In today's New York Times, Roger Cohen lays out a simple summary of the recent past in Iran, the current moment and a recommendation for US action. What action does he recommend? DO NOTHING. That's right, nothing. OR put another way--there is nothing the US or the West can really do, and the best option for reform in Iran is to let things take their course. What do I have to say about this? It's about time someone laid out such a strategy in a compelling way. You can see the NYT piece here: Roger Cohen December 18th, 2009.
Cohen starts by making a comparison to 1989 and the fall of the Eastern Block. In 1989, the US largely stayed out and gave the Soviet Union no ability to use "Western meddling" as an excuse. A similar circumstance exists today in Iran, because as Cohen states, "When I’m asked where the "stick" is in Iran, my response is the stick is Iranian society — the bubbling reformist pressure now rising up from Iran’s highly educated youth and brave women." Cohen clearly and coherently supports this assertion throughout the piece. The best option going forward is to do nothing that undermines the potential of the Reformers in Iran. (Ironically, this is what the Reformers themselves have been saying since the summer, but no one here really seemed to be listening.)
Among the other gems in this piece, Cohen points to the obvious ambivalence of the Iranian nuclear program:
Iran has been messing around with a nuclear program for some four decades. Pakistan went from zero to a bomb in about a quarter that time. Setting aside the still debatable objective of this Iranian endeavor (nuclear ambiguity or an actual device?), it’s not in the midst of the current political turmoil that Tehran is going to break out of its back-and-forth tinkering. Inertia is always strong in Iran’s many-headed system. Right now it’s stronger than ever — hence the risible, blustery confusion over a possible deal to export Iran’s low-enriched uranium.
He goes on to blast the recent House passage of the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act. This stupid move does nothing but undermine Obama's diplomatic efforts and the Reformers of Iran directly. He also highlights some critical language Obama used in his recent Nobel speech, "Somewhere today, in this world, a young protester awaits the brutality of her government but has the courage to march on." The "her" clearly references Iran, and as I have been pointing out to anyone who will listen, 60% of Iran's 1.5 million university students are women. The future belongs to the youth of Iran, and among them women are not being left behind--they form the core of reform.
To supplement Mr Cohen's insights, I would also strongly recommend a recent Gareth Porter piece as well. Porter's analysis clearly goes after much of the US and the West's conventional wisdom on the nuclear negotiations with Iran. Much has been made of the recent "intransigence" of Iran over negotiations about their nuclear program. Here in the US we get a pretty steady stream of certainty about the intent of Iran's program, although little rational rationale is supplied for answering how one bomb (this is apparently what all their LEU* adds up to if enriched to weapons levels) really does them any good. 19-20% enrichment, however gives them appropriate levels for nuclear medicine and nuclear fuel. So what exactly happened in negotiations over the last months? Is it possible that they desire something other than a nuclear weapon? Gareth Porter, who frequently writes for The Nation has some possible answers, and I have a couple of my own.
*LEU=low-enriched uranium
To briefly summarize, Gareth Porter in an article submitted to Le Monde Diplomatique, titled "U.S.-Iran Talks: The Road to Diplomatic Failure," posits that there is plenty of blame to go around, and if the West thought Iran negotiated in bad faith, ample evidence supports the same from the US. The essential policy goals for Iran are:
- Obtain a source of material for nuclear medicine which will run out in 2010, the previous source being Argentina, has been unavailable since 1993.
- Potentially use the LEU bargaining chip in a swap for, if not diplomatic recognition, at least a dialing down of hostility toward Iran by the US and the West.
- Recognition of Iran as a significant regional actor that should be officially involved in regional matters. (This is also a major theme developed by Trita Parsi and a long-term policy goal regardless of regime)
When negotiations took the form of "Do what we say and follow this agreement to give all your LEU in one move and receive enriched material in the future," and none of their other regional concerns were addressed, Iran balked. They backed off, however, after the initial set of negotiations. This occurred after they returned to Ali Larijani's (Speaker of the Majlis) criticism and a harsh denunciation from opposition candidate Mir Hossien Mousavi on October 29th. Mousavi essentially called the agreement a joke, and an insult to Iranian national pride.
Further, Porter postulates that the US negotiating strategy was founded on a flawed belief that a quick diplomatic victory could be won. I strongly suggest reading the Porter piece completely. You can see it here: Gareth Porter.
Here's what I would add. As much as I hate a reference to The Song of the South, the nuclear issue is the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei RG coalition's brier patch. They want to spend as long as possible negotiating over this because it's a good issue for them. Why? Here are a couple quick reasons:
- It keeps the focus off human rights
- It allows them to continue to play the victim to Western double standards
- Conflict or the threat of conflict gives them a freer hand internally (If things ever really do get hot, you can kiss those Greens you were cheering for last summer goodbye)
- Sanctions, and foreign armies don't scare the Revolutionary Guards--millions of people marching in the streets do
I could go on, but I think you get the idea. I don't think anything happened in this round of negotiations that the Iranian leadership did not expect or even welcome. Incidentally, China may give lip service to our sanctions routine, but the reality is they need the oil and they will have no problem with Iran's internal politics. Our policies will drive Iran further into alliance with China.
So what should we do instead? We could do as Cohen recommends and do nothing. That would certainly be better than where we seem to be heading with another round of inane sanctions. However, we could do something better. We could drop the nuclear issue, and talk about something else. Open up opportunities for US companies to do business in Iran in fields like earthquake safety--no nuclear applications there. Biological Science like this: Stem Cell Diplomacy. Exchanges in medical programs, athletics--there are numerous possibilities. At least with these types of overtures, the ruling elites in Iran might for once not really know what to do about it.