Throughout history certain examples gain incredible resonance. Their significance acquires nearly mythical status, and their implied conclusions become axiomatic. The Lesson of Munich is one such example, and this diary compares that "lesson," well known to American policymakers, with one they are less familiar with, but one well known to Iranian political elites--The Lesson of Mossadegh.
I posted this on Sunday, but with 25 recs from only 65 viewers I thought it might be worth a re-post.
In modern politics, many widely received historical lessons replace actual debates on policy. They derive their strength from the ease in which they communicate a point, and unfortunately they tend to stifle debate rather than enhance it. Moreover, they oversimplify and they carry an almost binary logic with them that allows people who use them to apply them in relatively unrelated circumstances. Everyone ascribes to the idea that, "Those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it," and yet while this expression does contain significant truth, the reality remains that history does not really repeat; instead, it contains patterns that allow similarities from the past to inform the present. The problems come up because many who invoke the "History Repeats" line tend to use it to provide the appearance of solid "historical" justification, while the origins of their intentions and motives come from elsewhere--something personal, ideological or downright self-serving. I prefer Mark Twain, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme." This insight requires knowledge of the details of history including nuance and the ability to recognize crucial differences as well as similarities when comparing various courses of events. Unfortunately for our modern political arena, this kind of analysis and insight does not translate well into soundbites, and it requires an electorate with a fairly decent regard for and grasp of history. In the United States, the majority of the electorate possesses neither.
The Lesson of Munich crystallizes a series of historical points into axioms. 1) Force must be met with force. 2) The failure to confront aggression in a nascent phase always results in a larger more destructive conflagration. 3) Failure to use force reflects weakness. The following description provides the historical details of this "lesson".
After the assumption of power in 1933, Hitler and the Nazis pursued a course of action that sought to overturn the results of the Treaty of Versailles. These actions included the re-militarization of the Rhineland, re-occupation and re-industrialization of the Ruhr and Saar valleys, and the re-unification with Austria (Anschluss). In the summer of 1938 Hitler demanded the re-unification with Germany of the German speaking Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia. This lead to the Munich Conference in September of 1938 where major powers including Great Britain, France and Italy, but not Czechoslovakia, met and finally agreed to Hitler's demands. Nazi Germany marched into the Sudetenland and five months later broke the Munich Agreement and swallowed the rest of Czechoslovakia without a fight. What made the annexation of Czechoslovakia different was the complete lack of connection to the Treaty of Versailles. No one could continue to claim that the Nazis merely sought to redress the imbalances of the Versailles Treaty.
The standard interpretation in line with the three axioms portrays British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as a weak-willed liberal afraid to stand up to Hitler. Contrary to this stood the brave Winston Churchill, ever vigilant and ready to confront. There exists a great deal of truth to this portrayal, however, the circumstances surrounding the Munich Conference contain more detail and nuance in reality. By the summer of 1938 Churchill certainly advocated a much tougher stance toward Hitler, but public opinion remained quite different. Most perceived Churchill as a war-monger, and with Europe's most disastrous and bloody conflict a mere twenty years past, few believed that Hitler and Germany really wanted a replay. In addition, prior to going to Munich, Chamberlain contacted all the governments of the Commonwealth and asked for detailed assessments on their readiness for war. Any war effort would require complete support from the British Commonwealth--Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc. The answer he received from all was an emphatic "No." No popular support, and in the midst of a world depression no material support either. They all needed at least a year to prepare. So, going into the Munich Conference Chamberlain knew he had nothing more than a bluff. Even if he wanted to pitch in his support for Czechoslovakia, it remained an option he did not possess. In hindsight, Czechoslovakia presented a much better opportunity than Poland to make a stand against Hitler. They maintained a small but excellent army, and the terrain of Czechoslovakia presented a much less inviting target for Blitzkrieg than the flat plains of Poland. However, public opinion and Commonwealth support had yet to materialize. The French, in general, were even less prepared for war, and their position in Munich followed accordingly. Even though when Chamberlain returned he overdid the positive interpretation of the Munich Agreement; waving his piece of paper and publicly claiming, "Peace in our time," his government immediately began preparation for war in conjunction with the Commonwealth. When the Nazis marched into the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, public opinion changed overnight, and the Commonwealth already began preparations in the Fall of '38. When Hitler continued the following summer with threats to Poland and talk about rescuing Germans in Danzig, the French and the British threw in their support for Poland and when Hitler invaded on September 1, 1939, World War II in Europe began in earnest.
In the late 1930s, and all throughout the disaster of WW II the foreign policy establishment of the United States perceived, interpreted and internalized The Lesson of Munich. It became the core component of their world view and formed the foundation of Cold War Foreign Policy. Moreover, both major political parties embraced it whole-heartedly resulting in very little dissent in foreign policy for decades. In reality it evolved into a "toughness" contest where weakness in the face of Communism became tantamount to giving in to Hitler and becoming Neville Chamberlain. Over the decades it brought the Vietnam War and numerous interventions into the politics of sovereign nations--Guatemala, Iran, Chile, Indonesia etc. Iran just happened to be the one that blew up so dramatically in our faces. The essential logic clumsily imposed the Nazi fervor on every communist movement or leftist party that might have communist sympathies and bundled them all into the largest World Conspiracy ever seen with individual nations moving in lock step with Hitler youth-like devotion toward world domination. In effect, over time it almost entirely replaced analysis with ideology, and as a result we have been blind to major differences between The Lesson of Munich and the realities of life in the Third World. We failed to see the utter corruption of Chiang Kai-Shek as it contributed to Communist triumph in China. We failed to see or acknowledge the significant Nationalist component of Ho Chi Minh's Communism or Allendé's leftist Marxism for that matter. We failed to see or acknowledge the Sino-Soviet split until the 1970s, and then again many took longer than that. We ignored the brutal human rights records and elitist economic policies of numerous dictators provided that their anti-Communist credentials remained valid. Now, I must acknowledge that the threat of communism throughout the Cold War was real, however, our misguided policies throughout the Third World put us on the wrong side of some pretty legitimate struggles for justice for decades, and we continue to operate as such. I should also mention that US foreign policies have been terribly convenient for American and other Western multinational corporations.
At the end of the Cold War The Lesson of Munich ideology needed a new tabula rasa to project its image upon. Whether you want to acknowledge it or not, a significant component of our foreign policy establishment expended a great deal of effort over the last few years to make that new threat Islam. Now they couch their language carefully for domestic consumption here in the US, but Bush used the language of Crusades more than a few times, and that was no accident. Advocates of this world view hedge by using terms like "Islamofacism" or more gently "Islamic Fundamentalism," but for many their intent is clear. They say things like, "we are not at war with Islam," but the actions speak much louder than words. The problem here in the US is that so many of our citizens, many of them well intentioned, are completely unaware of how we appear to the Muslim world. The Bush Administration did their best with the Iraq War to transfer The Lesson of Munich ideology to a new enemy. Has any official entity in the US government tried to develop an accurate estimate of how many Iraqis have perished since 2002, or how many remain refugees? We do not ask questions to which we do not wish to know the answers. A clearer representation of reality would recognize that groups like Al Qaeda reflect a symptom of disorder and in order to uproot their power the US and other Western powers must do something other than bomb. Military units are not diplomats; if trained properly they excel at achieving strategic advantage on a battlefield and accomplishing military objectives. We should not expect them to bring about resolution in poor societies racked by social strife and deprivation. Sadly, that really is not what the US is selling, Shock Doctrine, indeed. I still hope that Obama may begin to turn this around, but only time will tell.
The Lesson of Mossadegh enshrined a number of political imperatives for any Iranians watching the 1953 coup that re-instated the Shah as a US backed dictator. 1) A thinly supported government provides an invitation for foreign intervention. 2) A government must be ruthless to maintain independence for Iran 3) Failure to use force reflects weakness. The following description provides some historical detail for The Lesson of Mossadegh.
In the late 1940s, Iran's political environment experienced significant upheaval. World War II had been a period of heavy foreign intervention with troops from the US and the Soviet Union stationed on Iranian soil. Iranians put a high priority on getting foreign troops out and a strong nationalist movement gained significant traction in the postwar years. The other target issue of the nationalist movement was the exploitative relationship with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The AIOC played all kinds of games and did not pay what was due to Iran under an already exclusive concession agreement that was a poor one for Iran to begin with. In many years AIOC paid more to the British government in taxes on their profits than they did in royalties to Iran. One of the major sticking points was the fact that AIOC would not let Iranian government officials inspect their accounting books. In 1951 this issue came to a head. In March, assassins cut aspiring dictator then Prime Minister General Ramzara's life short. On the 15th the Majlis nationalized Iranian oil operations and Muhammed Mossadegh became Prime Minister on April 29th. The coalition that supported Mossadegh shared very little other than hatred for the British and dislike for the Shah. They included Tudeh (communist) Party members, Western educated elites, and various religious and workers parties and they were heavily nationalistic. Over the next two years Britain managed a boycott of Iranian oil, the Truman administration failed to broker a new oil agreement between Iran and Britain and Iran's economy declined while Mossadegh's diverse political coalition gradually disassembled. In the summer of 1953, with a new administration in Washington DC, the US and British ousted Mossadegh and instated the Shah with more power than ever.
Twenty-five years later social and political unrest in Iran took the form of street protests and subsequent government suppression. By the end of 1978 the Shah's violence and lack of any real reform united all of the former Mossedegh coalition and more against him. On January 16, 1979 he flew out of Iran never to return. Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran in February and the Iranian Revolution swept into power. Khomeini and those around him remembered the failure of Mossadegh and they made certain to avoid his mistakes. Although the political environment of 1979 proved markedly different from '51-'53, the new leaders took no chances. The diverse and sometimes violent factions of the Revolution contained a wide array of people. On one end of the continuum stood communist leftists and on the other socially conservative religious parties. The person of Khomeini united them all. Over the course of the next few years Khomeini and his inner circle of leaders consolidated power in an Islamic State. Although in the initial months Khomeini tried to influence from a distance in Qom, the events of the summer and fall of 1979 eventually paved the way for the establishment of the role of Supreme Leader which Khomeini embodied until his death in 1989. It was actually moderate leaders like Mehdi Bazargan and Bani Sadr that relied on Khomeini for their influence; the bulk of the Revolution held more radical views. Ironaically, and unknown to most Americans, the Islamic Republic also destroyed the Tudeh Party for good in 1983. A Soviet defector to the British supplied them with nearly the entire Tudeh party membership. The Brits turned this information over to Khomeini's people and that spelled the end for them. This incident provides yet another example of the US choosing to overlook the vehemently anti-communist belief system of the Shia clergy. Ayatollah Kashani expressed similar anti-communist sentiments in the 1950s and his group initially participated in the Mossadegh coalition. Over the years, the Shah's anti-communist credentials provided one of the major pillars upon which US policymakers based their support for him. Moreover, many implied his irreplaceable role in that regard.
Like The Lesson of Munich, the nuance of 1953 contains some critical elements of difference from popular interpretation as well. Mossadegh spent the rest of his life under house arrest, and devoted followers insisted that Mossadegh lacked the ruthlessness required in such political circumstances. Further, they argue that his inability to act forcefully on his own behalf doomed his government and Iranian independence for the time being. There remains a great deal of truth to these observations, however, the Revolution of 1978-79 contained within it popular support and a fury that no foreign power could control or direct. It was much stronger than any Mossadegh coalition of the 51-53 period. That did not stop Iran's leaders, however, from pursuing policies that reflected the belief that a new coup lurked around the corner, and the leaders today still readily express beliefs that hidden foreign hands attempt to stoke the fires of conflict inside Iran. As we look at the events in Iran continuing today it remains difficult to predict with certainty how this will turn out. The Khamenei/Ahmadinejad government and their allies certainly made numerous statements recently to play the old foreign interventionist line. This will no doubt continue, and the emerging Reform movement will carefully watch their language and posturing. They do not want to be accused of weakening the position of the State and inviting foreign meddling. They will be accused of this by some, anyway, but they certainly need to painstakingly avoid giving any real substance to these accusations.
It remains critical to realize that what we see going on right now is not even close to a repeat of the '79 Revolution, yet. Divisions within Iran make toppling the government highly unlikely. No unifying coalition is close to emerging, and no figure in Iranian politics provides a unifying example and image even in the neighborhood of Khomeini. Who truly has the majority? It is difficult to tell, but sharp divisions remain, and in those circumstances the forces which control the power of the State possess the advantage. I would not cheer too much for the Green Reformers yet, unless you think that civil war will solve their problems. I find it particularly ironic, that in order for the US and Iran to move closer to resolving our differences, leadership on both sides will have to abandon historical "lessons" that put such emphasis on the use of force to avoid the appearance of weakness. I find doubly ironic that the US suffers from projecting force externally on others while Iran directs that force into repression within.