Recently some have whitewashed McCain's support for hundred years in Iraq. The Columbia Journalism Review http://www.cjr.org/... ,
argued that he meant peaceful presence rather than military conflict. Politico repeated that, http://www.politico.com/... Of all people, Joe Klein, on April Fool's Day has correctly pushed back:
The problem with John McCain's 100 years in Iraq formulation isn't that he's calling for 95 more years of combat--he isn't--but that he thinks you can have a long-term basing arrangement in Iraq similar to those we have in Germany or Korea. That betrays a fairly acute lack of knowledge about both Iraq and Islam.
http://www.time-blog.com/...
But the ignorance revealed is far deeper than so-called gaffes. It represents a world view that proves how UNqualified McCain is to be anything more than an ex-flyboy. The lesson is to attack McCain's supposed strength.
The problem is not so-called gaffes - - confusing Shiite and Sunni or being surprised about Basra and Maliki - - though that is serious enough. McCain's hundred years in Iraq reveals how little McCain knows about the last hundred years in Iraq or for that matter Egypt, or for that matter Iran or for that matter Turkey or for that matter any other large unthreatened self-confident state in the Near East or elsewhere in the Islamic world. It also reveals how little he understands Korea or the aftermath of the Second World War. In short it demonstrates how abysmally ill-informed HRC's favored Mr C-in-C is about the world.
The Profound Depths of McCain's Ignorance of the World
If there is one lesson that even the most uninformed observer can draw about Near East politics over the past dozen decades it is that most of its people intensely dislike the presence of foreign troops. The issue has destructively dominated the politics of Iraq and Egypt, though the opposition to foreign presence is not universal elsewhere. Foreign troops have been accepted, particularly in small fragile states, fearful of internal disorder or threatening enemies. The one large state with a foreign military, Turkey, first accepted a US airforce base in Incirlik during the Cold War when it had genuine reason to fear threats from the USSR. More typically Jordan (and before it Trans-Jordan) has long accepted a significant UK and later US intelligence and military presence throughout its long artificial Hashemite history because at different times it has feared Syrian, Saudi, Egyptian, or Israeli interference or even invasion. The sheikh-ruled statelets of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula have welcomed a UK and US military presence because at different times they thought that Iraq, Iran, or their sheikhly neighbors were more dangerous. Lebanon has accepted to a degree US, European, or UN presence, but the first two have been limited in time. And it took no time for the first two to be regarded as taking sides with one local faction leading to attacks from the other.
Egypt and Iraq, have been the poster-boys for the disorder and devastation that a foreign military presence can arouse in the Near East. The British occupied Egypt as a whole and later the Suez Canal zone alone from 1882 to 1956. For most of its history this presence prevented the possibility of normal and productive relations between the two states. Particularly in the twentieth century the occupation provoked periodic popular uprisings, growing violence, and destabilized Egyptian domestic politics. In Iraq, with even greater opposition and ensuing instability, the British insisted upon maintaining a military presence from the First World War until the bloody overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty in 1958 finally kicked them out. And of course the US military presence in Saudi Arabia has been one of the pretexts for al-Qaida.
It is true that Germany, Korea, and to a lesser degree Japan have accepted the US military for more than half a century, but those circumstances do not apply in Iraq. The US victory in the Second World War was total and complete. The devastation wreaked on Germany and Japan was overwhelming. There was no significant armed opposition when the battle ended. Furthermore neither country had a history of destabilizing and divisive prolonged occupation by global powers. Nonetheless the US bases in Okinawa have been continuing sources of friction in relations with Japan. Even in that best case scenario occupation is a dangerous thing. The US presence in South Korea resembles that in Turkey, only more so. Both countries faced a Cold War threat, but in South Korea it was realized. And the North remains a real concern for the South. In no way does Iraq resemble any of those countries. Most important of all, in the Near East the Cold War is over.
Being a POW Does Not a Commander in Chief Make
There is a broken record in the conventional media, that HRC has played to her shame as well: McCain is the world affairs expert. He is qualified to be Commander in Chief. But what are his qualifications? As he has repeatedly demonstrated on Iraq, he is in fact demonstrably unqualified. And his unqualifications extend beyond Iraq to Germany, Japan, and Korea as well.
With all due respect, being a guest at the Hanoi Hilton does not make one an expert on world affairs. Before that he was by all accounts a privileged and sometimes reckless, but still capable Navy flyboy. After leaving Hanoi , the playboy took over from the flyboy. He was a naval liaison officer, which helped him cultivate congressional ties. He did marry an heiress to a beer business. None of that makes him qualified. His lone demonstrable qualification is in fact, his long service on the Senate Armed Services Committee, but he never chaired it. If his own colleagues did not feel him qualified to command that committee, why should the country feel confident that he can command it. While his pilot years and committee service certainly informed him about military matters, it clearly has failed to make him an expert on foreign affairs. The two are not the same.
The responsibilities of Commander in Chief extend beyond weapon systems and military tactics, they require a depth of knowledge of the world and understanding of policy that McCain has failed to demonstrate. The last presidential election proved the utility of going after a candidate's supposed strength. The Republicans swift-boated Kerry. The Democrats should Hanoi Hilton McCain. Heroism is not the same as wisdom.