I am just putting this diary up in a hurry, because I was remineded of my "No to Eu" vote exactly 16 years ago today when I saw two Euro diaries recently up. As those diaries includes a video with a controversial British politician I wanted to tell how a rural anti-establishment centre-left coalition in Norway successfully campaigned against Norwegian EU membership in 1994 (as they had previously done in 1972).
The Organization Nei til EU (No to the EU) has a historical oversight written by Dag Seierstad on their homesite, that I will quote here to tell how Norway was able to avoid membership. As this is a political organization I don´t think it´s copyright violation to quote it at length (somewhat edited):
During 1990 and 1991 the whole establishment kept on telling the people: It is no longer possible to remain outside the EU. The Berlin Wall has come down. Now comes the New Europe, and Norway must be part of it.
Gradually there developed in the population a mood of resignation. We used to call it a "belief in fate". Opinion polls started to show majorities of about 10 % in favour of membership. And more importantly: when asked "do you think Norway will become a member of the EU in five or ten years", 85 % answered yes.
Therefore we had to fight this mood of resignation - the tendency of looking at the EU as destiny, as historical fate.
The organization "No to the EU" was founded as an information group in 1988 - and was established as a proper organization in August 1990.
At the end of 1990 our organization had about 15,000 members. At the time of the referendum in November 1994 our membership was 145,000 - or approximately five percent of the electorate.
We had more than 500 local branches - in all 440 local municipalities and at parish level in the bigger cities.
We were better organized in the countryside than in the towns and cities. In Oslo we had only one percent of the electorate as members. In my own region with 180,000 inhabitants we had 15,000 members - or 11 percent of the electorate. In some small countryside communities up to 50 percent of the electorate were members of our organization.
THE CAMPAIGN UP TO THE REFERENDUM.
- the power elite were against us
- the government, the ministries, the whole government apparatus were against us
- the top people in economic life were against us
- the banks, the big firms, the employers' organization were against us and provided money for our opponents
- most of the big newspapers were against us
Parties opposing membership:
Three so- called "center parties" with a combined voting strength of 20 -30 % were all campaigning against membership.
The Socialist Left Party with voting strength of 6-8 % (12 % in 1993) and the ultra-left party, Red Electoral Alliance, with a voting strength of 1 % were both opposed to membership.
[Labour and The Conservatives were for membership, the far right Progress Party didn´t campaign on the issue)
What did our opponents tell us during the campaign?
The fairy tale:
- that membership would add to democracy
- that the EU is equivalent to international cooperation
- that the EU will and can control capital in the age of transnational capital
- that the EU is needed to solve environmental problems.
We were able to show people that those arguments were not convincing. Then the other side turned to threats - just as in 1972.
The threats - if people voted no:
- that our exports would be hit
- that capital would move abroad and investments would decrease
- that the interest rate would rise
- that the value of our money, the krone, would drop
- that employment in industry would be hit
THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF THE NO CAMPAIGN:
To us who oppose membership of the EU, the main question - the question above everything else - is the question of democracy.
In all European countries, democracy developed within a national framework. When a decision is taken at a national level, when a new law is enacted, we know who is responsible:
- the government is responsible
- the majority in parliament is responsible
- for more specific decisions a minister or a department within a ministry is responsible.
There is someone who is responsible. If the decision is bad enough, we can in principle elect another Government at the next election.
That is not possible in Brussels - for two reasons:
- No one is responsible. At least: It is impossible to know who is responsible.
- Even if we knew who were responsible, we could not get rid of them. We could not make them responsible for their actions or decisions.
Conclusion: If no one is responsible, then the whole system is irresponsible - and a threat to democracy.
THE REFERENDUM PROCESS:
Four countries applied for membership of the EU, all four should have their referenda, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway.
We proposed - in agreement with the no movements in the other Scandinavian countries - that all Scandinavian countries should vote on the same day. But the governments decided to break the chain where opposition seemed to be the weakest.
So Austria voted in June - and the result was 38 % no.
Finland voted in September - and the result was 43 % no.
Sweden voted on 13. November - and the result was 48 % no
Norway was to vote 15 days later - on 28. November. And the government hoped that the fear of being completely isolated outside the Union would produce a majority in favour of membership.
Rally against the EU on a rainy November day. Leader of the agrarian Centre Party was speaking:
THE REFERENDUM DAY, 28. NOVEMBER 1994.
The weather forecast on the referendum day was as unfortunate as it might be - with nice weather in the central regions - the main yes regions - and storm and rain along the coast and in the North - in the no regions.
Then came the first results - from the small communities along the northern coast. The votes were cast 80 to 20 or even 90 to 10, and the participation rate was 90 percent, 90 percent, 90 percent - and we knew we might win. At the end of the night the average participation for the whole country ended at a record 88 %. And for the first time the participation rate was as high in the periphery as in the central regions.
WHAT DIVIDED THE VOTERS?
As in 1972 four dimensions split the voters:
1.a center-periphery dimension:
- Oslo voting 2:1 in favour of membership
- the periphery (the countryside, the fishing communities, the far north) voting 2:1 against membership.
- a social dimension:
- the power elite, the better-off, the highly educated, the upwardly mobile people (the career oriented) tended to vote in favour of membership
- the powerless, the poorer, the lesser educated, the ordinary worker tended to vote against membership.
- a political right-left dimension:
People at the right of the political spectrum tended to vote in favour of membership. We find this tendency among the voters in general, but even more so within the labour movement, inside the Labour party, and inside the trade unions.
- a gender dimension:
Men voted 50-50, women voted against membership by 55-45.
WHAT KIND OF VICTORY?
We won the debates among ordinary people because our activists knew the facts, knew the treaties, knew the results of the negociations between Norway and the EU, knew the consequences of membership.
We won because the establishment had to confront an informed and organized people.
Dag Seierstad: Norway-EU 1961-1994
Wikipedia on the referendum
The End Result: After the people had voted down membership in the EU, Norway instead became a member of the European Economic Area, which consists of the EU, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein and is a kind of EU light membership. It´s far from an ideal arrangement, but it still feels good to have voted no to the EU.
Norway – European Union relations