DISCLAIMER: I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I do have a fascination and interest in the Constitution and so I started reading the Federalist Papers and posting my interpretation on my own blog. I thought it might be of some interest here. Your interpretations and thoughts are greatly appreciated in the comments!
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
Federalist No. 8 and links to previous Federalist Papers entries below the fold and previously posted at LiveJournal
Federalist No. 1 here
Federalist No. 2 here
Federalist No. 3 here
Federalist No. 4 here
Federalist No. 5 here
Federalist No. 6 here
Federalist No. 7 here
In this essay, Hamilton begins by assuming that a disunited nation would indeed be victim of all of the dangers outlined in his previous papers. Under that assumption, he then explores the consequences of the hostilities between the states.
The first consequence would be much more awful wars between the states than would be expected between say the established nations of Europe. Hamilton states that this would be due to the fact that each state would not have a well-established army or militia. In Europe, countries were well-fortified and protected by garrisons and armies and as such, most conflicts consisted of skirmishes over cities or regions that went back and forth under control of both nations. The results were rarely all out war. However, in the case of the United States, there would be no such protections and Hamilton argues that conquest of weaker states would be rather easy to achieve, but also just as hard to maintain. He proposes that the more populous states would eventually be able to overrun their less populous neighbors. This type of war between the states would be devastating.
Hamilton then goes on to argue that such a situation is not likely to last long. In such a weakened state, wrecked by civil war, the young nation would be quite vulnerable to attack and as such would necessarily unite in self-defense and preservation. Such continued threats, he says, would compel people to give up some degree of liberty for safety.
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
(emphasis mine)
Sounds familiar in a post-9/11 United States, no?
Hamilton then goes on to discuss the fact that armies or military establishments are the ones that gain power at the expense of liberty under these conditions. He then explicitly states that the Constitution does NOT provide against their establishment and therefore it must be assumed that they will exist (a point which is argued in a later paper). Standing armies would naturally arise from such a state of constant conflict between the states and weaker states would rely upon them to try to make themselves more equal to the stronger states.
And then in yet another example of something we have experienced under the Bush Administration post-9/11 Hamilton writes:
They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.
(emphasis mine)
torture? warrantless wiretapping anyone?
Hamilton then goes on to say that smaller states with strong armies would trigger an "arms race" between all of the states. It would be a natural consequence and one of great danger.
He then asks why such a system did not arise in Ancient Greece and proposes at least one answer that relates to the evolution of society into a commerce-based one.
The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
In short, we're too busy making money to be bothered with soldiering, too. So, we need separate professional soldiers.
Hamilton then suggests that the nature of the military establishment is a direct result of the state of war. States that are not subject to much internal conflict have little to fear from repression by the military establishment due in part to the required size and power of a military in such circumstances. In fact, in such cases, one might expect that the citizens could ultimately overrun the army. However, in the opposite situation where there is constant internal strife, the balance of power is shifted to the military establishment, often at the expense of the rights of the governed.
The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.
He then states that Great Britain falls into the camp of not having great internal strife and thus enjoying a relatively stable time of liberty as opposed to the tyranny of other continental European nations.
Hamilton closes by arguing that a united nation under the Constitution would likely fall into the same situation as Great Britain, not needing large armies to police internal strife, but just enough to defend against foreign invaders. In this case, the united nation would be best poised to experience great liberty. He then closes by emphasizing the importance of this one consideration to adopting the Constitution:
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.