In late May and early June Russia was pushing to take Severodonetsk and Ukraine was putting up a strong defense instead of pulling back behind the river. At the time people floated theories as to why (here’s mine) but these theories floated around because the “why” was not obvious. Kos expressed doubt as to the military wisdom of holding Severodonetsk even as Russia was threatening to cut off the Ukrainian salient.
Still, rather than retreat, reports are that Ukraine is actually sending more troops to Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, reinforcing the cities against the Russian onslaught.
Here’s a reminder of what this salient looked like at the time.
Popasna had fallen and Severodonetsk and Lysychansk were in danger of being cut off if Russia could push north from Popasna. Eventually Ukraine did retreat back to pretty much the current line of Bakhmut to Sivers’k. Obviously the northern part of this map has been changed with Ukraine now threatening to take Kreminna and Svatove.
Now that Russia continues to pound on Bakhmut even without the Izyum salient, the question remains as to why Ukraine refuses to budge. Instead of paying to keep Bakhmut with increased casualties, Ukraine could fall back perhaps to pull Russia into a salient themselves. Kos recently asked the question of why Ukraine holds on so tightly to Bakhmut in this article. To offer a perspective different than his own, Kos pulls in John Helin’s take from twitter who cites Bakhmut as a logistics hub amongst other reasons. Kos doesn’t fully buy into John Helin’s theory and so the question remains “Why?”
I’ve been pouring over the RUSI 67 page document “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022” and have cited it enough times now I feel like the movie reference “This one time in band camp,...”. So at the risk of being “that guy”, this one section in the RUSI report gives a reason as to why Ukraine didn’t give up Severodonetsk without a fight and is most likely holding onto Bakhmut for the same reason:
It is briefly worth flagging here a political factor that shaped, and in some ways constrained, Ukrainian military preparations for the defence of Donbas at this time. The discovery of war crimes perpetrated at scale by Russian forces in occupied territories on the axes approaching Kyiv created a political climate in which the surrender of territory, and especially settlements, became politically unacceptable. Given the disparity in forces, a manoeuvre defence would have been most effective from a purely military point of view, enabling the enemy to be shaped and then cut off through counterattack to maximise its losses. However, the human cost of these tactics on the population, whom the UAF were mobilised to defend, would have been unacceptable. Showing that the Army would hold ground for as long as practicable was therefore not only a political imperative, but also important in underpinning the moral component of the fighting force. This is not to argue that political decisions inappropriately had an impact on military decision-making. Instead, it is one of the ongoing strengths of the Ukrainian state that there remains a healthy civil–military discourse and an ability to balance these critical factors. Nevertheless, this led to tactical dispositions that, from a purely military perspective, may have appeared suboptimal. — Page 36
So the reason why Ukraine holds so tightly to these cities is because of the atrocities Russia committed in Bucha and elsewhere. Ukraine doesn’t want to leave any more of their population in Russia’s hands. Even if Bakhmut were almost deserted (it sounds like some civilians are still there) pulling back here just gets Russia closer to other towns and cities exposing those towns and cities to increased bombardment or possible take-over. For better or for worse, Ukraine has decided to take a stand to protect as many of their people as they can even if it results in increased casualties for their own forces.
Please note that I keep going back to this RUSI report as it contains appraisals by individuals with insider knowledge of the Ukrainian decision making and force structure. It doesn’t give an academic level assessment as they cannot provide their sources, but in a time when any information regarding Ukraine can be hard to come by the RUSI report offers a view into information I only wish I could see. Of course if I saw it, I wouldn’t be able to write about it. Until then I will continue to pull out nuggets from this report until we get a fresh batch of insider info.
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