How would I feel, he asks? But Jews themselves write and talk about Jews that same way all the time. I mean, all the time. And we engage with others who write about us that way as well. Indeed, we encourage people to see us in terms of our cultural and political history. If anything, we do too much of it.
The offenses AaronBa sees are not in Smiley’s writing, but in his culture’s extreme defensiveness. And the fact that he floats a facile comparison between Jews and Scots-Irish (even though Smiley’s subject isn’t ethnically defined) merely underscores how stereotypically his own thinking is: Saying X, Y, Z about a Scots-Irish-descended cultural tradition is exactly the same as saying X, Y, Z about Jews. There is no consideration of historical and cultural contexts—contexts that give the same sorts of discourse entirely different meaninigs and significance.
Doing Social Science vs. Stereotyping
Before looking at what Smiley wrote, we need to make an important distinction:
(1) Sociological and cultural characteristics. These are characteristics of an identifiable group that can be statistically identified as either dominant, or as significantly different from broader norm of larger groups of which they are a part, or that constitute structurally significant aspects of group organization. Group characteristics such as kinship structures, courtship and childrearing practices, organization of social hierarchies, and religious beliefs and practices and their normative impacts on the group at large are among some of the most basic characteristics studied by cultural anthropologists.
Some such characteristics can only be described in group terms (a kinship structure, for example) while other characteristics can be described at the individual level (what defines a "good father," say). They may be physical (basketball players tend to be tall) as well as behavioral. Such characteristics must be objectively true. A mistaken description of kinship structures, for example, cannot be a cultural characteristic of a group. Finally, the purpose of talking in terms of such characteristics—including their historical origins and systematic relationships—is to enhance understanding. What appears as essential and immutable is revealed as an historical and cultural product, which has already changed from its original form. This not only combats harmful stereotyping from without. It also empowers current cultural agents to further modify their culture, without feeling that they are abandoning or betraying it. More generally, by recognizing different patterns that hold true of different groups and subgroups to differing degrees, we create more efficient models of human behavior and motivation, which makes it more possible to recognize to recognize and appreciate both typical and atypical behavior.
(2) Sociological and cultural stereotypes. In contrast, sociological and cultural stereotypes may or may not be objectively true. They can be based on applying one groups set of assumptions to another group, or on justifying some pre-existing prejudice or desire, or even on pure whimsy. Even when true, a stereotype functions to (a) represent a relatively common characteristic as a universal and defining characteristic, (b) thus obscuring or denying individual autonomy and group variance, (c) and obscuring or denying the true historical and systematic sources of those characteristics.
In short, understanding in terms of characteristics de-essentializes culture, empowering individuation and choice for all concerned. "Understanding" in terms of stereotypes essentializes culture, trapping all concerned in fruitless, repetitive patterns. (But, then again, some cultures seem to like fruitless, repetitive patterns.)
While the underlying purpose of studying and talking about sociological and cultural characteristics is to create comprehensive, multi-faceted descriptions of how different characteristics interact and inter-relate, the purpose of employing stereotypes is generally to reduce complexity. Rather than knowing members of another group individually, and appreciating them as individuals, they are categorized through stereotypes, so that individual characteristics need not be considered. Thus, stereotypes need not be inherently negative. They need only be reductive. By the very nature of how groups operate, any group will tend to develop some stereotypical images of other groups it comes into contact with—whether it be high school cliques, different professions, opposing political parties, or different racial, religious or ethnic groups.
While the two phenomena are clearly distinguishable in their extremes, an obvious grey area exists. It’s not always clear whether an accurate group description is being used to elucidate or explain away, for example. There is, therefore, a need to not stereotype language which may superficially seem stereotypical. For example, when groups have long related to each other via stereotypes, artists, comedians and others who work at breaking down stereotypes often employ stereotypes in order to reveal their inadequacies. While it may be legitimate to question such strategies, particularly on a case-by-case basis, it is mistaken to see no difference between such activity and the everyday thoughtless use of stereotypes.
Smiley’s Run-Down of Fischer’s Four Cultures
With that distinction in mind, let’s turn to what Smiley wrote, and see for ourselves if she is stereotyping, or describing group characteristics.
Smiley’s piece is 3700 words long. Roughly a third, 1200 words, is devoted to her summary of Fischer’s four cultures. The leading things she writes about the first three are as follows. You are encouraged to click the link, and read her descriptions in their entirety. I cut each description off just before her discussions of child-rearing, except for the Quakers.
1. Puritans from East Anglia to New England, 1629-1641. Characteristics in both England and America: Calvinist, family-oriented (the ratio of men to women was 3-2, rather than 4-1, as in Virginia), highly motivated, closely related to one another, intently focused on moral principles and precepts, urban, and generally middle-class and highly literate. Women were not equal, but they were relatively independent agents who entered into the marriage contract, could be divorced, could inherit, and often were powers in the community....
2. Cavaliers and Indentured Servants from the south of England to Virginia, 1642-1675. Characteristics in both England and America: Anglican, status- and wealth-based, highly hierachical, focused on familial inheritance rather than community, rural, with an emphasis on large estates. Women were legally possessions rather than agents and often referred to as "breeders", but were prized for beauty and fiery independence....
3. Quakers from the North Midlands to Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 1675-1725. Characteristics in both England and America: Quakers and Quaker sympathizers were both anti- hierarchical and anti-doctrinal. They believed in a God of love, not punishment, and did away with rituals, sacraments, and professional ministers. Communities of Quakers were ethnically diverse and had strong ties to communities with similar beliefs in Europe; they were welcoming to the large number of German immigrants who came after them, but not welcoming to the next set of English immigrants, the North Borderers (see below). Quakers tended to be working-class.... People tended to be independent, egalitarian, rural, plain-spoken, and receptive to unorthodox religious ideas. In America, Quaker families were love-oriented rather than rule- or status-oriented, and more child-nurturing than other English cultures; husbands and wives were more or less equal, based on the idea that "in souls there is no sex" (p. 490). [Emphasis added]
These are all, quite plainly, descriptions of social and cultural systems—religious beliefs, settlement patterns, class status, gender relations and family structure. Portions not quoted tend to deal with childrearing, attitudes toward government, the rule of law (including punishments) and conceptions of liberty. The role of conscience is described for Puritans and Quakers, while the nature of the Quaker’s English origins warrants a few sentences. In short, it’s all about group characteristics. It has nothing to do with stereotyping.
I now quote her description of the fourth group in full:
4. Scots-Irish "New Light" Protestants from the Border Counties and Ulster to the Appalachian Backcountry, 1717-1775. Characteristics in both Britain and America: Mean as a snake and twice as quick...oh, excuse me. I am losing my judicious tone. Let me begin again. Scots-Irish immigrants from the northern parts of Britain and from Ulster were generally fleeing what was an increasingly archaic, warrior-based society. Most were tenant farmers or the tenants of tenants. As Irishmen and Scots, they had built up years of economic resentment and Celtic pride with regard to their English neighbors and landlords.
The social arrangements of the Borders grew out of the constant warfare (1040-1745) between Scotland and England over who owned the borderlands (remember that the Act of Union that made Scotland part of England was only enacted in 1707). Men on both sides of the border were expected to be alert and aggressive, ready to fight at a moment's notice. When the kings of England and Scotland weren't fighting, local warlords were. Tenancy was based on the ability to fight, and the economy was primitive compared to other parts of England. Keywords: poverty and violence. The legal system relied on vengeance and the economic system relied on protection money.
Through the 17th century, the Borders were "pacified", which as we all know is actually a process of singling out the most independent warlords and putting them to death as an example to the others (gallows were placed on hilltops, so that the hanging bodies could be seen from far and wide). Absentee English landlords also got rid of tenants by means of exorbitant rent increases (rack-renting), land enclosure, construction of new roads, and imposition of new laws. Throughout the 18th century, the Borderers came to America, more or less, as refugees from forced modernization (where have we seen that before?)
Their religious beliefs were diverse on the surface, but shared an underlying intensity and tribal character--they were believers, simultaneously, in grace and sectarian conflict. As Fischer writes, "The North Britons brought with them the ancient border habit of belligerence toward other ethnic groups." [p. 632] The Quakers would not allow them to settle nearby, and they moved west in Pennsylvania, then south through the Appalachians. Clannish, suspicious, well-armed, and believers in "bride abduction" (!) as a good method of courtship. In marriage, men dominant, women absolutely subservient, and wife beating considered normal. Rage a typical (if not desired) feature of child-raising; beatings common. Religion--"emotional, evangelical, and personal", deeply informed by superstition as a method of folk wisdom for avoiding ever-present injury and death. You can see what I'm getting at.
Once again, it’s all about group characteristics. It has nothing to do with stereotyping. There is no essentializing of group characteristics. No submerging of individuality behind group characteristics, either, since there’s no discussion of individuals at all in these passages. They are group descriptions—a typical feature of social science discourse.
It is clear from this description that Smiley is, how shall we say?—not enamored of Borderers. ("Mean as a snake...") But she doesn’t try to hide behind false objectivity. She also shows sympathy as well as loathing—spelling out precisely what "pacification" meant, for example. Indeed, Smiley’s passage on the Scotch-Irish is longer than the others, and devotes much more attention to the brutal historical background that shaped their culture. This is the opposite of the essence of the stereotyping impulse, which is to essentialize aspects of culture, which are actually responses to specific historical conditions and events.
Conclusion
This, then, is Smiley’s basic rendition of Fischer’s cultural typology. She goes on to discuss specifically applying it to understanding our situation today—a subject I’ll take up in another diary. Among the objections AaronBa raises is that such a typology involves "extraordinarily questionable generalizations," that it is too "facile," too "simplistic," too "limiting." AaranBa says this directly about Fischer (mostly in the comments)—whom he has not read—though he claims he’s only talking about Smiley’s description. This confusion about who and what he’s objecting to (particularly as commentator Pletzs exposes—see the thread starting here, for example) appears to be symptomatic of a broader confusion that permeates his whole discussion of this subject.
Either way, however, there is a valid point here. Any attempt to reduce American culture to a mere four factors is bound to oversimplify. The question is, as Les McCann & Eddie Harris put it, "Compared to What?" Compared to binary, ahistorical talk of "red states" vs. "blue states," it seems silly to dismiss Fischer’s work as simplistic. Furthermore, there is no reason to limit oneself to Fischer’s typology. (Fischer himself is working on a book about Black contributions to American culture.) Photographers use multiple filters, lenses, and shot angles to render different views of a single object. No one choice is meant to exclude all others. Why should it be any different for us? The only thing that limits our options is the conscious refusal to consider them—which is what AaronBa has done, not David Hackett Fischer, not Jane Smiley, and not me.
Why do I care so much? One reason, above all: I think Smiley is onto something. Something very important. I think that binary attempts to understand our politics, devoid of historical and cultural context are doomed to failure. I think that the four traditions Fischer identifies represent highly significant aspects of our collective public life. I think his work can open up possibilities for further insights and a richer, more productive political dialog. And I think that—despite AaronBa’s unpromising start—the Scots-Irish themselves have a place in this dialog. I think that dialog is possible, despite the fact that the Bush Administration’s hostility to dialog—as well his hostility to the reality-based community—is perhaps best understood in terms of the Scots-Irish fighting tradition. I am more hopeful than Smiley that dialog may be possible—but only if we first have some notion of who the different dialog partners are, and the sorts of things that divide them.
At over 3,000 words, I’ve gone on long enough. But I’ve got much more to say on the subject, both about what Smiley has to say, and my own ideas as well. The best proof that AaronBa is badly mistaken is to show just how fruitful this sort of discussion can be.