This is the 196th diary since the earthquake in Haiti. This is the book diary edition of the diary.
"The Haitian people are asking not for charity, but for justice."
The Uses of Haiti last paragraph pg. 307
What, then is to be done? Speaking of events since the 1991 coup, Noam Chomsky has noted that "honest commentary would place all of this in the context of our unwavering opposition to freedom and human rights in Haiti for no less than 200 years." The first order of business, for citizens of the United States, might be a candid and careful assessment of our ruinous policies towards Haiti. Remorse is not a very fashionable sentiment. But for many, old-fashioned penitence might be the first step towards a new solidarity, a pragmatic solidarity that could supplant both our malignant policies of the past and the well -meaning but unfocused charity that does not respond to Haitian aspirations. The Haitian people are asking not for charity, but for justice.
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This is where Paul Farmer's book The Uses of Haiti ends. This is where our new diary begins. Farmer answers our question- what to do first, "The first order of business, for citizens of the United States, might be a candid and careful assessment of our ruinous policies towards Haiti." that is what this diary will attempt to do (mainly through the discussion that takes place in the comments). Many of us are new to learning about Haiti. But we really want to help. This diary is a place to learn about Haiti, about US policy towards Haiti, and to advocate for Haiti.
Be sure not to miss JDH's Summer Reading list..
Meanwhile, in Chapter 5 of Damming the Flood, the title is "2001-2003: the return of the army". I have to admire Hallward's self-restraint in refraining from scare quotes when referring to the democratic opposition, our old friends the CD.
The worried neighbor
This is the Dominican Republic, Haiti's old enemy, and cooperative American client state. They had already provided shelter for ex-Army and FRAPH exiles, and were known for years for their mistreatment of Haitian migrant workers. Why were they worried? Aristide had gone and abolished the Haitian army! Dominican Republic generals were hearing calls to slash the size of the DR's bloated army! What to do, what to do?
The distressed democratic opposition
Poor Convergence Democratique! by July 2001, their option zero or eternal no was wearing thin, ground down by Aristide's ruthless compromises. It looked as though they would have to reach an accomodation with him. What a strange coincidence that FLRN raids took place at the end of the month and sabotaged the talks!
The seductive hotel
Santo Domingo Hotel, that is, in the Dominican Republic. Guy Phillipe (see below under Ingredients), Paul Arcelin, his polical adviser (and also CD representative to the Dominican Republic), Stanley Lucas of the Republican-Party-backed IRI (remember him from Chapter 4? Haitian MRE conservative fossil) all stayed there, and somehow Never Talked Politics.
Even in December 2003, when representatives of the CD, private sector, and student leaders met to plan Phillipe's armed insurgency, all remained pure. (Yeah.)
Ingredients to reconstitute an army
Curiously enough, it proved more difficult to buy up criminal gangs in Haiti's slums than one might have expected. Ex-army and FRAPH exiles proved more useful.
Guy Phillipe, once of the Haitian Army, became the public face of the FLRN "insurgents". He went to the Ecuador military academy from 1992 to 1995, joined the new Haitian Police in 1995, and was posted to Delmas in Port-au-Prince from 1997 to 1999, where he was implicated in the summary execution of "dozens of suspected gang memebers". Sensing disapproval, he holed up in the Dominican Republic from 2000 to 2004, often at the Santo Domingo Hotel.
Louis Jodel Chamblain served on a FRAPH death squad under Emmanuel Constant. He was described in a U.S. intelligence report as a "cold-blooded, cutthroat, psychopathic killer". (This served to make Constant look urbane in contrast.) He was involved in the 1995 Raboteau massacre.
Jean Tatoune, another FRAPH alumnus, was in prison in 2000 as a result of that same massacre. He escaped from prison in 2002 and rejoined his buddies.
Ravix Remissainthe and Jean-Baptiste Clotaire were more ex-army types who joined up with the small anti-Lavalas force training in the Dominican Republic.
Insurgent raids
I will spare you some of the disgusting details, mostly because I can't bring myself to type them. The first big raid was July 28, 2001, much to the relief of the democratic opposition. Attacks were made simultaneously on the national police academy in Port-au-Prince and three police stations near the DR border, up on the Central Plateau. (35 suspects were arrested but never prosecuted, which of course did wonders for police morale.) The Presidential Palace was attacked in December 2001. Belladere sustained several attacks in 2002; attackers missed a FL activist, so killed five of his family members instead. Other damage and deaths from the following attacks. The Dominicans played catch and release with suspects, briefly arresting 5 including Phillip and Arcolin, but quickly letting them go. In May 2003 the Peligre hydroelectric plant was attacked. By February 2004, when isolated police and Fanmi Lavalas activists had good reason to fear, the full-scale attack started.
You were attacked? Shame on you!
The CD denied any connection with the insurgents. Starting in 2001, they claimed that the government staged the attacks to get sympathy and suppress the poor little democratic opposition. Oh, I think it's time for a blockquote! From pate 127,
By the time such attacks had grown into the open insurgency of February 2004, the CD took a rather different position. CD spokesman ex-colonel Himmler Rebu told Radio Metropole on 9 February that "Aristide has no choice but to resign after losing control of towns in different parts of the country."
The US and the OAS blamed Aristide's adminstration for failing to create a "climate of security" needed for negotiations with the CD. (!!!!) Oh, and I've got to blockquote Roger Noriega.
When Roger Noriega called on Aristide to take steps to "heal the wounds" caused by the 17 December 2001 attack on the presidential palace, for instance, he made it clear that in the opinion of the US it was the government (rather than those who attacked it) that was mainly responsible for causing those wounds.
Oh, and one final blockquote from page 130:
When the Security Council finally got round to passing a resolution on the crisis in Haiti, on 29 February 2004, it drew attention to the regrettable levels of violence and insecurity but made no mention of the role or even the existence of the rebels.
The fate of talkers
Ravix Rammissainthe and other ex-military insurgents started claiming 10 years of back pay in the summer of 2004, based on Aristide's causing their unemployment. However, when promised promotions and raises failed to materialize, he started talking his fool head off. From page 128,
As a frustrated Ravix began to outlive his usefulness, in the autumn of 2004 he made ever more incriminating claims on public radio about his pre-coup association with leading figures in the CD and the G184. Acoording to Ravix, all of the most notorious incidents that opposition leaders tried to pin on a tyrannical government - the attack on the National Palace of 17 December 2001, the hit-and-run raids in and arround Belladere in 2002-03, the sbotage of the Boutilliers radio transmitters on 13 January 2004, etc. - were in fact commissioned by these very opposition leaders themselves.
He was gunned down by the Haitian national police in April 2005.
Phillipe also started talking, though he was a bit more cautious. in 2006, for instance, he said Serge Gilles of PANPRA ordered the Peligre dam attack.
By a curious coincidence, the DEA (U.S.) indicted him in July 2007.