The first block quote below shows an abstract of an article submitted to the U.S. Army War College. Subsequent block quotes are from the downloaded article (available for free). I have long since gotten over my surprise that articles from these sources often seem to advocate against military force. In this case, it seems like the author feels that building democracy will strengthen the region and our strategic interests, while pursuing oil and gas (our current real policy, along with pursuing military bases)just benefits the local dictators and ultimately undermines stability. Makes sense. Our current policy has certainly been disastrous.
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2-27-09
Russia and China have been reacting to the pressures of changing U.S.-Central Asia policy over the past 5 years as has the United States. In response to the "color" revolutions, they achieved broad agreement on the priority of regime security and the need to limit the long-term military presence of the United States in Central Asia. These are also two key areas—defining the political path of Central Asian states and securing a strategic foothold in the region—where the United States finds itself in competition with Russia and China. The Russia-China partnership should not be seen as an anti-U.S. bloc, nor should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) be viewed as entirely cohesive. Although there is considerable suspicion of U.S. designs on Central Asia, divergent interests within the SCO, among Central Asian states, and especially between Russia and China serve to limit any coordinated anti-U.S. activity.
Despite the fissures within the SCO and the competitive tendencies within the Sino-Russian partnership, the United States will not have an easy time achieving its aims in Central Asia. The author documents how American policy goals—energy cooperation, regional security, and support for democracy and the rule of law—continue to run at cross-purposes with one another. In particular, she asserts that competition to secure basing arrangements and energy contracts only benefits authoritarian regimes at the expense of enduring regional security. She argues further that the rhetoric about a new Cold War in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis, and the more general tendency to view U.S.-Russia-China competition in the region with 19th century lenses, as some sort of "new great game," obscures the common interests the great powers share in addressing transnational problems in Central Asia.
Since 2005, the prospects for democratic change have been dimming, and Central Asian leaders have become increasingly suspicious of what they view as U.S. interference in their domestic affairs. Against a background of renewed concerns about regime security since the "color" revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and in light of the 2005 protests in Andijan, the Uzbek regime requested that the United States close its base at Karshi Khanabad (known as K2). With the rise in the price of oil, Russian influence in the region and on energy flows has increased. Moreover, Russia has become more determined to restore its influence on its southern flank, partly to guarantee access to needed gas supplies for reexport to Europe and for its own domestic needs, but also to keep the United States at bay. As China’s energy needs have grown and its policymakers have sought to develop its western provinces, China, too, has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia. All of this is occurring at a time when Al-Qaeda has become reinvigorated in Afghanistan, instability is deepening in Pakistan, a poor U.S. image pervades the Muslim world, and the United States faces challenges in its relations with Russia and China.
Despite the tendency to depict great power relations in Central Asia as essentially conflictual, the United States also faces many opportunities for multilateral cooperation due to the increasing primacy of such transnational threats. Given U.S. funding limitations, the Obama administration should attempt to coordinate with key allies, such as the EU and Japan, which also have significant policy initiatives in Central Asia and share many of the U.S. concerns. Moreover, the United States also should seek opportunities to engage both China and Russia on areas of common interest, such as achieving stability in Afghanistan, reducing narcotics and human trafficking, preventing proliferation, and encouraging energy conservation and efficiency in Central Asia. Finally, the United States should explore mechanisms to engage the SCO, either within the context of existing Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) initiatives, or through new efforts, such as an SCO plus three format, which could include the United States, Japan, and the EU on issues of common concern like Afghanistan or narcotics trafficking. The monograph develops these recommendations in a final section.