The "dumbest fucking guy on the planet," as Douglas Feith was called by Gen. Tommy Franks, was charged by Paul Wolfowitz, shortly after 9/11, with looking for "state sponsors of terrorism," and that "soon turned into a quest for signs of collaboration between Al Qaeda and Iraq," according to TPM Muckraker's preliminary report on today's release of the Pentagon Inspector General's report. [UPDATE: rgdurst posted the summary link.] The Senate Armed Services committee held an open/closed hearing at 9:30am ET with Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General for the Department of Defense, as its sole witness.
It's highly useful to look at the interview of Ty Drumheller, former CIA chief of European operations and a 25-year CIA professional, by Der Spiegel, republished in Salon:
The agency [CIA] is not blameless, and no president on my watch has had a spotless record when it comes to the CIA. But never before have I seen the manipulation of intelligence that has played out since Bush took office. As chief of Europe I had a front-row seat from which to observe the unprecedented drive for intelligence justifying the Iraq war.
Larry Johnson reviewed Drumheller's new book, On The Brink, at his No Quarter blog in October. Larry wrote:
[B]eyond a look back at what went wrong with Iraq from an intelligence perspective, Tyler offers a devastating critique of how the Bush Administration has engaged in an unprecedented politicization of the CIA. In corrupting the intelligence community the Bush Administration has put the nation at greater risk and hobbled an important government resource.
Here's more from Drumheller's interview reprinted in Salon (questions are in italics) -- note how he tried to warn the administration against using Curveball's dubious claims -- and, below, there are his observations of Condoleezza Rice during an important meeting:
One of the crucial bits of information the Bush administration used to justify the invasion was the supposed existence of mobile biological weapons laboratories. That came from a German BND source who was given the code name Curveball. An official investigation in the United States concluded that of all of the false statements that were made, this was the most damaging of all.
I think it is, it was, a centerpiece. Curveball was an Iraqi who claimed to be an engineer working on the biological weapons program. When he became an asylum seeker in Germany, the BND questioned him and produced a large number of reports that were passed here through the Defense Intelligence Agency. Curveball was a sort of clever fellow who carried on about his story and kept everybody pretty well convinced for a long time.
There are more than a few critics in Washington who claim that the Germans, because of Curveball, bear a large part of the responsibility for the intelligence mess.
There was no effort by the Germans to influence anybody from the beginning. Very senior officials in the BND expressed their doubts, that there may be problems with this guy. They were very professional. I know that there are people at the CIA who think the Germans could have set stronger caveats. But nobody says: "Here's a great intel report, but we don't believe it." There were also questions inside the CIA's analytical section, but as it went forward, this information was seized without caveats. The administration wanted to make the case for war with Iraq. They needed a tangible thing -- they needed the German stuff. They couldn't go to war based just on the fact that they wanted to change the Middle East. They needed to have something threatening to which they were reacting.
The German government was convinced that "Curveball" would not be used in the now-famous presentation that then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave in 2003 before the United Nations Security Council.
I had assured my German friends that it wouldn't be in the speech. I really thought that I had put it to bed. I had warned the CIA deputy, John McLaughlin, that this case could be fabricated. The night before the speech, then-CIA director George Tenet called me at home. I said: "Hey, Boss, be careful with that German report. It's supposed to be taken out. There are a lot of problems with that." He said: "Yeah, yeah. Right. Don't worry about that."
But it turned out to be the centerpiece in Powell's presentation -- and nobody had told him about the doubts.
I turned on the TV in my office, and there it was. So the first thing I thought, having worked in the government all my life, was that we probably gave Powell the wrong speech. We checked our files and found out that they had just ignored it.
So the White House just ignored the fact that the whole story might have been untrue?
The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming, and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy. Right before the war, I said to a very senior CIA officer: "You guys must have something else," because you always think it's the CIA. "There is some secret thing I don't know." He said: "No. But when we get to Baghdad, we are going to find warehouses full of stuff. Nobody is going to remember all of this."
In your book, you mention a very high-ranking source who told the CIA before the war that Iraq had no large active WMD program. It has been reported that the source was Saddam Hussein's foreign minister, Naji Sabri.
I'm not allowed to say who that was. In the beginning, the administration was very excited that we had a high-level penetration, and the president was informed. I don't think anybody else had a source in Saddam's cabinet. He told us that Iraq had no biological weapons, just the research. Everything else had been destroyed after the first Gulf War. But after a while we didn't get any questions back. Finally the administration came and said that they were really not interested in what he had to say. They were interested in getting him to defect. In the end we did get permission to get back to the source, and that came from Tenet. I think without checking with the White House, he just said: "OK. Go ahead and see what you can do."
So what happened?
There were a lot of ironies throughout this whole story. We went on a sort of worldwide chase after this fellow, and in the end, he was in one place, and our officer was in another country asking for permission to travel. I called up people who were controlling operations, and they said: "Don't worry about it. It's too late now. The war is on. The next time you see this guy, it will be at a war crimes tribunal."
Should you have pressed harder?
We made mistakes. And it may suit the White House to have people believe in a black-and-white version of reality -- that it could have avoided the Iraq war if the CIA had only given it a true picture of Saddam's armaments. But the truth is that the White House believed what it wanted to believe. I have done very little in my life except go to school and work for the CIA. Intellectually I think I did everything I could. Emotionally you always think you should have [done] something more.
And Doug Feith is eagerly pointing out that the Inspector General has called his manipulations "inappropriate" but not unlawful? (From the Washington Post today, via TPM Muckraker's summary today of stories in the WaPo and McClatchy Newspapers)
On that meeting with Condi:
So there was no clear guidance of what is allowed in the so-called war on terrorism?
Every responsible chief in the CIA knows that the more covert the action, the greater the need for a clear policy and a defined target. I once had to brief Condoleezza Rice on a rendition operation, and her chief concern was not whether it was the right thing to do, but what the president would think about it. I would have expected a big meeting, a debate about whether to proceed with the plan, a couple of hours of consideration of the pros and cons. We should have been talking about the value of the target, whether the threat he presented warranted such a potentially controversial intervention.
This was no way to run a covert policy. If the White House wants to take extraordinary measures to win, it can't just let things go through without any discussion about their value and morality.
... without any discussion about their value and morality ...
That sums it up pretty damn well.
Yesterday's indicators were that the IG's report would be a bit "softball", but we will see what Sen. Carl Levin, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Sen. John Rockefeller, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, have to say about the report's contents in the days to come.
I don't see a hearing scheduled by the Select Committee on Intelligence on the IG's report. But, reports the New York Times today:
But the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, said in a statement that because the inspector general considered the work of Mr. Feith’s group to be “intelligence activities,” the committee would investigate whether the Pentagon violated the National Security Act of 1947 by failing to notify Congress about the group’s work.
[...]
The Senate Intelligence Committee, meanwhile, is completing work on its own investigation into the use of intelligence by policy makers in the months before the Iraq war. Under Republican leadership, it had delayed an examination of Mr. Feith’s activities pending the outcome of the inspector general’s report.
And it appears that the IG was perhaps influenced by a rebuttal to his report brought by the Pentagon:
The Pentagon’s rebuttal vehemently rejected the report’s contention that there was “inappropriate” use of intelligence by Pentagon civilians and said the effort to identify links between Saddam Hussein’s government and Al Qaeda was done at the direction of Mr. Wolfowitz, who was deputy defense secretary at the time.
Describing the work as a “fresh, critical look” at intelligence agency conclusions about Al Qaeda and Iraq, the Pentagon rebuttal said, “It is somewhat difficult to understand how activities that admittedly were lawful and authorized (in this case by either the secretary of defense or the deputy secretary of defense) could nevertheless be characterized as ‘inappropriate.’ ”
The Feith operation dates to shortly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, when the Pentagon established a small team of civilians to sift through existing intelligence with the aim of finding possible links between terror networks and governments. Bush administration officials contended that intelligence agencies were ignoring reports of collaboration between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
By the summer of 2002, the group, whose membership evolved over time, was aimed at identifying links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq.
The inspector general’s report criticizes a July 25, 2002, memo, written by an intelligence analyst detailed to Mr. Feith’s office, titled, “Iraq and al-Qaida: Making the Case.”
The memo said that, while “some analysts have argued” that Osama bin Laden would not cooperate with secular Arab entities like Iraq, “reporting indicates otherwise.”
The inspector general concluded that the memo constituted an “alternative intelligence assessment” from that given by the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies and that it led to a briefing on links between Al Qaeda and Iraq that was given to senior Bush administration officials in August 2002, according to excerpts of the draft inspector general report quoted by Mr. Edelman.
It is not clear whether the inspector general revised his report after receiving the rebuttal.
The draft inspector general report said Mr. Feith’s office should have followed intelligence agency guidelines for registering differing views, “in those rare instances where consensus could not be reached.”
In his statement Thursday, Mr. Feith said he was pleased that the inspector general had cleared him of violating laws or Defense Department policies, but he called it “wrong” and “bizarre” for the report to criticize civilian officials for scrutinizing intelligence agency conclusions and passing along their findings to senior officials.
It's "wrong" alright. It's "bizarre" too to manipulate the weakest possible intelligence into a rationale for an ELECTIVE WAR that has cost over 3,100 American lives and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives.
And it was all done, as Ty Drumheller said so eloquently, "without any discussion about their value and morality."