The report from the National Intelligence Council that is making the rounds on the news (and discussed by devilstower here) is titled "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World" and purports to be a series of best estimates by government and non-government experts of the directions in which the world will be going over the next 17 years. There are sections devoted to energy, global warming, the fall of the nation-state, geo-strategic shifts, and so on. All in all, a big-picture-lover's toy store.
However, the report is not what it claims to be. It is in fact a series of warnings to Barack Obama to toe a hawkish, status-quo line.
I will provide an example of what I mean (a particularly hilarious one, I think) from the pdf and then discuss the larger point being made between the lines of the NIC report.
The 120 page pdf includes 4 short stories written as if by different people living in the future, under different global scenarios. For example, in one, the President in 2020 discusses a hurricane striking New York City, forcing the relocation of the NYSE to New Jersey (the future president writes, "it might have to change its name to the "Garden State (New Jersey) Stock Exchange"—wouldn’t that be a blow to New Yorkers’ pride!"). In another, and this is the one I will quote from at length, we read a "Letter from Head of Shanghai Cooperation Organization to Secretary-General of NATO." In this scenario, China and Russia dominate the geo-strategic world in 2015 because the United States and NATO . . . pulled out of Afghanistan. Page 58:
Letter from Head of Shanghai Cooperation Organization
to Secretary-General of NATO
June 15, 2015
I know we meet tomorrow to inaugurate our strategic dialogue, but I wanted to share with you beforehand my thoughts about the SCO and how far we have come. Fifteen to 20 years ago, I would never have imagined the SCO to be NATO’s equal—if not (patting myself on the back) an even somewhat more important international organization. Just between ourselves, we were not destined for "greatness" except for the West’s stumbling.
I think it is fair to say it began when you pulled out of Afghanistan without accomplishing your mission of pacifying the Taliban. I know you had little choice. Years of slow or no growth in the US and West had decimated defense budgets. The Americans felt overstretched and the Europeans were not going to stay without a strong US presence. The Afghan situation threatened to destabilize the whole region, and we could not stand idly by. Besides Afghanistan, we had disturbing intelligence that some "friendly" Central Asian governments were coming under pressure from radical Islamic movements and we continue to depend on Central Asian energy. The Chinese and Indians were very reluctant to throw their hats into the ring with my homeland—Russia—but they did not have better options. None of us wanted the other guy to be in charge: we were so suspicious of each other and, if truth be told, continue to be.
The so-called SCO "peacekeeping" action really put the SCO on the map and got us off the ground. Before that, it was an organization where "cooperation" was a bit of a misnomer. It would have been more aptly called the "Shanghai Organization of Mutual Distrust." China did not want to offend the US, so it did not go along with Russia’s anti- American efforts. India was there to keep an eye on both China and Russia. The Central Asians thought they could use the SCO for their own purpose of playing the neighboring big powers off against one another. Iran’s Ahmedi-Nejad would have joined anything with a whiff of anti-Americanism.
-- snip --
In the end, these events [mostly a rise in U.S. protectionism] were a godsend because they forced Russia and China into each other’s arms. Before, Russia had been more distrustful of China’s rise than the United States. Yes, we talked big about shifting all our energy supplies eastward to scare the Europeans from time to time. But we also played China off against Japan, dangling possibilities and then not following through. Our main worry was China. Fears about China’s overrunning Russia’s Far East were a part of it, but I think the bigger threat from our standpoint was of a more powerful China—for example, one that would not forever hide behind Russia’s skirts at the UN. The Soviet-China split was always lurking too. I personally was angered by endless Chinese talk about not repeating Soviet mistakes. That hurt. Not that the Chinese weren’t right, but to admit we had failed when they might succeed—that struck at Russian pride.
But now this is all behind us. Having technology that allowed for the clean use of fossil fuels was a godsend. Whether the West gave it to us, or as we were accused of doing, we stole it, is immaterial.
. . . and so on. If the President-Elect Obama is getting advice from a group of intelligence agencies (or at least their leaders) that regards this as something other than slightly hilarious, then I hope the new President will also take advice from more reality-based sources; Tom Clancy, say.
But this short story is merely an example of an overall pattern. At all points, the goal of "Global Trends 2025" is not to provide a realistic look at the next couple of decades but rather to provide a series of warnings about what will happen if the United States does not dominate them.
The report contains notable absences. Of rising threats of nuclear war in the next era, we are given India, Pakistan, Iran, and terrorists, but no hint that the United States might engage in a first use.
Warned of international conflicts caused by energy scarcity; the United States is again, here very noticeably, absent as a disputant. Amusingly, we are assured that we have not seen conflicts over energy "for awhile" but that they "could reemerge" in the future. Page x of the introduction:
Types of conflict we have not seen for awhile—such as over resources—could reemerge. Perceptions of energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regimes. However, even actions short of war will have important geopolitical consequences. However, even actions short of war will have important geopolitical consequences. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water naval capabilities. The buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water becoming more scarce in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to become more difficult within and between states.
Um, yeeeeah. I think there might be a key national player in the worries just listed, and I think the writers of this report know it . .. being citizens of it and all.
The overall message of "Global Trends" is that the international arena is growing more complicated; nation-states are losing influence; global warming is real; and the economy is problematic. In other words, the same messages the blogosphere has been putting out since its inception. The difference is that the NIC report leaves a noticeable absence at the center -- the rotor of this whirly-gig. It was and will continue to be United States actions that generate many of the threats to world-wide stability, in the U.S.'s quest for eternal "stability," a code word for dominance. Whether President Obama can read between the lines of the advice he is being given, and see that this quest is destined to result in its own failure, will be of central importance.
One of the jobs of the blogosphere -- which collectively knew all this, already, and saw without ideological blinders more clearly what it meant and means -- is to continue pressing the message that yes, all this is happening, and yes, the United States can be part of the solution; but one thing it must do is to stop being part, or at least such a major part, of the problem.