I am trying to defend our rights to represent ourselves in Court. This is due on 8/22/08 in the 8th Circuit number 08-2494. Any suggestions appreciated (kaysieverding@aol.com):
I was put in jail by Colorado federal Judge Edward Nottingham solely for representing myself in Court, for no other reason and I think that was a felony by Judge Nottingham. Impeach Judge Nottingham! Prosecute Judge Nottingham!
I have edited this to show what we actually filed which is different than what was originally posted
Thank you for your help
Kay Sieverding 8/27/08
The panel dismissal conflicts with the U.S. Judiciary Act Title 28 § 1654 and § 2074 b, the 1st and 14th Amendments, four U.S. Supreme Court decisions, (JONES V. BOCK, NAACP v. BUTTON, SHELLEY V. KRAEMER and VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GRACE OLECH), the Wisconsin and Minnesota remedies clause, and two 8th Circuit decisions (Jaramillo v. Burkhart, and Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.) and reversal is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions with its and the Supreme Court’s previous decisions.
THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS:
“Must petitions presented by Wisconsin free citizens in the District of Minnesota be adjudicated without delay and in full conformance to law, even when the litigants are self-represented?”
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN NAACP v. BUTTON:
In a landmark civil rights Access to Courts decision, NAACP v. BUTTON, the Supreme Court ruled, that the First Amendment protects “advocacy”, such as the Sieverdings’ petitions, in court.
“Abstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion…. a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights… Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely private gain… Although petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the protection of the First Amendment, the State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed.” NAACP v. BUTTON 371 U.S. 415 (1963) U.S. Supreme Ct.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also acknowledged:
“We are not unaware or unconcerned that persons identified with unpopular causes may find it difficult to enlist the counsel of their choice”. SACHER V. UNITED STATES, 343 U. S. 1 (1952) U.S. Supreme Ct.
In this case, the Sieverdings sued lawyers for “Damages based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights”. Thus, by definition, their claim was for “vindication of constitutional rights”. At the same time, their claim is identified with an “unpopular cause”. The order against self-representation acts to obstruct and prevent the Sieverdings’ presentation to a jury of their peers.
Because lawyers are expensive, and suing lawyers is unpopular, and their claims involve federal crimes, self-representation may be the Sieverdings’ only viable method to effectively exercise their First Amendment rights:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
Because Congress is not authorized to make laws prohibiting the petitioning for a redress of grievances, the Courts are also limited as to how they can interpret laws. The court’s authority cannot be extended to prohibit or abridge the petitioning of the government thru the court. To be consistent with the First Amendment, a Court cannot prohibit or abridge First Amendment Rights, it can only recognize First Amendment Rights.
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE RULES ENABLING ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN JONES v. BOCK:
The Supreme Court recognizes that the courts cannot erect barriers to
adjudication of unpopular claims thru judicial interpretation and ruled:
“We once again reiterate, however, as we did unanimously in Leatherman, Swierkiewicz, and Hill, that adopting different and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be done through established rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts.” JONES v. BOCK U.S. 549 01/22/07 No. 05–7058 U.S. Supreme Ct.
Thus, a requirement that the author of pleadings be licensed to sell legal services to others is a violation of established rulemaking practices and conflicts with the S.C. decision in JONES V. BOCK.
Also, the Judiciary Act requires Congressional approval to modify the rules of evidence, which is part of an order against self representation:
“(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress”
U.S. Judiciary Act Title 28 § 2074 b
The district court order that:
“counsel fully handles the case, including preparing all court documents and handling all filing and communication with the Court and the opposing parties” (Appendix 5 page 2)
modifies the evidentiary privileges but was not approved by Congress.
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN SHELLEY V. KRAEMER and VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GRACE OLECH:
The U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that the 14th Amendment must be observed in litigation in state courts and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, means that the 14th Amendment must be observed in litigation in federal courts. Thus, it protects individuals against discrimination including that shown by the district court’s boycott of the Sieverdings’ complaint.
“The actions of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities are actions of the states within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment… The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights.” SHELLEY V. KRAEMER 334 U.S. 1 (1948) U.S. Supreme Ct.
“Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a “class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441(1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster City, 488 U. S. 336 (1989). In so doing, we have explained that “‘[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’” Per Curiam VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GRACE OLECH No. 98–1288 U.S. Supreme Ct., 2000.
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 14th Amendment
If not overruled, the precedent of Sieverding v. Faegre & Benson may require that other citizens be excluded from civil court unless they have adequate financial resources to afford a lawyer “to handle all matters”. The net effect may be to exclude injured parties from use of the federal courts for civil matters unless they retain substantial financial resources after injury.
Excluding citizens from court conflicts with
“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” Title 28 Part 5 Chapter 111 § 1654. Appearance personally or by counsel
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE 8TH CIRCUIT IN JARAMILLO v. BURKHART:
The order that remedy must be delayed until a lawyer is contracted and that expenses be increased to pay for a lawyer contradicts the MN and WI remedies clause. The district court decision that the Sieverdings do not have an absolute right of self-representation is contrary to Wisconsin case law as published by the State of Wisconsin, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17b(1), and the 8th Circuit’s deferral to Wisconsin law as decided in Jaramillo v. Burkhart recognizing Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17 b (1),
“In diversity cases the state law regarding real party in interest applies.” Jaramillo v. Burkhart, 999 F.2d 1241, 1246 (8th Cir. 1993)
“the capacity to sue is determined …for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity by the law of the individual’s domicile.” Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17 b (1)
The State of Wisconsin Annotated Constitution proclaims:
“Rights of suitors. § 21. [As amended April 1977]
(2) In any court of this state, any suitor may prosecute or defend his suit either in his own proper person or by an attorney of the suitor’s choice. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] Every person has an absolute right to appear pro se. Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc. 174 Wis. 2d 381, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993). A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate the guarantee that any suitor may prosecute or defend a suit personally.” Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. Wisconsin Supreme Court 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997)” [emphasis supplied]
The District of Minnesota Court ruled:
“Should Plaintiffs wish to press their claims, they must secure the assistance of an attorney prior to filing any lawsuit relating in any way to the events described in the above orders (Appendix 2)
“Plaintiffs are not being forced to surrender any rights. Moreover, the Wisconsin Constitution does not guarantee Mrs. Sieverding the “absolute right to [proceed] pro se”(denial reconsideration appendix 4)”
In Minnesota and Wisconsin:
“Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.” Minnesota Constitution Article 1 § 8/ Wisconsin Constitution Article 1 § 9 Remedy for Wrongs
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE 8TH CIRCUIT IN COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. CO.:
“Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. Mixed questions of law and fact that require the consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles are also reviewed de novo.” Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1995)
Because the dismissal for lack of a law license conflicts with Supreme Court and 8th Circuit cases, a “de novo” review was required.
CONCLUSION:
Excluding citizens from petitioning for redress of grievances because of their financial limitations or lack of a license to sell services deprives them of basic common law rights recognized in all civilized societies.
s./David Sieverding s./Kay Sieverding
641 Basswood Ave, Verona, WI 53593 608-848-5735 8/22/08