There is a fascinating column in the NY Times by Dennis Ross, the former chief US middle-east negotiator under President Bill regarding the recent move by the PA in asking the UN to consider Palestine for statehood.
In the column Mr. Ross accurately describes the Palestinian move as one that costs the PA leadership nothing and asks only of Israel without providing for any of the valid security concerns that nation has in regards to the ongoing conflict.
If Palestine is ready to be a state it must take on issues that have costs as well as benefits. Leadership is called for on both sides not just one side. Just as the Israelis must negotiate in good faith and be willing to give in order to receive the same is true for the Palestinians.
Neither side will get all it desires and the domestic political opinion of each state must be prepped for this reality.
Allowing the Palestinians to use the UN side-steps this requirement and does nothing to further peace.
Palestinian political culture is rooted in a narrative of injustice; its anticolonialist bent and its deep sense of grievance treats concessions to Israel as illegitimate. Compromise is portrayed as betrayal, and negotiations — which are by definition about mutual concessions — will inevitably force any Palestinian leader to challenge his people by making a politically costly decision.
....
That’s why European leaders who fervently support Palestinian statehood must focus on how to raise the cost of saying no or not acting at all when there is an offer on the table. Palestinians care deeply about international support for their cause. If they knew they would be held accountable for being nonresponsive or rejecting a fair offer or resolution, it could well change their calculus.
....
If not, and the Europeans decide to pursue one, it must be balanced. It cannot simply address Palestinian needs by offering borders based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps and a capital in Arab East Jerusalem without offering something equally specific to Israel — namely, security arrangements that leave Israel able to defend itself by itself, phased withdrawal tied to the Palestinian Authority’s performance on security and governance, and a resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue that allows Israel to retain its Jewish character.
In all likelihood the Palestinians would reject such a resolution. Accepting it would require compromises that they refused in 2000, 2008 and 2014. There is, of course, no guarantee that the next Israeli government would accept such a resolution. But the Israelis are not the ones pushing for United Nations involvement. The Palestinians are. And if their approach is neither about two states nor peace, there ought to be a price for that.