So, I was driving to work this morning and, like most mornings, was listening to the Chicago's Progressive Talk lineup--the end of the Bill Press Show and the beginning of the Stephanie Miller Show. And, today Press wasn't there and his show was being done by Rick and Chad. The topic, as usual, was health care reform. These guys, however, irritated me no end with the premise of their discussion. Which was "incrementalism good" and "wouldn't we rather have all of the insurance reforms, even without the public option, than nothing?"
The reason this pissed me off was that this is a false choice given the actual dynamics and procedural rules involved in Congress. And neither these guys nor the callers brought this up. They all took it as a given that it would be easier to pass a package with robust insurance reforms and regulation, an employer mandate, and subsidies, but no public option than the same package but without the public option. And, I suppose, logically, it should be--the more one compromises, in theory, the higher the likelihood of making a deal; it works that way when you buy a house or a car, or when you settle a case.
In practice, the picture is very different. Putting aside the vows of House progressives to torpedo a bill without a public option--since I believe they were the target of Rick and Chad's argument--the relevant facts are these, starting with the most basic:
- Any bill must pass both the House and Senate, be reconciled in conference and go to the President (Civics 101);
- There are, currently, 59 members of the Democratic Senate caucus and 40 Senate Republicans. One of the members of the Democratic caucus is the unreliable Independent, Joe Lieberman;
- Under the Senate rules, there are two possible ways to pass a health care bill: (1) the standard procedure, which will require 60 votes to overcome a certain GOP filibuster; or (2) reconciliation, which requires only a simple majority of 50 votes (or 49 if a Senator is absent);
- The reconciliation process is subject to the Byrd parliamentary rule, which requires that anything passed through reconciliation: (1) be germane to federal revenue; and (2) be better than revenue-neutral;
- The 40-member Republican caucus contains exactly one (1) member (Olympia Snowe) who has done anything other than say he or she will obstruct anything and everything put forward as health care reform (I suppose an argument could be made for Susan Collins as well, but I've seen no evidence of it); and
- The principal mechanism in the health care reform proposals which would produce a savings in federal outlays, and thus drive a bill's satisfaction of the Byrd rule, is the public option. The stronger the option, the closer it's tied to Medicare and Medicare pricing, the more savings.
So, to recap: a health care reform bill needs either 60 Senate votes for cloture plus 50 for passage OR it needs 50 votes and must satisfy the Byrd rule. So the relevant question for pragmatists like Chad and Rick who are terrified of the prospect of not passing anything, the relevant question is not "Is no public option better than nothing?"; the question is "Is it easier to secure 60 votes for cloture for a non-public option bill or 50 votes for passage of a bill with a strong public option that produces savings?"
I would argue that the latter is the case. To break a filibuster, you would need the entire Democratic caucus (including Lieberman) AND Snowe. No margin for error. Is there a bill that does anything meaningful, let alone the mythical griffin discussed by Chad and Mike, that could get all of these votes for cloture? And if so, at what point do you lose the first Senator to drop off?
On the other hand, a bill with a robust public option--that includes all or nearly all of the other elements of the HELP or HR 3200 bills could easily pass muster in reconciliation--Judd Gregg's 1000 objections notwithstanding. So, can it get 50 votes? This bill can kiss Snowe goodbye, as well as Lieberman, Landrieu, Ben Nelson, and Carper. But that still leaves 55 members of the Democratic caucus. Meaning we could still lose any 5.
Now, finally, let's look at the politics of the situation. This is one area where I generally agreed with the point Chad and Rick made: that if the entire enterprise collapses and nothing passes, it will be an electoral disaster for the Democrats in 2010. It is undeniable that the members of Congress who represent more naturally Republican states and districts are more vulnerable to a bad political climate in 2010 than those who represent more Democratic areas. The Senators who would be the questionable votes on health care reform tend to be those same Senators from conservative states. Thus, while they may not want to vote for it, they are the most in need of something passing.
I am not convinced that they'd be any worse off in 2010 if the ultimate bill contained a public option than if it didn't, and they'd probably actually be better off--either way, the right will attack them for it. The only questions are whether their own Democratic base will be enthusiastic and contribute, campaign and vote, and whether the Independents will be satisfied with what was accomplished.
So, my question for Chad and Rick--and any other Chads and Ricks out there--is, given all of this, why do you think it's easier to put a weak bill together to that wins over Joe Lieberman, Ben Nelson and Olympia Snowe, with no margin for error, than it is to get 50 of the 59 member caucus to support a bill with a strong public option?