As in every revolution, the sentiments of the lower ranks of the security forces will decide the battle when things get violent. If they do not mow the protesters down, the government is finished. The feelings of the army (the Artesh, not the IRGC or its Basij militia) are especially important. Although the IRGC and the Basij may crush protesters in the streets, if the Artesh thinks they have gone too far they will be no match for the Artesh’s armored divisions.
The main upshot of all of this is not that the Iranian government has become weak. It has been weak for some time, which is why the conservative faction went to such lengths to steal the election. The main upshot, if the current government keeps power by force through a Tiananmen-style crackdown, is that the entire world knows that the Iranian government is weak, and that the government knows that the world knows.
Iran will be increasingly militant against America and the West in general, but also through an increased cooperation with Russia and China, putative rivals to the West. A government that is weak and is opposed to its own people is even more beholden to domestic considerations in its foreign policy than a democratic one. In addition to distracting its people with a flashy and antagonistic foreign policy, it will need to seek foreign partners to supply it with weapons and materiel to oppress its own people and carry out any military adventures. However, abandoning the pretense of democracy and the rule of law would allow the ruling faction far more freedom in allocating Iran’s resources to their supporters. Still, the ruling conservatives may not be able to hold on to Iran even as a kleptocracy.
Russia and China fit an Ahmedinejad government quite well, as these conservative authoritarians together could cook up some political-nationalist theory to enhance each others’ legitimacy. But will they take the bait? Even if the hardliners succeed in keeping power for now, the massive opposition to their rule by Iranian youth means that sooner or later they are finished (although they probably don’t see this) and a sinking ship is not an attractive partner.
This already seems to be happening, with the events at the SCO meeting in Yekaterinburg indicating that Iran’s resources, natural and political, are too much for China to resist. China will prop up a conservative government, in exchange using Iran as a proxy for Middle East power plays.
If A Moussavi government can take and hold power after the overthrow/removal of Ahmedinejad/Khamenei, the West can expect to be disappointed. The need to keep conservative elements of society on board will keep regional foreign policy changes to a minimum, but some thawing towards the West will occur as relations with the SCO, tied to Ahmedinejad’s camp, sour. Paradoxically, Iran’s influence in Iraq may actually increase, as a US eager to get out will welcome a friendly Iran’s cooperation.
The third and most likely outcome is a power-sharing agreement between the competing factions. Neither is strong enough to hold Iran. The outcome will more likely be paralysis than schizophrenia for 5-15 years, after which the Reformist revolution will finally take place.
China and Russia face a losing proposition in Iran. Iran is no China, and another Tiananmen will not work. Iran is simply too rich now (and the US too poor) to experience China’s post-Tiananmen growth, and its economy too centered on fossil fuels and rent-oriented to allow broad-based entrepreneurial growth. Iran under the conservatives will stagnate economically, and discontent with the regime, already boiling over, will rise. Battening down the pressure cooker will not be to China’s benefit, however much it may seem to be right now.
The Reformists have already won. Only now are they joining the battle.
Crossposted at We Are All Dead