In a diary... er, post... published last Thursday (Egyptian Elections, Part I), I attempted 1) to draw attention to the upcoming parliamentary elections in Egypt, 2) to discuss the development over the last six months or so of the innovations to the electoral system, 3) to outline the schedule of elections for both houses of Parliament, 4) to note a few of the unresolved and/or controversial issues surrounding these elections and 5) above all to highlight the fundamental importance of these elections vis-a-vis the drafting of a new Egyptian constitution. My intent in this post is to discuss the major political parties vying for seats in Parliament and the available public-polling.
First, however, I would like to add some additional information to two issues raised in the previous post and subsequent Witnessing Revolution Liveblogs (the question of whether expatriates will be allowed to vote and the supra-constitutional maneuvering by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] to protect their fiefdom) and discuss briefly as well the "Law on the Corruption of Political Life."
Expatriate Voting
As noted at the tail-end of Egyptian Elections, Part I, the current Egyptian government under the stewardship of the SCAF announced their decision to facilitate voting by Egyptian nationals living abroad, thus fulfilling (perhaps) one of the demands of the protest movements. I noted previously my doubts that some of the obstacles to implementing expatriate voting could be resolved in the very limited time available before the first stage of voting (28 November), but the interim constitution is being amended to allow expatriates to vote. Expatriate registration (via the Internet or in-person at diplomatic facilities) has been scheduled by the High Elections Commission for 10 to 19 November. An estimated 500,000 of the approximately 8,000,000 Egyptians living abroad registered to vote in the first few hours yesterday. Diplomatic personnel at Egyptian embassies and consulates will be authorized to monitor the balloting in place of judicial personnel. Some background information is available via al-Masry al-Youm's English Edition: 30 June, 15 October, 31 October, 6 November, 7 November and 10 November.
Supra-Constitutional Maneuvering
In my previous post I also alluded to the supra-constitutional maneuvering by the SCAF, an issue raised again in a comment there. While I still intend to defer discussion of the SCAF's perspective on oversight of their budget until Part III of this series (my view is that it has more bearing on the drafting of a new constitution by the soon-to-be elected parliament than on the parliamentary elections per se) a little background may nonetheless be useful for curious readers.
On 1 November, Deputy Prime Minister al-Selmi introduced a document containing 1) details regarding the parliamentary procedures for forming the Constituent Assembly charged with drafting the new constitution and 2) a 22-Article list of "basic constitutional principles" in view of which the new constitution should be drafted. Many of these Articles are reiterations of the basic rights of citizens and the basic structures of the Egyptian State from the Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 and are, in that sense, unproblematic. However, Articles 9 and 10 sparked a serious political controversy, proposing that the SCAF shall have sole authority to consider military affairs and the military's budget, and that only the SCAF would have the authority to propose legislation related to the military. While al-Selmi quickly (3 November) introduced language amending Article 9 by omitting "solely" and by proposing a National Defense Council (including members of both houses of Parliament as well as the head of the Central Auditing Agency) to share supervision of the military's budget and legislation related to the military, these two Articles are viewed by many across the political spectrum of Egyptian politics as well as by international observers as a fairly naked power-play to insulate the military's economy-within-the-Egyptian-economy. I've cited on numerous occasions previously the work of Robert Springborg on the Egyptian military's economic fiefdom, and will simply paste here a snippet of an interview conducted with Springborg by al-Masry al-Youm, well worth reading in full:
Al-Masry Al-Youm: In early February, before Hosni Mubarak stepped down, you warned that the military would look to hold on to power. This is what we seem to be witnessing now with a longer-than-planned transitional phase.
Robert Springborg: I don’t believe I said the military would seek to hold onto power in the form of a classical coup d’etat. What I meant to say in any case was that the military would seek to ensure that it was not subordinated to any other power. The delay in constituting a new system of government results probably not from a change in the military’s strategic objective of “ruling but not governing,” but from the tactical difficulties of forming a civilian government that forswears any meaningful control over the military.
The SCAF's supra-constitutional maneuvering is a fundamental problem for many Egyptian parties on both the political
left and
right. This is a crisis of legitimacy and transparency for the SCAF for whom the successful management of their reputation and their economic interests seem now potentially at odds.
"Law on the Corruption of Political Life"
The great unresolved question with regard to upcoming parliamentary elections is that of the eligibility of former members of Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP), now dissolved, to run as candidates associated with other or new political parties. The SCAF's position on this issue is anticipated by the imminent release of the "Law on the Corruption of Political Life," an amended version of the 1952 "Treachery Law." The law is expected to bar those convicted of political corruption from seeking office but it is not at all clear how it will impact the list of candidates for parliamentary seats given that the High Elections Commission is supposed to review the final list of candidates for parliamentary elections this Friday, 11 November. While many citizens and parties across the spectrum support efforts to bar ex-NDPers from office, others note that the inconsistent application of the 1952 Treachery Law was an essential tool in successive regimes' ability to marginalize and effectively criminalize opposition parties and dominate elections. This may be a "be careful what you wish for" kind of moment...
...WE NOW RETURN TO OUR REGULARLY SCHEDULED PROGRAMMING...
POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITIONS
There are currently almost four dozen legally registered political parties in Egypt although not every party is running candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections, either as part of a list (for the seats contested via a closed-list proportional system) or as individual candidates (for the seats contested via two-seat constituencies.) It would be overly obsessive to describe all of these registered political parties, so I have chosen here to provide some background information on the major parties (those drawing significant percentages [>~5%] in recent polling) and then simply list other parties according to ideological orientation and/or coalition membership.
The Freedom and Justice Party (Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-Adala)
Established: 6 June 2011
Leadership: Mohammed Morsi, Rafiq Habib, Essam al-Arian, Saad al-Katatni
The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was founded by longtime leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood and is the dominant political party in Egypt at the moment, likely set to take a plurality of seats in Parliament. Although consistently identified as an Islamist party—and properly so, in my opinion—the FJP prefers to describe itself as a civil and moderate party and, to that end, has sought alliances with secular and left-leaning parties as part of the Democratic Alliance.
Resources: Egypt State Information Service; Bikya Masr; Carnegie Endowment
al-Wafd / The New Wafd Party (Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid)
Established: 4 February 1978
Chairman: Sayyid al-Badawi
The Wafd Party is among the oldest and most recognized political parties in Egypt, having been the ruling party in Egypt until 1952. Abolished in 1953, the party was revitalized in 1978 as the New Wafd Party yet is known simply as al-Wafd. The party is secular and left-leaning. On 13 June 2011 al-Wafd announced its coalition with the Freedom and Justice Party in the Democratic Alliance, a move rejected by a number of prominent members who then left al-Wafd for parties allied to the Egypy Bloc coalition. Following heated debate over the proportion of seats alloted to each party on coalition lists, al-Wafd withdrew from the Democratic Alliance on 2 October. Al-Wafd has consistently polled second behind the Freedom and Justice Party.
Resources: Egypt State Information Service; Bikya Masr; Carnegie Endowment
al-Nour / The Light (Hizb al-Nour)
Established: 12 June 2011
Chairman: Emad al-Din Abd al-Ghafour
Al-Nour is the most visible and consistently highest polling Salafist party in Egypt. They were members of the Democratic Alliance (with the Freedom and Justice Party, al-Wafd and others) until 3 September when they left the coalition citing the disproportionate influence of small secular parties. On 29 September al-Nour announced the formation under their stewardship of the Islamist Alliance coalition, seeking to partner with more conservative offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood. In opinion polling, al-Nour and the Islamist Alliance draw ~6-8% support, a distant third to the Freedom and Justice Party and al-Wafd.
Resources: Egypt State Information Service; Bikya Masr; Carnegie Endowment
al-Adl / Justice Party (Hizb al-Adalah)
Established: 27 June 2011
Leadership: Mustafa al-Naggar, Ahmed Shoukri, Mohammed Gabar et alii
Al-Adl was formed in May 2011 and legally registered in late June. Many of the members of the party's Executive Committee as well as many of the party's candidates were key figures in the opposition movements such as Kefaya and April 6 Youth Movement which were involved in events leading up to the revolution and during the protests themselves. Al-Adl has consistently positioned itself as a centrist movement, bridging the leftist Democratic Bloc and the conservative Democratic and Islamist Alliances, and has employed messaging of consensus and compromise among all parties to fulfill the goals of the revolution. Al-Adl attempted to form a centrist coalition called "The Third Way" but that was ultimately abandoned and al-Adl has resisted joining any other coalition. They have polled fairly steadily at ~5%.
Resources: Egypt State Information Service; Bikya Masr; Carnegie Endowment
Other Registered Parties (in alphabetical order)
al-Ahrar / Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar): secular, liberal
Arab Democratic Nasserist Party (Hizb al-Arabi al-Dimuqrati al-Nasseri): secular, socialist
Arab Justice and Equality Party (Hizb al-Adala wa al-Musawa al-Arabi): secular, liberal
Arab Unity Party (Hizb al-Tawhid al-Arabi): Islamist
al-Asalah / Authenticity Party (Hizb al-Asalah): Islamist
Building and Development Party (Hizb al-Bina wa al-Tanmiya): Islamist [political wing of al-Jamaa al-Islamiya]
Conservative Party (Hizb al-Muhafzin): Islamist
Democratic Front (Hizb al-Gabha al-Dimuqratiyya): secular, liberal
Democratic Generation Party (Hizb al-Jeel al-Dimuqrati): secular, socialist
Democratic Peace Party (Hizb al-Salaam al-Dimuqrati): secular, socialist
Democratic Union (Hizb al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati): secular, liberal
Egypt 2000 Party (Hizb Misr 2000): secular, socialist
Egypt Freedom Party (Hizb Misr al-Hurriya): secular, liberal
Egyptian Arab Socialist Party (Hizb Misr al-Arabi al-Istiraki): secular, socialist
Egyptian Arab Union Party (Hizb al-Ittihad al-Misri al-Arabi): secular, liberal
Egyptian Citizen Party (Hizb al-Muwatin a-Misri): secular, liberal, numerous ex-NDPers
Egyptian Current Party (Hizb al-Tayyar al-Masri): Islamist
Egyptian Green Party (Hizb al-Khudr al-Misri): secular, liberal
Egyptian Labor Party (Hizb al-Amal al-Misri): Islamist, socialist
Egyptian Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Masri): moderate Sufi religious party
Egyptian Revolution Party (Hizb al-Sawra al-Misriyya): liberal
Egyptian Social Democratic Party (Hizb al-Misri al-Dimuqrati al-Igtimai): secular, liberal
Egyptian Youth Party (Hizb al-Shabab al-Misr): secular, liberal
Equality and Development Party (Hizb al-Musawa wa al-Tanmiya): moderate Islamist
al-Fadilah / Virtue Party (Hizb al-Fadilah): Islamist
Free Egyptians Party (Hizb al-Masriyin al-Ahrar): secular, liberal
Free Republican Party (Hizb aj-Jumhuri al-Hurr): secular, socialist
Free Social Constitution Party (Hizb al-Dousturi al-Igtimai al-Hurr): secular, liberal
Freedom Party (Hizb al-Hurriya): secular, liberal, numerous ex-NDPers
al-Ghad / Tomorrow Party (Hizb al-Ghad): secular, liberal
al-Ghad al-Jadid (Hizb al-Ghad al-Jadid): secular, liberal [offshoot of al-Ghad]
al-Karama / Dignity Party (Hizb al-Karama): secular, socialist
Modern Egypt Party (Hizb Masr al-Haditha): secular, liberal
National Conciliation Party (Hizb al-Wifak al-Qawmi): secular, socialist
New National Party (Hizb al-Watani al-Jadid): secular, liberal, numerous ex-NDPers
Reform and Awakening Party (Hizb al-Islah wa al-Tawiya): Islamist
Reform and Development Party (Hizb al-Islah wa al-Tanmiya): secular, liberal
Reform and Renaissance Party (Hizb al-Islah wa al-Nahda): moderate Islamist
Revolutionary Egypt Party (Hizb Misr al-Sawra): secular, liberal
Social Justice Party (Hizb al-Adala al-Igtimaiyya): Islamist
Social Solidarity Party (Hizb al-Takaful al-Igtimai): secular, liberal
Socialist Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar al-Ishtirakiyyin): Islamist, socialist
Socialist Popular Alliance (Hizb al-Tahaluf al-Shaabi al-Istiraki): secular, socialist
al-Tagammu / National Progressive Unionist Party (Hizb al-Tagammu al-Watani al-Taqqadumi al-Wahdawi): secular, socialist
al-Umma (Hizb al-Umma): Islamist
Union Party (Hizb al-Ittihad): secular, liberal, numerous ex-NDPers
Voice of Egypt Party (Hizb Sout Masr): secular, liberal
al-Wasat (Hizb al-Wasat al-Jadid): moderate Islamist
Young Egypt Party (Hizb Misr al-Fatah): Islamist, socialist
Coalitions
From the middle of June through the end of October, parties' leaderships were deeply involved in the formation of political coalitions through which lists of candidates could be run and which would afford some gravitas to smaller or regionally-specific parties. Four of these coalitions are worth noting here.
The Democratic Alliance was founded on 12 June as a broad coalition of 34 leftist, liberal, centrist and Islamist parties including both the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the liberal al-Wafd party, the two dominant political parties. Through a series of internal conflicts, notably regarding the proportion of seats to allot to each party in the coalition but also for ideological reasons, the Democratic Coalition has now withered to 11 parties among which only the Freedom and Justice Party, al-Ghad al-Jadid and al-Karama have significant support. The defection of al-Wafd on 2 October was of particular import, as al-Wafd was the largest proportional 'balance' to the Freedom and Justice Party. The Democratic Alliance is contesting almost every list and individual seat in the elections, with candidates of the Freedom and Justice Party representing ~70% of the lists and ~90% of the individual candidacies.
The Egypt Bloc was founded on 15 August a a coalition of 14 liberal, leftist and mostly secular parties. Attrition through ideological conflict has resulted in a current Egypt Bloc of three parties: the Free Egyptians Party (50% of the candidacies in the Bloc), the Egyptian Social Democratic Party (40%) and al-Tagammu (10%.) The Bloc is fielding 233 candidates on lists across 64 constituencies.
The Islamist Alliance was established on 29 September under the leadership of al-Nour, the first of the Salafist parties to defect from the Democratic Alliance. Al-Nour is joined in the Islamist Alliance by two other parties: al-Asalah and the Building and Development Party (the political wing of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya.) The Islamist Alliance is competing in all list-based electoral districts.
The most recently formed coalition is the Saving the Revolution Alliance, comprised mainly of former partners in the Egypt Bloc. This coalition represents a grouping of leftist, youth and moderate Islamist parties, the most significant of which are the Egypt Freedom Party, the Socialist Popular Alliance Party and the Revolutionary Youth Coalition. The Saving the Revolution Alliance is fielding 300 candidates (250 list-based, 50 individual) in 33 districts.
PUBLIC OPINION POLLING
While admittedly not perfect, the most consistent (thus comparable) polling available for the Egyptian parliamentary elections is being conducted by the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute in cooperation with Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Each poll consists of a sample of 2400 voting-age respondents across 22 of the 29 governorates (major civil divisions.) Three polls have already been conducted (5-17 August; 11-21 September; 10-26 October) and a fourth is planned prior to the first stage of the elections on 28 November.
Respondents in each round of polling have been asked whether they intend to vote or not and whether they are decided for whom to cast their vote. Here are the results for those two questions:
|
intend to vote |
do not intend to vote |
August |
82% |
18% |
September |
73% |
27% |
October |
76% |
24% |
|
decided |
undecided |
August |
43% |
57% |
September |
62% |
38% |
October |
49% |
51% |
The strong intent to vote is undoubtedly a good sign for Egyptian democratization and I hope that this intent is manifest during the parliamentary elections themselves. There has been a certain amount of recent fear-mongering in the Egyptian press (particularly Al-Ahram) regarding the potential for uncertain security at polling-stations, which could be a factor in keeping voters away.
The surprisingly (to my mind) high percentage of undecided voters should perhaps temper the certainty with which we discuss the following data for support of political parties.
|
August |
September |
October |
Freedom and Justice Party |
31.5% |
39.0% |
35.7% |
al-Wafd |
14.8% |
20.0% |
26.2% |
al-Nour & Islamist Alliance |
6.0% |
6.8% |
8.9% |
al-Adl |
2.6% |
4.7% |
5.2% |
Union Party (Hizb al-Ittihad) |
0.0% |
0.0% |
4.3% |
Free Egyptians Party |
7.5% |
6.0% |
3.9% |
al-Karama |
1.9% |
3.8% |
2.1% |
al-Wasat |
1.6% |
1.0% |
2.1% |
Egyptian Social Democratic Party |
5.2% |
0.6% |
2.0% |
Arab Democratic Nasserist Party |
3.7% |
2.7% |
1.5% |
al-Ghad |
1.4% |
3.5% |
1.4% |
Egypt Freedom Party |
1.6% |
0.6% |
1.2% |
New National Party (& other ex-NDPers) |
0.4% |
2.8% |
0.9% |
al-Tagammu |
2.2% |
0.7% |
0.9% |
Revolutionary Youth Coalition |
17.2% |
2.0% |
0.4% |
Democratic Front |
1.4% |
1.3% |
0.0% |
Other |
1.0% |
4.4% |
3.8% |
I am not too surprised by the high polling for either the Freedom and Justice Party or for al-Wafd. These parties have not only superior organizational skills and superior name-recognition due to their long histories but they also represent two fundamental orientations to Egyptian identity as a nation, in the region, in the world and in the context of Western modernity. As in Tunisia and in Libya, the critically important public debate over identity was deferred in favor of a top-down notion of identity determined by the authoritarian regimes in power following national independence. The Muslim Brotherhood and al-Wafd are best positioned to guide the terms of this debate and implement an agreeable vision within the context of the new constitution.
Many of the leftist and youth parties and coalitions will, I think, be unhappy with what they will perceive as a step (or many steps) back from the revolutionary ideals which drove the movements in Midan Tahrir and elsewhere but I suspect that their vision for radical reform will be met by a generally conservative attitude of “too much, too soon.”
WHAT'S NEXT, THEN?
My goal in these first two diaries / posts has been to provide enough background information on the upcoming Egyptian parliamentary elections that we have some resources here on dKos to make sense of events, and results, as they unfold. I've attempted, at least so far, to limit imposing too much of my own opinion although I'm more than happy to participate in discussions in the comments.
There are a few unresolved practical issues leading up the the beginning of the first stage of the elections on 28 November, and DEDI / ACPSS are planning a fourth opinion-poll just prior to then, so I'm planning on one more background post, effectively bringing all of this information up to date. At that point, I'll explore some larger issues beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood's and al-Wafd's perspectives on Egyptian identity, Islam and modernity which I alluded to above, and which I think are going to be the defining issue of these parliamentary elections.
As always, drop a note in the comments if you see an error or omission and I'll make corrections. My notes for these elections are all over the place, so while I'm aiming for completeness I can't swear to it. Thanks for your patience :~)