George W. Bush's speech over two weeks ago in Anbar province prompted a flare of optimism among Democrats throughout the country, reagrdless of the fact the arming of Sunni tribes there has little to do with the sectarian rifts that the Iraqis most overcome. Although General Petraeus did acknowledge this in the Iraw War Report, the likely withdrawal of about 30,000 troops, as well as the prospect those currently in Anbar province could be moved elsewhere, little was mentioned of Afghanistan, where the real mission has been put on hold for over a half a decade now.
Time to Follow the Brits into Afghanistan.
It's not often that anyone, particularly Democrats who have long hoped for an end to the War in Iraq, will walk away from a speech saturated with misconceptions such as who precisely was fighting with Al Qaeda, or a stark ambivalence over what step to take next, feel very optimistic. After all, indecision over how to conduct a war is something you'd expect to hear from one of the 2004 Democratic presidential candidates, not a president, as stubborn as George W. Bush is, who at the very least, seems to have some type plan going forward in Iraq.
That is because not only did Bush insinuate the possibility of a possible withdrawal from Anbar province after declaring it, "one of the safest places in Iraq", but the speech could not have been timed better, as while Bush flirted with a new term to the war on terror- flexibility- British troops were simultaneously continuing their withdrawal of Basra Province.
And yes, this comes in the wake of the sixth anniversary of one of the darkest days' in our nation's history.
Due to the fact I was toiling in elementary school on 9/11, I am forced to rely upon books and TV to grasp the emotional fallout following September 11 th; it was a mixture of unity and reluctance; determination and fear. Images of World War two infiltrated our minds because everyone seemed onboard to fighting "The right war", our president vowed to capture those responsible, and we would not "distinguish between those who gave aid and comfort to terrorists and the terrorists themselves," but we could not shed the feeling that many of us felt insecure about our long term national security.
Nevertheless, we did, indeed, launch a grand scale invasion of Afghanistan on October 7 th, 2001, with relative ease. The Taliban, at least temporarily, was seemingly destroyed, while a group of NATO ambassadors walked the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan as though no resistance had ever existed.
Only a strange thing happened during the invasion of Afghanistan: Despite destroying the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, the architect of the September 11 th attacks, managed to slip his distinctive figure across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Bush's partisans will point to President Musharaff's insistence that the U.S. not deploy ground troops, but it seems inconceivable as to why the Bush administration would tell NATO forces that they not "dictate the coalition", while practically handing over that precise responsibility to Musharaff. Perhaps Bush was simply ignorant about what it would take to ascertain that Bin Laden be captured. More likely, the administrations predisposition to invade Iraq eliminated the prospect of deploying the necessary amount of ground forces to Afghanistan.
And we all know what happened next. Republicans and Democrats alike drove us into Iraq recklessly, and in hindsight, unnecessarily. Like Thomas Jefferson imposed the Embargo Act of 1807 in his poor mans attempt to simply shun away the threat posted by the tyrant Napoleon and the formidable Royal Navy, ignorant of the exorbitant consequences it would come to have on the young nation's economy, we repeated this same offense by invading Iraq. The American people still felt an immense amount of insecurity following 9/11, propelled by the unrealistic need to defeat the idea of terrorism. As the German philosopher Lactantius attested, "Where fear is present, wisdom cannot be."
Regardless of who or what to blame over the adversaries and mistakes we made in both Iraq and Afghanistan, our efforts in Afghanistan were undermined following the invasion of Iraq. We were, at first, unable to provide Afghan president Hamid Karzai the necessary military force to provide security beyond the capital of Kabul, resulting in the resurgence of the Taliban in the Spring of 2003. The CIA's most skilled officers were also sent to Iraq. Washington spent just 3.4 billion a year when it came to rebuilding Afghanistan, half the amount we spent on Iraq. The Taliban has since expanded suicide and roadside bombings throughout the country.
Only now, the situation is different; for an army used to be stressed so thin since the commencement of the War on Terror, we now have the type of flexibility when it comes to deploying troops that we never had. This is not to say that the number of troops stationed in Anbar province, (Under the "surge" strategy, 4,000 additional troops were sent to the once violent province) should they be redeployed to Afghanistan would make a dramatic difference. It would, however, set the tone for a larger deployment of resources to Afghanistan within the foreseeable future. In addition, right off the bat, it would likely achieve two important preliminary objectives: Win over the necessary public support from the people of Afghanistan by ostracizing the use of U.S. air strikes, which would, inadvertently, also win back the support of British commanders, who currently have the predominant of troops stationed in Afghanistan, a fact that will only increase following Britain's withdrawal from Basra Province.
. With Al Qaeda, who once posed a serious threat to the takeover of control in Basra province, now routed, it simply makes little sense to continue to keep troops in the province. The thought of, in Bush's words, "Sunnis who once fought side by side with al Qaeda against coalition troops now fighting side by side with coalition troops against al Qaeda", is far less glorious than it sounds. There is no reason to keep troops there out of fear for sectarian rifts- one of the main purposes of the surge- considering Anbar's provinces miniscule 3,000 Shiite population. Since the Central Government of Iraq fails to provide basic services to its' people, such as household fuel supply among other things, it will come down to whichever of the 31 Sunni Tribes in Anbar province wins the battle, and ultimately support, of the people there. In addition, despite the U.S. support Sunni tribes have received there dating back to the beginning of 2006, there are still high tensions between the two, and the Sunnis have always had a high resistance to the U.S.'s occupation. It is strictly a Sunni-Sunni affair, something that the U.S. should not take part in.
I am not talking about a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq or any significant withdrawal for that matter, but instead a more pragmatic idea. The growing resentment of the War throughout the American people shows that we are ready to move on from Iraq, and start to question just what exactly our mission should be.
You can contact Matt at: matthimelfarb@gmail.com