A look into the Federalist Papers on the subject above.
[About the Federalist papers, Thomas Jefferson, said: “the best commentary on the principles of government, which has ever been written.” Noted political scientist Clinton Rossiter explained: “It is, indeed, the one product of the American mind that is rightly counted among the classics of political theory.”]
One of the fundamental issues the founders wrestled with in constructing a new form of union between the states was how to control political factions. Much of the design of the proposed new federal government was related to controlling factions. Why was controlling factions considered important?
A study of past democracies showed that none had survived and all had ended up being ruled by monarchs or a strong man. One of the main reason for the downfall of past democracies? The development of factions.
The dilemma the founders faced was creating a federal government that maximized liberty, but the problem, according to Madison was liberty “nourishes factions.” Madison says: “… Human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.”
Madison defines faction as: “A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”
Examples: right-to-bear-arms vs gun control; high taxes versus low taxes; woman’s right to choose versus pro life; conservative versus liberal; wall versus no wall etc.
The basic ingredient of government is man. According to Madison: “As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed.” Hamilton’s view of man was also pretty brutal. In Federalist #6 he says: “… men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.” [marked by inordinate desire for wealth or possessions or for another's possessions]
Madison concludes: “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity… So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.”
One of the advantages of adopting the Constitution was the: “advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”
What Madison had seen when he studied the history of democracies on the impact of factions was: “The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished.”
The men who argue against democracies and liberty of the people, in fact, use the specific problem of factions to argue for monarchy. Madison says: “the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations.”
So how did the founders think about how to handle problem of factions? At a basic level, Madison says: “There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.”
Removing the cause of factions can only be accomplished, Madison concludes, “By destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence.” This remedy, Madison says: “was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, then it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.”
The other remedy was by controlling the effect of factions. One of the fundamental principles in the Constitution design, according to Madison was: “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time.” (What would Madison say about the power of a President to pardon himself?)
In a true democracy on any issue, Madison says: “the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail … It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”
“The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.” END- Part 1.
Part 2 - Means of Controlling the Effects of Factions.
Federalist Papers #10 - The Utility of Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, by James Madison, dated January 29, 1788.