So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China.
For some time now, I have been wanting to read a long article from the New York Times Sunday Magazine titled "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony", kick the tires, maybe offer an unsolicited opinion. Writing detailed diaries has not been my style in the short time I've been posting at Daily Kos (typical posts lead here), so today, I figured I will change things up a bit.
When I saw the headline "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony" roll by a few weeks ago, on Memeorandum of all places, I decided I'd wait to read the blogospheric summaries and reactions until after I'd read the article and jotted down some thoughts. Below the fold, a few impressions.
First, I'll try to sum up the general thrust of the article for those who may not have been able to read the whole thing. My own inexact interpretation of key assumptions and assertions made by the author might look like the following:
Since its unipolar moment, following the fall of the Soviet Union, the position of the U.S. in the world has declined. The U.S. is not likely to experience another unipolar moment.
This decline is attributed, in part, to imperial overstretch, and in part to the counter-balancing actions of other nations.
The U.S. is losing, in the geopolitical marketplace, to Europe and China. Together, this trio ("The Big Three") will vie for power and influence for the foreseeable future.
There are roughly "three hemispheric pan-regions, longitudinal zones dominated by America, Europe and China", with overlapping networks and systems that grow and evolve as globalization progresses.
The geopolitical chess game is playing out, and will continue to play out predominantly in the Second World.
Russia, India, the Middle East are considered Second World nations, unable to compete, or influence events at the same level as The Big Three.
Swing States are Second World nations and/or consolidated regions of the same, that can, and do influence the balance of power among The Big Three in ways they deem beneficial to their own strategic interests.
One of the overriding imperatives of the Swing State is to prevent one single member of The Big Three to achieve unrivaled dominance over it. By playing The Big Three against each other skillfully, a Second World nation may reduce the likelihood of being absorbed into a single sphere of influence, continue to extract concessions from all three, and hopefully improve its position while retaining autonomy.
Presumably, The Big Three will seek to expand their power and influence at the expense of Swing States if it gives them advantage in relation to their rivals, but this does not seem to be the conclusion of the article, rather one that could be inferred from the assumptions about Swing States.
This is the bare skeleton of the article, which the author fleshes out using numerous First and Second World examples. Before looking at the state of play among The Big Three and Second World nations, I think it might be useful to assess the implications of the first two tenets. Admittedly, the summary I provide reflects my own reading of the article and is likely to be fallible, but I do not believe it to be an unfair representation. Too simplistic? Perhaps. Missing important points? Obviously. But I'm not trying to set up straw men, just riff off what I've read.
It's hard not to agree with the first assertion, that the U.S., as a superpower, is on the wane. This article does not, however, offer any real analysis of the decline, or attempt to explain more precisely what "imperial overstretch" entails (for an excellent historical treatment of this phenomenon, steal this book).
The article essentially begins from the starting point of a multipolar world, where the U.S. could not regain unipolar hegemony even if it studiously learned from its recent failings. This may be an accurate view, and an appropriate place to begin for the purposes of this article, but I might have begun with a fuller initial recounting of those reckless economic, diplomatic, and militaristic policies that conspired to bring the U.S. so low, so fast. Perhaps that is covered in the book, which I have not yet read.
I'm of the opinion that the fall from grace of the sole superpower should not, in the pages of history, be treated as if it happened in a void, as merely a natural regression that overtakes all "empires". The causes and effects should be examined, and the findings assimilated into future policy making.
A question for the author might be, if the U.S. and its foreign policy elites cannot do this, how does it expect to hold its own as a member of The Big Three, let alone aspire to make an unlikely comeback as the dominant power in a unipolar world? A question for readers here might be, should America aspire to such a goal in the first place?
Of course I am missing the point, which seems to be that the systems of an alternate world order are developing fast, and already beyond control or influence of the United States, but I don't see why the projected U.S. strategy will necessarily be monolithic or preordained on this score (I may be misinterpreting the author's intended portrayal). If the countries that the author analyzes in the piece can operate skillfully to maximize their potential, and it is a good bet they will try, then it does not follow that the U.S. must concede the premise from the beginning that it cannot rise again to the position of sole superpower. Surely Europe and China's strategic thinkers would not hamstring their gaming of the future in this way. Without making judgments on the value of the aspiration to dominate, benevolently or otherwise, it seems that ruling out the possibility is a non-starter for a significant number of the established foreign policy community.
[barbs and withering criticism of said clerisy to be expected, and encouraged]
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I'm going to end it here for now, a basic summary of a few of the central ideas behind the article, followed by a gut reaction to the same...maybe later on I'll quit being a quitter and analyze more closely the examples provided, instead of reacting generically to whatever tangent appeals. Feel free to point out any misinterpretations or lapses in comprehension. Like I said, I'm rusty as hell at this, and was never very good at it in the first place.
For the record, the article is worth reading, and fairly interesting, if you have time.