I am leaving for vacation today, so I thought I would gather my thoughts into a single post before I go. This has certainly been some week, and I think this is one of those historical events where everything has surpassed the individuals involved. We will be thinking and writing about this for some time to come. To quote one of my favorites Leonard Cohen (introduced to me by my wife), "There is a crack in everything, that's how the light gets in." What will the light shine on in the coming days? What will come? Peace, Inshallah, peace.
To start with I'm going to go back a bit in Iranian history. Return to 1953 and the infamous coup orchestrated by the US government through the CIA, largely at the behest of the British. By the summer of 1953, Mossadegh's coalition had dwindled. In the initial nationalist upswing of '51 he held many allies from the intellectuals to the socialists and communists (Tudeh) and the Clergy. By '53 however his support was deserting him. Some of the factors were economic--the British were better at waiting; some of them were purely practical--the Clerics were vehemently anti-communist, and as the Tudeh became the most reliable column of Mossadegh's support, the religious groups left him. In the summer of 1953 the US tipped the balance; the CIA brought the Shah back and empowered him to purge the communists. They did more than that really--they forced him to truly purge the communists. In those early years of 1954-55 the only dissidents that were executed were Tudeh. The first wave of executions came as a surprise to the Iranian population; they did not think that the Shah would follow through. He did. The US State Department was encouraging him to do so, and reporting as to the necessity of it all back home. (I know because I have done significant archival research on declassified documents from the State Department in Iran from 1952 to 1964. I will reproduce these documents for you later in a diary that addresses those issues alone.) In those early years, the religious parties were expecting a seat at the table.
Two of the main religious figures at that time were Ayatollah Kashani and Navab Safavi. Kashani was the older man who initially spoke with any State Department official who would listen about how an Islamic society was fundamentally anti-communist. He was the establishment cleric who sought to build association with Shia Clerics outside of Iran. Navab Safavi was more the radical--he is generally credited with being the founder of the Fedayan and he attempted to assassinate the Shah in November of 1955. He was arrested and executed in December of 1955. (Navab Safavi was arrested in the house of Hamid Zolghadr, my father-in-law, whom I never met--he died in 1981.) Over the years Kashani never held a significant role in the Shah's government. Navab Safavi become a symbol to the more fiery clerics, and in the 1960s part of the religious establishment began to turn against the Shah. Many to this day refer to him as the father of the Islamic Revolution. The most visible and vociferous critic that emerged was Khomenei. He was critical of the Shah and critical of the US presence in Iran. He began to develop a great following, and the Shah cracked down. Khomenei was exiled in 1964, but he continued recording anti-Shah and anti-US diatribes from Paris which were distributed throughout Iran. As the Shah's government survived, it also became more repressive, and the religious factions became more against the Shah, and subsequently more anti-US.
So what does this mean? The religious factions were part of the rise and fall of Moassadegh, and they expected to have more of a role in the Shah's government. Instead they were repressed, and they developed their power structure and ideas outside of the government. They were instrumental in the 1979 Revolution, and in a short time they turned the Revolution into an entirely religious government. Today, as we look at Iran, we should be able to identify a number of factions and political fault lines. However this turns out, if a significant sector is left out, or feels it has no reasonable part of the government, then these tensions will surface again in the future. Regardless of what the actual vote was, there are significant elements of society that support Ahmadinejad, and there are significant elements that support Mousavi. There are also a number of groups outside of the various street demonstrators from both sides that have less visible positions.
It is vital to realize that despite our inclinations to support the "Greens" as their outlook more closely coincides with ours, there are many who support Ahmadinejad for reasons other than religion or conservative values. We tend to have myopic vision regarding Ahmadinejad, and see only his international posturing. Many in Iran see an anti-corruption, anti-elite who represents them against powerful elements, particularly the economically powerful. Here's a significant example of something Ahmadinejad has done in this regard. One of the major problems the government has is corruption. One of the driving forces of corruption at the lower levels has been the cost of living in Tehran. For many government workers there is no way they could live in Tehran on their pay--so it drives them to take bribes. Ahmadinejad in the last few years has significantly increased government worker's pay, and made their situation more livable. He has many supporters because of his wage policies. With Rafsanjani's support, Mousavi could easily be seen by many as an elitist candidate, and less likely to continue tackling corruption.
We should also realize that although there have been mass demonstrations, the violence has subsided somewhat, and it is quite possible that both sides of the street demonstrators might actually be more interested in working out their differences. If you have not seen it, this article by Abbas Barzegar in The Guardian certainly points to other possibilities: Iran's Identity Crisis. From many of the people I have talked to from ex-pats, to Mousavi supporters, and Ahmadinejad supporters of all types there are quite a variety of opinions going around. However, many of them share the opinion of Barzegar who said in the final line of the linked article, "From my estimation, the calming climate of the mass gatherings is the first indication that Iranians would rather tackle that challenge than return to the dark days of the early 80s."
At this point I am pretty frustrated with mainstream coverage as they seem to assume that at any minute this will all result in slaughter and wholesale violence. I think there are a number of former Shah people to whom "the wish precedes the thought," as they prognosticate about the imminent fall of the Islamic Republic. As the diary by ShadowSD on the Rec List reflects, as well as this less noticed diary here: mocajava13 indicates--the drive to avoid a new "Revolution" remains strong. I also think that Obama's insistence on not taking sides is a good position, hopefully he will continue until this is resolved. Hopefully reports of an imminent crackdown will also prove false. In the coming days we shall see.
I will be watching this significantly less over the next couple weeks hopefully a more moderate solution that considers the widest possible group of people emerges. I will continue to pray for the people of Iran, and I hope you will join me.