Despite the recent spat over the Guardian's contributor, the relations between the UK media and the security services is rather more cosy than you might think. Nor are government officials quite as confident about preventing revelations as they pretend.
First, the long standing "gentleman's agreement" about what should and should not be published. This is under a system called the "Defence Advisory" system or more widely known as the "D - Notice".
Defence Advisory Notices (DA-Notices) are drawn up by a committee comprising members of the media and government officials.
The Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee (DPBAC) oversees a voluntary code which operates between the UK Government departments which have responsibilities for national security and the media. It uses the Defence Advisory (DA)-Notice System as its vehicle. The objective of the DA-Notice System is to prevent inadvertent public disclosure of information that would compromise UK military and intelligence operations and methods, or put at risk the safety of those involved in such operations, or lead to attacks that would damage the critical national infrastructure and/or endanger lives.
http://www.dnotice.org.uk/...
Yes, they have a web site and you can read the current 5 DA Notices on there. Two are of particular interest in the Miranda/Guardian case.
DA Notice 03 concerns "ciphers and secure communications" and asks that no details be published without consulting the Secretary to the Committee about such ciphers and "related data protection measures and communication facilities, or those of NATO or other allies."
DA Notice 05 concerns the UK Security and Intelligence Services and the Special Services. In full it reads:
Information falling within the following categories is normally regarded as being highly classified. It is requested that such information, unless it has been the subject of an official announcement or has been widely disclosed or discussed, should not be published without first seeking advice:
(a) specific covert operations, sources and methods of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ, Defence Intelligence Units, Special Forces and those involved with them, the application of those methods*, including the interception of communications, and their targets; the same applies to those engaged on counter-terrorist operations;
(b) the identities, whereabouts and tasks of people who are or have been employed by these services or engaged on such work, including details of their families and home addresses, and any other information, including photographs, which could assist terrorist or other hostile organisations to identify a target;
(c) addresses and telephone numbers used by these services, except those now made public.
A very common situation where this comes into effect is coverage of security operations undertaken by, for example, the SAS (or its sister Special Boat Squadron which is an equivalent of the US Navy Seals). In all cases, the faces of the soldiers are pixellated out or when they do publish a book about their exploits, they adopt noms de plume.
You may notice the phrase "or has been widely disclosed or discussed" which recognises some of the realities of modern media and communications. For example, the UK government until fairly recently did not even acknowledge the existence of the Secret Intelligence Service including GCHQ. Their locations were officially state secrets even though most people knew - which is even more difficult nowadays given that they have a bl..dy great building on the south bank of the Thames that has featured in James Bond films.
The previous position was shown in its true farcical light back in the 1980s when a retired MI5 intelligence officer wrote his memoires in response to his anger at pension arrangements which did not credit him for his time at GCHQ. In "Spycatcher", Peter Wright gave many operational details and named staff - exactly the sort of thing covered by DA Notice 05. This was also probably the reason for the reaction "what's new" in response to Snowden leaks about the arrangements between GCHQ and the NSA. When they heard of the book, the UK government attempted to block its publication, first in Australia where they failed. On the other hand they did obtain an injunction at the High Court in London. They did however have a slight problem - the ruling only applied to England and Wales. In theory extracts could be published in Scottish newspapers (although most decided not to risk it as they distributed into England). Nor was it possible to stop booksellers in the USA from selling it. The shops at Newark and JFK did a roaring trade with tourists returning to the UK, I still have my copy!
Incidentally, this throws new light on the agreement between the Guardian and the security services to destroy the discs on which they held the Snowden files. Quite clearly the Guardian would have consulted the Committee Secretary on the publication of their articles and their publication in the USA would have been taken into account when they were given advice. You will note that despite the huffing and puffing and the detention of Greenwald's partner, no action has actually been taken. What's the point of attempting to suppress when the articles were freely available on the web?