Cross-posted from a broader series of discussions at my home base, Starboard Broadside. I've modified the intro and title to make more sense here.
On my site, we recently had, as one site author put it, "a rather spirited debate" on the use of Predator drone planes in counterterrorism operations in Southern/South-Central Asia (i.e. Afghanistan and Pakistan). I'm generally opposed to their use, except in certain specific circumstances (e.g. if we have specific intelligence that a target like Osama Bin Laden is in a particular location for a limited time). We can't keep using them in a widespread/mission-critical manner because too many civilians are killed and resentment grows. Now, a reader has provided me with even more interesting links, and I've been doing more of my own research as well, and I have a lot more to add to the subject, enough to post here.
For background, the drones are operated remotely from the US, but they are launched closer. They then fly to targets and either snap photos or release weapons on the targets. That's created another reason why the people of Pakistan are overwhelming not really fans of the government there:
These two photos from Google are that reason:
Pakistani Airbase, Balochistan, 2006...
Same place, more recently, with new buildings...
View Larger Map
What do these pictures reveal? Pakistani international journal, The News, reported on the story when it broke in Pakistan partway through February:
Amid the raging controversy over US drones and whether they take off from Afghanistan or Pakistan, at least one fact has been definitely confirmed: the drones have been parked on Pakistani soil.
Two pictures of an unidentified flying strip in Balochistan — bearing the coordinates 27 degrees 51 minutes North, 65 degrees and 10 minutes East — prove that Pakistani ground was being used, at least until 2006.
Both the pictures are still available on Google Earth, which maps every corner of the world through a satellite and internet users can zoom in to see every detail, even cars parked in front of their drive ways. The pictures on Google Earth are not live but the satellite updates them after every few months.
The Economist had more last month, as well:
By one—possibly wishful—estimate, American missile strikes in Pakistan have killed 11 of al-Qaeda’s 20 commanders in the past six months. But they have also boosted anti-Americanism among Pakistanis, especially within the army. Senior ISI officers attribute most of their troubles in the tribal areas to anger over the American strikes. They also accuse India of giving "significant" support to their Taliban enemies there. On both counts, this seems unlikely. Moreover, recent reports allege that the unmanned drones being used in the strikes are in fact based inside Pakistan, which would suggest a certain Pakistani complicity in the ploy.
So what does all this mean? It means the government of Pakistan has been lying repeatedly (again) in their public policies, saying one thing and doing another. They claim to want the airstrikes to end, and then they provide the semi-covert means to execute them anyway. Now, the people of Pakistan know the truth once the photos emerged. And it didn't even take spy planes to find out -- just a California-based corporation with a slogan of "Don't Be Evil." It was also just confirmation of accidentally leaked classified documents from CENTCOM in April 2003 that said 57,000 bombing runs were flown from Pakistan against Taliban targets between 2001 and that point. All the while, the Pakistani government continued "vociferously" to deny the bombing runs.
And it doesn't really matter that the military is no longer officially in power, since the bases now have new hangars for the drones to stay under<span style="font-style: italic;"></span>. To the people of Pakistan, the whole government is still complicit as the bombing runs continue because chances are, the government is still authorizing them under US pressure and still providing remote airstrips all over the country.
In December 2008, an International Republican Institute poll of public opinion in Pakistan was released, showing the mood of the 3,500 people surveyed in October. 52% said (page 2 of PDF) that country had not made important progress toward democracy, despite "the separation of the offices of Army chief of staff and president, the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf, and the democratic election of a new parliament and president." Basically, there's little distinction between the old and the new. Probably with good reason, especially since the military still calls the shots much of the time. Favorability of the so-called "War on Terror" has only crept up slightly since Musharraf's departure because it was seen as "his" policy (page 4).
What's worse, in terms of US and Pakistan governmental/military goals, is that 54% want a peace deal with the extremists (page 3 of above link) and 63% oppose cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. That's not a way to get popular backing for counterrorism and help from the people on the ground there. 54% also named strikes on Pakistan-based terror camps as a major concern, and only 23% felt concerned by terrorist use of Pakistan as a "base of operations" against Afghanistan (page 4).
The situation in Pakistan should be of enormous importance to the average American, far more so than Iran or many other countries. Even if Iran does want to acquire nuclear weapons, that's irrelevant when we consider that there's little standing between an actual, already-in-existence nuclear missile arsenal and radical Islamic groups and anti-American terrorist groups. What's keeping the nukes and terrorists separate for the moment is a weak and unpopular government, which stands accused of helping to bomb their own people.
Even the army, with its dubious loyalties is not a buffer between extremists and the nuclear arsenal. As the article above from The Economist noted, the Army has a lengthy history of supporting the terrorist groups it is now allegedly trying to eliminate:
For a rear-base—or "strategic depth"—against the threat of an Indian invasion, the army has sought to control Afghanistan; thus it helped propel Mullah Omar and his turbaned friends to power there in the 1990s. In fact, Pakistan’s generals have consistently employed Islamist militants as proxies, from 1947 onwards.
By toppling Mr Sharif in 1999, Mr—then General—Musharraf followed a long tradition of army coupsters seizing power to "save the nation." However, by turning his back on the Taliban in 2001, he promised a new track. And in extending his hand to the Indians, he seemed to show that he was serious. At America’s request, Mr Musharraf shifted troops from the eastern border to secure the north-west frontier. At the same time—and especially after Islamist assassins twice tried to kill him in 2003—he vowed to eradicate militancy in Pakistan, including some 40-odd jihadist groups with links to the army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. For this reason, liberal Pakistanis who were sceptical of Mr Musharaf’s other promises—to improve Pakistani democracy, for example—supported him. Yet there were always reasons to doubt that a genuine policy shift was under way. Banned militant groups, including LET, re-emerged under new names. Militant leaders, such as LET’s Hafiz Saeed, remained at large. After Mumbai, alas, these doubts have proliferated.
The alacrity with which the Pakistani army rushed to embrace the threat of an Indian military reprisal was remarkable. In fact, India did not explicitly threaten any such thing. And Mr Zardari, as a conciliatory gesture, offered to send the head of the ISI, Lieut-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, to Delhi. Yet Pakistan’s generals, having scotched that offer, leapt to battle-stations. They shifted several thousand troops from the north-west to the eastern border. Pro-army media commentators, spewing anti-India propaganda, whipped up the nation for war. In a briefing to Pakistani journalists, a senior ISI officer said that the Taliban had assured the army of its support in the event of a war with India. He referred to their leaders, including Mr Mehsud, the alleged killer of Ms Bhutto, and Mr Fazalullah, as "patriotic Pakistanis."
So that leaves the precarious civilian government, pulled in many directions (hardest by the US and the Bush and Obama Administrations) to keep the militants at bay, at the risk of aligning its own people with the most radical elements.
While it would not solve everything, ending the US Predator drone strikes in Pakistan would go a long way to relieving pressure and it would lessen a serious threat to global security. It's time for the Obama Administration to end the aerial campaigns, not step them up.
(Clarification added: As I said in the intro, I'm referring to the extended bombing campaigns, which Obama has indicated he will increase. I'm not saying we should end all predator drone use ever. Again, there are specific cases where they're necessary.)