As someone who has conducted evaluations of torture victims, the "evaluation" of high-value detainee Abu Zubaydah is a fascinating, if sickening, look at how the CIA goes about their kind of business. In the course of this article, we'll learn more about how this "psychological evaluation" was used to further torture, making its drafting an unethical and illegal violation for a psychologist of the highest order. We'll end with a look at the turf war that shaped the evolution of the torture program, of which this report represented just one episode.
Spencer Ackerman has looked at the possibility that former SERE psychologist James Mitchell wrote the report, and the conflict of interest that arises from having the interrogator/torturer write the report upon which the approach to the subject will be based. While it's a reasonable guess that Mitchell wrote the evaluation, I'm going to proceed as if I don't know who wrote it.
Marcy Wheeler wrote a piece examining questions regarding the date of the evaluation (the copy we have was sent to John Yoo on July 24, 2002), the failure to mention Abu Zubaydah's head injury, and the report's claims that he allegedly wrote the Al Qaeda interrogation resistance manual. Hopefully, this article will contribute some plausible answers.
Why Was the Evaluation Written?
Every psychological evaluation has a presenting problem or reason for referral, e.g., does this child have a learning disability? is this patient psychotic? etc.
Regarding Abu Zubaydah, one would presume the presenting question most likely was, what psychological strengths or weaknesses does this person have that we can exploit in our interrogation cum torture plan? Unfortunately, numerous parts of the released assessment have been redacted, including its closing paragraphs, which is where one would find the concluding recommendations. In any case, we'll see that the report appears to lack a presenting question, and that the recommendation is a foregone conclusion.
From internal and convergent evidence, it appears the recommendations included higher levels of coercive interrogation, including waterboarding. The date on the cover sheet of the report, addressed to John Yoo, July 24, 2002, is the same date that the Office of Legal Council gave oral approval for use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT), including waterboarding (H/T Marcy Wheeler). The OLC memo of August 1 states that CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo had said that Zubaydah had become "accustomed to a certain level of treatment," and CIA wanted to enter an "increased pressure phase." (We'll see that CIA had been pushing this line since at least mid-May.)
In any case, it was around late July or early August that the waterboarding of Zubaydah began in earnest, partial drowning, or waterboarding Abu Zubaydah 83 times. Towards the end of the psychological evaluation, less its last redacted paragraphs, the author -- and it was an Agency or Agency contract psychologist, since only psychologists write these reports (and it was likely either James Mitchell or Bruce Jessen, who arrived in Thailand in July) -- notes the following, allowing that Zubaydah is "well-versed" in Al Qaeda resistance techniques (emphasis added):
[redacted] subject believes in [sic] the ultimate destiny of Islam is to dominate the world. He believes that global victory is inevitable. Thus, there is the chance he could rationalize that providing information will harm current efforts but will represent only a temporary setback.
The remaining page or so of the report is redacted, but likely represents the work's loaded conclusion, i.e., that Zubaydah may yet give up more information or cooperation if the amount of coercion (torture) is increased. The likely recommendation: waterboarding. And in fact, the legal memo authorizing the latter followed within a week after the evaluation landed on Yoo's desk; the oral approval appears to have come even days earlier.
It is clear the evaluation was written specifically to get permission for waterboarding, and not to undertake a serious psychological evaluation of the prisoner. The report lacks details related to relevant past history that any psychologist would find important in a psychological evaluation, e.g., the quality of his family relationships, the existence of prior traumas, his actual work and school history, recent medical traumas or injuries, etc.
The man presented in the report, in a most amateurish fashion, cannot be in fact a real person. They present him as a superman-terrorist (he wrote the Al Qaeda resistance manual, ran the Al Qaeda training camps, was their "coordinator" of foreign communications, was their chief of counterintelligence, "no one came in and out of Peshawar, Afghanistan without his knowledge and approval," but still had time to be involved in every major Al Qaeda operation, and still had time to direct the start-up of an Al Qaeda cell in Jordan!). Additionally, he was supposed to have developed the Al Qaeda interrogation resistance techniques (a claim later contradicted in the report -- see below), and taught them to many others. A real busy guy.
The discussion of his personality at times sounds like it was cribbed from a printout of a computerized personality assessment. There are also a number of contradictions in the portrayal, e.g., Zubaydah "wrestles" with idea of killing civilians, but "celebrated" 9/11; he has the discipline, drive, creativity and pragmatism of a good leader, but is private and vigilant of others’ intentions, and doesn’t trust people, and oh, yes, wants to be one of the guys. Supposedly he felt anything outside of jihad was "silly." But at the same time he chafed against the constrictions of "radical salafist environments" and was very independent minded.
Only for a moment does what is probably the real Abu Zubaydah emerge from the report: a man who wanted to go to college, become a computer expert or engineer, who felt homesick, who wanted a traditional career and family life.
When Was the Evaluation Written?
The report was almost certainly written in July 2002, not long before it was passed to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). It likely was part of a packet of material used to present the "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques," including waterboarding, as potentially "safe" to use.
There are plenty of indications in the report that Zubaydah had been under observation and interrogated (tortured) for some time prior to the drafting of the report (emphasis added).
Of particular note has been subject's ability to manage his mood and emotions during detention. [About four lines redacted] In addition, he showed strong signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal (possibly fear) when he experienced the initial "confrontational" dislocation of expectation during an interrogation session.... As has been observed during his recent detention, he was able to quickly bounce back from these most disconcerting moments and regain an air of calm confidence, and strong resolve in not parting with any other threat information.
By sympathetic nervous system arousal, the report's author means rapid breathing and heartbeat, dilated pupils, raised blood pressure, a spike in adrenaline, muscle tension, increased sweating -- noting "fear," possibly Zubaydah experienced a panic attack.
What could have brought about this "'confrontational' dislocation"? (The term "dislocation of expectation" is commonly used in UK Special Forces and SERE training. H/T cinnamonape at Firedoglake, and also see usage at this link.)
Most likely it was the appearance of James Mitchell and his SERE-style torture methods, replacing the early "rapport"-based interrogation of Ali Soufan and the FBI interrogation team. What Mitchell or whomever is saying here is that when things got rough, Zubaydah was temporarily shaken and "talked" more, subsequently regaining his "calm" and not producing more of what the torturers wanted.
Mitchell arrived in Thailand sometime in April 2002, and FBI interrogator Ali Soufan left in mid-May, in protest over the implementation of Mitchell's "learned helplessness" techniques. Already, Zubaydah had been subjected to forced nudity, sensory overload, shackling and sleep deprivation (and I'd guess, dietary manipulation, i.e., slow starvation), and perhaps other cruel treatment. (Soufan admitted that the FBI interrogation did not meet Geneva Common Article Three standards, either.) If my thesis is correct, the "dislocation" took place sometime before mid-May.
This appears to be corroborated by the fact that it was in mid-May, according to a narrative released by the Senate Intelligence Committee (H/T again to Marcy Wheeler) that the CIA first proposed ratcheting up the pressure on Zubaydah, including the use of the waterboard.
According to CIA records, because the CIA believed that Abu Zubaydah was withholding imminent threat information during the initial interrogation sessions, attorneys from the CIA’s Office of General Counsel met with the Attorney General, the National Security Adviser, the Deputy National Security Adviser, the Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, and the Counsel to the President in mid-May 2002 to discuss the possible use of alternative interrogation methods that differed from the traditional methods used by the U.S. military and intelligence community. At this meeting, the CIA proposed particular alternative interrogation methods, including waterboarding.
The frustration with Zubaydah -- who by mid-May had recovered from his "dislocation" experience (or conversely, had simply nothing more to say, or was already beyond reasonable functioning) -- places the portion of the psych evaluation narrative on this point a minimum of two months before the report was presumably written.
It also means the report could not have been written before mid-May. If the psychological evaluation was written to assess Abu Zubaydah's ability to handle interrogation, or to assess what types of interrogation techniques might be most effective, then it would have been written much earlier. It looks as if they were interested in running an experiment, trying out certain (SERE) techniques, irregardless of the actual psychological characteristics of the individual involved. That's why there was no earlier evaluation. The only purpose for this evaluation was CIA concern that they would not be caught doing something "illegal," i.e., to cover their asses.
John Yoo’s July 14, 2002 letter to John Rizzo, "about what is necessary to establish the crime of torture," may have been the impetus for the production of the "psychological evaluation." Yoo pontificates about his insistence that the crime of torture carry the "specific intent" to induce severe physical pain/suffering or prolonged mental harm. One way, Yoo says, that such intent can be reasonably rejected, and torturers protected from prosecution, is to produce expert evidence "that the conduct would not result in prolonged mental harm":
Thus, if an individual undertook any of the predicate acts for severe mental pain or suffering, or did so in the good faith belief that those acts would not cause the prisoner prolonged mental harm, he would not have acted with the specific intent necessary to establish torture. If, for example, efforts were made to determine what long-term impact, if any, specific conduct would have and it was learned that the conduct would not result in prolonged mental harm, any actions taken while relying on that advice would have be [sic] undertaken in good faith. Due diligence to meet this standard might include such actions as surveying professional literature, consulting with experts, or evidence gained from past experience.
One such "effort" was the "psychological evaluation," which supposedly would show that the superman terrorist Zubaydah could mentally withstand waterboarding. The report was sent to Yoo (probably forwarded by Rizzo) ten days after the above letter. While inferential, it seems plausible, if not likely, the report was written for this purpose between July 14 and July 24, 2002. Even so, the plan to waterboard Zubayda had already been in the works since mid-May.
Abu Zubaydah and the Al Qaeda Resistance Manual
The contradictions regarding the portrayal of Abu Zubaydah's life, noted in part one of this article, are most pronounced around his relationship to the vaunted "resistance" techniques of Al Qaeda fighters. The report retails alleged claims that Zubaydah actually wrote the manual. At another point, it states he is "familiar and probably well versed" in Al Qaeda resistance techniques (emphasis added). It's easy to forget today that Zubaydah was later proven to never have been an Al Qaeda or Taliban member, nor "privy to the information the government alleged he had provided" (H/T Gitcheegumee).
As Marcy Wheeler has pointed out, the claims regarding Abu Zubaydah and the Al Qaeda manual coincide with the early stages of the torture program, when a Mitchell and Jessen review of said manual was used as a cover for the experiment of reverse-engineering SERE techniques into a physical torture program to use on supposed Al Qaeda prisoners.
As a recent article of mine pointed out, the ostensible Al Qaeda manual likely was part of a cover story originating with CIA/Special Operations officers, operating on orders from Cheney's office, and sent down through the JPRA command, who used Mitchell and Jessen, and possibly other outsourcing companies, for implementation of a new torture program. It didn't hurt that they all planned to make a lot of money in the process.
Once the torture program was well under way, the Al Qaeda manual meme faded away, and JPRA insinuated itself as the new, go-to agency for "war on terror" interrogators. In the end, a turf war ensued, with JPRA, Special Operations command, DIA and super-secret covert action arm, the Strategic Support Branch, on one side, and FBI, other existing intelligence groups (like the Naval Criminal Investigative Service) and, to a certain extent CIA, on the other. None of these groups really opposed all abusive interrogations (even the FBI had dirty hands), but were quick to criticize the ineffectiveness of the other group's protocols.
The conflict still continues today. The latest plan of the Obama administration, introduced by its Interrogation Task Force just last Monday, to create an omnibus group of interrogation professionals and place its center at the FBI, represents a partial defeat of sorts for those who placed their bets on the "learned helplessness" paradigm. But it does not represent the end of torture, only the return to the CIA-oriented program based on isolation, sensory deprivation/overload, sleep deprivation, and fear. The latter are enshrined in Appendix M of Army Field Manual 2-22.3, the new "golden standard" for U.S. interrogations.
Did Abu Zubaydah write the Al Qaeda resistance manual or not? Almost certainly not, but the report's own contradictions on this point are telling, as it points to carelessness in writing the report, as the product itself was not important, only its conclusion: Zubaydah should be waterboarded. The purpose of the report was to provide a guarantee -- because a psychological professional signed off on it! -- that it is "safe".
This so-called "evaluation" is obscene, unprofessional, and I’m ashamed that my profession, which has helped so many people, has been dragged into the worst sort of crimes and unethical, illegal behavior. I support the call of Physicians for Human Rights for Congress and the White House to convene a non-partisan commission to investigate the role of medical and psychological professionals in "the design, justification, supervision, and use" of the torture program, and to prosecute those involved.
Originally published in slightly different form as a two-part series (one and two) at Firedoglake.com. This version, crossposted from The Public Record, contains some editorial corrections and additional material.