For the last few decades Democratic presidential candidates have faced a situation much like stepping in as a pinch hitter with two strikes against you; unless Ross Perot commits a catcher’s balk, things don’t look good. The problems, similar to those I faced in elementary school, are geography and math. Realistically, a Democrat must nearly sweep the Northeast, the West Coast, and win major states in the Midwest. After defending their "home turf," our nominee must win two of the three large swing states: Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Simply put, as things stand every four years we play a dangerous game of chicken with Rev. Ronald Podhoretz-Falwell; and the odds are stacked against us.
This is the first installment of a three part series addressing the issue of national voting patterns. It will overview experiments and data underlying major theories of voting behavior. The second episode will examine media effects and media markets. The final (and least theoretical)diary will examine the political landscape of 2008 and comment on the Obama campaign with regards to the possibility of a...
I'm going to throw a very scary word out there: Realignment. There, I said it. Let’s all take a second, breathe, and get ready for some graphs.
A realignment is a major shift in the electoral landscape. Depending on how you define it, there have only been about four or five realignments in American history; the most recent example of which is the Republican domination of the South in the post civil rights era. How and when these occur is a matter of scholarly debate. To explain realignment, a political scientist must account for changes in individual voting patterns en masse that occur along regional lines. One’s view of this phenomenon will depend on their theory of individual voting behavior. There are a number of reasons to think that an electoral victory is possible for the Democrats in 2008: a tanking economy, record levels of disapproval for a sitting president, an unpopular war, and unparalleled primary turnout, to name a few. However, in this diary I will survey some of the relevant literature to explain why I believe 2008 has the potential for even more; a Democratic realignment.
American Voting Behavior
(in 500 words or fewer)
As indicated the primary question that underlies this inquiry is, how do people decide whom to vote for? While there are alternative theories of voting behavior the Michigan, or Social Identification, Model is particularly well evidenced. This theory holds that partisanship is an important part of one’s self conception. It is unlike ideology which is relatively flexible and open to adaptation. The better comparison, the theory holds, is to a religion; one may dislike a week's sermon or even a new clergyperson chosen at their place of worship. However, they are unlikely to convert on account of this. Partisan identification, like Religious affiliation, is an identity constituting construct. On account of this, switching parties requires a radical change in one's self conception. As described in Partisan Hearts and Minds (Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler):
"Partisan identities are enduring features of citizens’ self-conceptions. They do not merely come and go with election cycles and campaign ephemera." (Green 4)
"In 1965, respondents were asked to answer a question about their political partisanship: ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?"... [in 1980] Ronald Reagan received votes from 89.5% of those who in 1965 labeled themselves Republicans... these sharp partisan differences eclipse corresponding sex, class, or religious effects." (Green 2-3)
Andrew Gelman and Gary King’s article "Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?" provides further evidence of this position. They plot coefficients that represent the strength of each indicator (party, ideology, race and region) for voting preference in the 200 days leading up to the 1988 presidential election. The difference between self identified Democrats and Republicans is both far more significant and stable than region, race and most notably ideology.
Note the y axis coordinates vary between graphs.
This difference is understood in the context of an experiment conducted by political scientist Wendy M. Rahn in an article titled "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates." Rahn held a series of experiments in which voters were presented with two candidates and given their policy positions. They were divided into four groups. In two, the candidates' policy positions were consistent, on the others they were not. Then, half of the subjects were given partisan identifications for the candidates. The voters who were given a partisan identification, when asked to restate the candidates policies in the inconsistent cases, would correct them to correspond with the party's expected position. Thus, she claims, party identification is a "perceptual screen" which filters out unfavorable information.
"The Road Up and Down is One and the Same"?~Heraclitus
(Chickens, eggs, and an hypothesis about realignment)
The next step requires the untestable assumption that, to draw an analogy, the horse and the cart are interchangeable. As I reviewed, it is statistically evidenced that party ID is an incredibly accurate indicator of vote choice. It is also very stable; people generally stay with their party much like a religion... but not always.
Party alignment works as a "shortcut" for voters to make determinations about candidates in low information environments. The Rahn experiment, however, suggests that, beyond this, a "perceptual screen" exists between what a voter hears and what they remember. This screen dismisses information that doesn’t coincide with a voter’s values and even fabricates facts about candidates to fit partisan preferences. However, what the experiment does not reveal is the mechanism by which this occurs. There are two possibilities. Information might be dismissed because party ID is important to voters and current events are not. The other possibility is that current events are very important. Thus, while partisanship is undeniably strong and stable, the perceptual screen exists to avoid what would be serious cognitive dissonance.
There is certainly evidence that voters are underinformed. However, given that election outcomes correlate to factors such as quality of candidates, overall political atmosphere, and perception of economic conditions, I do not think the first claim is reasonable (see Gary C. Jacobson, Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986). However, one could still contend that "independent" voters who do not self identify as partisans are responsible for these effects and that partisans do not cross the party line. Analysis of the 2006 midterm elections seems to contradict this supposition. If wavering independent voters were responsible for Republican House losses, we could expect those Democrats who unseated Republicans in blue districts to win by notably larger margins than those in red districts because the majority partisans would act as a bound on the margin of victory. However, this was not the case:
2006 margin of victory is graphed against 2004 Bush margin of victory. FL-16, OH-18, PA-10 and TX-22 excluded because of scandals
This shows the margin of victory increasing increasing in redder states. However, even if IN-08 is excluded as an outlier, the expected margin of victory for a Democrat in a D+10 district is only 2 points higher than a Democrat in an R+20 district.
If turnout and independents, alone or for the most part, were responsible for Democratic victories we would expect a greater difference. Thus, there is evidence for the second supposition; that current events are very important and that, therefore, partisans employ a "perceptual screen" to avoid cognitive dissonance. If this is true then it is no problem to put the cart before the horse. In other words, a realignment occurs because of a change in partisan identification; a stable and important aspect of voting intention. However, a shift in partisan ID can be caused by short term changes in vote choice resulting from a state of affairs.
While the distinction between Democrats and Republicans is usually considered the primary split in American politics, I would suggest that, in terms of mindset, there is a greater distinction between party-identifiers and non-party-identifiers. Non-identication is a different sort of social construct that defines self by rejection of the party system. While non-identifiers may vote for Democrats they are unlikely to become Democrats. Republican identifiers, however, may become identifying Democrats.
My supposition is this; in historically red districts there are a number of "weak identifiers." They identify as Republicans because most people where they live are Republicans. However, ideologically they are out of line with the Republican mainstream and their ideological commitment is unlikely to have been tested by opposition. While a perceptual screen can mitigate this fact, the 2006 results indicate that it can only do so much. Voters often split tickets. One can vote for a Governor or Senator from a different party without their partisan ID being a significant source of cognitive dissonance. However, a Republican cannot vote a Democratic ticket without it conflicting with their party ID. Voters may simply stay home without strong Democratic challengers who actively solicit their votes. However, if circumstances are unfavorable to Republicans at multiple levels of government and Democrats run strong challengers weak-Republicans may become Democrats.
I am advocating what seems to be a fairly bland proposition; we can change voters' party affiliation by getting them to vote for Democrats. However, we have reached this point without having to give up the claim that party ID is very stable and critical in determining vote choice. The whole argument therefore goes as follows:
1.) Partisan ID is a type of "social identification" and an "enduring feature of citizens’ self-conceptions"
2.) Partisan ID affects vote choice by acting as a shortcut and a perceptual screen that influences how voters choose candidates by changing voters' perception to avoid cognitive dissonance
3.) If a weak-Republican voter is faced with a state of affairs that compels them to vote a Democratic ticket, to avoid cognitive dissonance they must cease to consider themselves a Republican.
4.) Uprooted partisans will identify with the party for which they vote and adopt a new party ID. Their new identification will be stable and a strong indicator of voting preference.
The next diary will discuss media effects and the role of money in political campaigns. These two installments will provide the theoretical basis for the claim that a realignment of the Western states is possible in 2008.