It was when I first began grad school, the field of "global civil society" was arguably still in its infancy. For those unfamiliar with the term,
global civil society "refers to the vast assemblage of groups operating across borders and beyond the reach of governments." Quite predictably, recent geo-political events, from the "Arab Spring" to the unraveling crisis in Ukraine, continue to offer new empirical examples with respect to the growing strength of global civil society and the challenges it presents to so-called structural realism and the authority of the nation-state.
Indeed, it is a much echoed critique in the social sciences that the modern nation-state is too small to adequately address the major global issues facing the world today, and too large to properly deal with the nuances of local problems. And this is just one of many criticisms leveled against the nation-state, and is perhaps more fitting for our present day-and-age, in which questions of climate change and resource depletion are challenges no nation, irrespective of their wealth and strength can avoid. Understandably, past generations were preoccupied with other questions of the nation-state. A century ago, for instance, it was rampant and naked nationalism created by the nation-state, and the resulting carnage of World War I which concerned serious thinkers the most.
As globalization compresses space and time, social relations are becoming more interconnected. As these relations flourish, developing ever deepening and widening bonds between once distant and remote communities and people, long held notions of geographic boundaries are increasingly being called into question. This process has largely been facilitated by the advent of new and revolutionary technologies in conjunction with a growing network of global activists. “…A steady accumulating body of research has attested to the Internet’s effectiveness in amplifying the concerns of activists, bolstering protest efforts and helping to create political dialogue across vast geographic-territorial spaces (Ayres, as quoted in Laxer and Halperin, 2003, 32-33).”
Today, with the proliferation and diffusion of knowledge and technology, a new geo-political force is challenging the historical supremacy of the nation-state. This supremacy, as it will later be shown, has survived in a system that has been inundated by violence, war and terror. Over the past decade and a half, an alternative to the politicking of old, has captivated a once muted, if not docile audience into the streets and halls of the power elite. The emergence of a global civil society, “[c]ivic activity that addresses trans-world issues, involves transnational communication, is organized globally and unfolds on the basis of supraterritorial solidarity (Woods, as quoted in Ayers, 2003, 30)”, serves not only as a means by which an ever growing number of policy initiatives are democratized, but also has some wondering if the realist perspective is capable any longer of addressing and explaining the interaction of states on an international level. In light of recent develops, it is appropriate today to ask: Has global civil society has brought about the death of realism?
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists had monopolized theorizing international relations. Today, however, realism has shown itself inadequate in explaining present changes in the international arena. Nowhere has this been perhaps truer than in the examination of global civil society. To illustrate this point, one needs to look no further than the role in which the nation-state has played in harboring a system of international relations that has at times been plagued by anarchical tendencies. “Anarchy in the international system is defined by the absence of any overarching political authority. For more than three centuries, anarchy has taken the form of sovereign territorial states each claming to be the ultimate source of authority within its own domain (Buzan, 1984, 112-113). Alternatively, global civil society, has emerged as a very real and effective check to the unrestrained authority of the state. Again, the Arab Spring and Ukraine offer evidence of as much.
Westphalia, The Nation-State and the Anarchy that Followed:
The birth of the modern nation-state can be traced to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended Europe’s Thirty Years’ War. “This settlement resolved the religious stalemate in Europe between Protestants and Catholics by declaring that religious affiliation was to be determined by the ruler of the secular state rather than by an external ruler such as the Holy Roman Empire or the Pope (Turner, 1998, 26).” This new order of authority decentralized to a large extent, the role in which the ‘The Universal Church’ had until the protestant reformation of the sixteenth century, played in governing the affairs of Europe. With the ratification of Westphalia, power was cemented in the political authority of the state. In nearly all cases, this power rested exclusively with the head of state, or a sovereign. In his seminal work Leviathan, philosopher Thomas Hobbes expands upon the rights and roles of ‘soveraignes’. The ability to wage war, to provide a system of punitive justice, prescribe property rules and even declare a common and unifying religion, all fell in the exclusive domain of the sovereign. “The notion of unitary sovereignty was itself promoted by monarchs in their struggle against decentralized feudal relations, and it provided a conceptual tool for establishing unrestrained control over all elements of the social body (Bowles and Gintis as quoted by Turner, 1998, 26).” This “…concept of sovereignty concentrated social, economic and political life around a single site of governance (Devetak and Higgott, 99, 485).”
Having been a witness to the trauma of the English Civil War, Hobbes was understandably concerned with domestic order. “The war of all against all that Hobbes feared was prevented by the concentration of legitimate force at a series of single points…But the concentration of power at home left the international order without the shelter…the Church had provided in the shape of a system of law and authority to which even kings were subjects (Cooper, 2004, 8).” As sovereigns began interacting with other sovereigns, state-to-state relations emerged in a system void of rules and moral guidance. Force and violence became the name of the game. As states sought expanded resources and territory, war became the guiding principle of international relations. These wars provided the catalysts for the creation of new states, or the consolidation of power and authority into already existing states. “Wars[,]” as Bruce Potter notes, “gave rulers both the incentive and the opportunity to concentrate power – and that power was the force that ultimately overcame the fragmentation of feudal society (Potter as quoted by Tuner, 1998, 26).” Scott Tuner expands this line of thought:
“Not only international conflict, but also civil warfare, entailing the suppression of both lords and peasants who resisted emerging states, was instrumental in concentrating power in a single institutional authority…An interactive process was set in motion whereby war promoted the concentration of power in the state, and such concentration of power in one state required others to follow suit if they were to avoid falling victim to this revolutionary military machine (Tuner, 1998, 26-27).”
The constant deployment of war and the chaotic nature of state-to-state relations following Westphalia, in which states pursued self-serving agendas of violence for the further consolidation and/or further expansion of power and influence, led increasingly to an environment of state-centric anarchism. During this realist period of history, roughly 1648-1989, the only sufficient check on state aggression was the choice of rationality, whereby sovereigns weighed the risks of war against its preserved outcomes.
International Relations, as seen from the realist school “…describes a world political environment based on states as autonomous and unitary actors in an anarchical state of nature (Turner, 1998, 27).” With states pursuing their own self-interested ends, much of the interaction that existed between states was thus amoral, concerned primarily in obtaining greater levels of security and strength. From this realist perspective, there was little reason for one state to concern itself with the civic affairs of another. As such, few in government echelons ever pondered if there was any moral obligation to call to task the actions of another state. History testifies greatly to this accusation, as there was none in the American government, say perhaps one Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr., who was the least bit concerned about the Turkish “race murder” (Power, 2002, 1-16) of its Armenian population. For those of us who are aware of own history, it is unsettling to think that something as seemingly unimportant to the rest of the world, something like the Armenian genocide, could spawn something as big and as terrible as First World War.
As the world entered the 20th century, the banners of nation-hood waved high above the skies in Western Europe, stained deeply already with the blood of past wars. Yet despite this reality, nation-states made surprisingly few efforts in curtailing the inevitable violence of the volatile international system of their own creation. All this was, however, soon changed. The carnage of the First World War, aided immeasurable by the advancements of technology which pitted man against machine, brought home the destructive nature of state-centric anarchism in a way no war had previously done. In the taxing wake of this war, genuine efforts were for the first time undertaken in hopes of limiting future conflict. “The reaction after the First World War on both sides of the Atlantic was the simplistic view that pacifism, more or less disguised as neutrality, isolationism or support for the League of Nations, would bring peace (Cooper, 2004, 111).” Less than 30 years later, history would show us otherwise.
As the world recovered from yet another world war, the second in as many generations, calls for a government of governments were again renewed. Nowhere were these calls more vocal than in Europe, where even Churchill, with his staunch nationalism proclaimed, while addressing students and faculty at the University of Zurich, a need for “The United States of Europe (Churchill, 1946).” What followed was the steady creation of transnational organizations, each seeking to pacify the dangers of the international arena. The United Nations, Monnet and Schuman’s European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC), the European Union, the World Bank and countless other transnational organizations owe their very existence to this call. And while each of the above organizations is unique in their success and failures, none have fundamentally altered the existing paradigm from which state-to-state relations are governed. Rather, these organizations have simply provided other means by which the state can assert its power and influence. In particular, the United Nations “…represents an attempt to establish law and order within the modern state system. The UN Charter emphasizes state sovereignty on the one hand and aims to maintain order by force. (Cooper, 2004, 23).” Yet such show of force can only come via its member-states, and does little to address the anarchy of international relations.
The reality that the world continues to exist in a dangerous nature of state-centric anarchism has been made all the more apparent in the inability of the United Nations to assert any real authority over its member states. The imbalance of power that exists between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, the exercise of single party veto power and the ability of stronger member-states to outright ignore and disregard the will of the United Nations, are each testaments to the dangerous world we inhabit. As it stands today, the United Nations is in no better of a position to halt future state aggression of any subsequent size or scale. “…[D]irect attempts to build political organizations have resulted in institutions which serve, rather than undermine, the existing structure of fragmentation (Buzan, 1984, 113).”
Global Civil Society and the End of Anarchy?
Change is a slow and contested process. It was with this thought in mind that the title of this paper deliberately begins with the words “the slow death…” While events such as the attacks of September 11th or the Treaty of Westphalia may appear to be sudden changes to the status quo, they are indeed not. Such events serve as catalysts; and while fundamentally altering the way in which certain phenomenons are perceived and understood, events such as these are nonetheless steeped in a steady accumulation of history. And while it may be apparent that a given situation is undergoing change, identifying that change and better understanding the destination in which that change is headed, is all together a different story. While any avid listener of NPR can readily identify recent facets and manifestations of global civil society (say since the spring of 2011), such changes have long been taking place, and in so doing, they have helped foster a new moral foundation from which state-action is increasingly judged and restricted by.
Instances of Global Civil Society in the Late 20th Century:
In the waning days of the last millennium, ministerial meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO) were set to commence in the American city of Seattle. The so-called ‘millennial round agenda’ sought the further liberalization of global markets and the creation of a “…world economy based solely on market forces…(Ayer, as quoted by Laxer and Halperin, 2003, 30).” By November of 1999, meetings much like the one scheduled for Seattle were by then common for the WTO, and while the organization had come to expect protest, and host cities did well in preparing for them, the events that unfolded on the streets of Seattle would go on to serve both as a catalyst for public awareness as to the effects of globalization and as a rallying cry for a center-left movement as yet in its infancy. The disruption of opening day ceremonies exacerbated the already existent “…tensions between delegations (Ayer, as quoted by Laxer and Halperin, 2003, 29).” Suddenly, and with the unexpected collapse of the Seattle talks, coupled with extensive media exposure, the some 50 to 100 thousand anti neo-liberal protesters and a marginal number of classical conservative best represented by the likes of Patrick Buchanan, had an impressive historic victory.
“The novelty and historical significance of the ‘battle for Seattle’ protests can be exaggerated, but there is no doubt that the street-level champions of global civil society have a point: protests of this kind are symptomatic of the rebirth of civic actions that tend to grow into social movements on the global scale (Kean, 2003, 59).” With this recognition in mind, it is important to remember that the success of the ‘protest of the century’, or the failure of the Seattle millennial round, depending on which side of the coin one may fall, was built upon a much larger body of work. “Popular movements are created not only by domestic forces, but are also conditioned internationally. Victory against the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) broke the aura of inevitability about globalism’s advance and prepared the ground for the breakthrough in Seattle the next year (Laxer, of Laxer and Halperin, 2003, 186).” But there too, the MAI was preceded by a number of successful opposition movements, each of which has laid an important historical foundation. “Until the Seattle protests of 1999, the most noted example of global civil societies globalization ‘from below’ was the Zapatistas, whose use of the internet to promote their struggle over land rights was picked up by Western academics, who turned the limited success of the Chiapas rising into a revolutionary ‘postmodern social movement’ (Chandler, 2004, 157).”
In India in 1985, before the Narmada Valley was ever cleared by the Ministry of Environment for the construction of dams, the World Bank had issued a loan for the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam, the largest of what was to be a series of dams built in the valley. But such plans were terribly unpopular, resulting in the coming together of some 50,000 laborers, peasants and farm workers in protest against the proposed construction. Together, these protesters pledged to drown before moving. Under intense public pressure, by both those immediately affected by the proposed building projects and that of a sympathetic public, a World Bank committee report in June of 1992 recommended the withdrawal of the loan. “The recommendation produced governmental consternation in New Delhi, the Narmada basin states, divided opinion within the W[orld] B[ank], and heartened anti-dam protesters, both Indian and international (Wood, 1993, 969).” As yet, the Narmada dams have not been built.
In northern Quebec, Hydro-Quebec, a government owned entity sought the rights to build a total of “…nine dams, 206 dykes and five major reservoirs as part of a massive hydroelectric project that would have diverted four rivers (Turner, 1998, 31).” Resulting from this planned construction would have been the loss of indigenous lands occupied by both the Cree and Inuit people. Additionally, several environmental concerns were also raised. Under mounting public pressure, New York Governor Mario Cuomo in March of 1992 “…announced [the] cancellation of a 24 year contract with Hydro-Quebec, and in November of 1994, Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau announced that the second phase of the project, James Bay II would be postponed indefinitely (Gedlicks, as quoted by Turner, 1998, 31).”
Recent history is littered with examples of an engaged global civil society. This engagement has had several profound impacts, chief among them is the spread of democracy and democratic institutions. As the worlds population is increasingly coming to live under the auspice of democracy, and as technology has rapidly changed the way in which populations engage one another, the spread of further democracy is made all the more easy, as outsiders begin to take up the cause of those oppressed and less fortunate. “Electronic communications have given citizens access to unprecedented amounts of information at unprecedented speeds…Electronic communications have also enabled civil society activists across the planet to exchange views and coordinate strategies in global democratic campaigns for progressive social change (Scholte, 2005, 35).” One need look no further than the Chiapas of Mexico, the collapse of the Doha trade talks, the rise of a conscience buying public, the Arab Spring, and the democratic mobilization in Ukraine (both 2002 and late 2013/early 2014, to find examples of an engaged global civil society.
Increasingly the public is organizing on a truly international scale. Transnational networks, unaffiliated with government and government bodies are facilitating in this organizational process. The voice of the people has been magnified. A moral foundation is being laid, and new rules are being written. Government and Corporate interests have had no choice but take notice and listen. There is a new and emerging order and it is coming from the bottom up. Should governments choose to ignore the demands of the people, people are increasingly finding themselves empowered to change the government under which the live.
**As many of you might suspect, much of what you have just read come from an unpublished working paper of mine dating back to my early days in grad school (hence the thinly veiled attempt to incorporate more recent examples of global civil society into the text...what can I say, I don't have the time to do a massive re-write for what I wanted to be a quick diary entry). That said, I believe the ideas expressed in this piece are especially relevant today. As time and interest permit, I hope to expand upon this piece, by looking into such ideas of bio-regionalism, as well as by evaluating proposed alternatives to the modern nation-state. Any ideas, comments, or criticisms would be greatly welcomed. Likewise, anyone in the Kos community who would be interested in pursuing further work along these lines (I'm not sure what that might be, or what I might have time for), please shoot me a line. My interest in this and related subject matter has been growing as of late, and would be curious to see where it could go.