“Russian forces used an array of missiles, especially those that #Ukraine cannot intercept such as the #Kinzhal, to ensure [...] some informational successes [...] regardless of [#Russia's] dwindling supply of high-precision missiles,”
"[ISW] estimates that about 50% of #Bakhmut is now under Russian control, and Russia is now committing higher-quality Wagner and traditional Russian military special forces operators in an effort to conclusively take the city.
Russian forces struck infrastructure sites in four regions overnight on March 9, including Kirovohrad, Odesa, Vinnytsia and Kryvyi Rih oblasts, Natalia Humeniuk, spokesperson for Ukraine's Southern Command, reported.
According to preliminary information, there were no casualties.
Humeniuk said that Russia used Iranian-made Shahed-type drones and several types of missiles, including Kh-22 long-range anti-ship missiles, Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles, Kh-59 cruise missiles and Kalibr cruise missiles.
At least nine missiles were shot down over Mykolaiv Oblast, six missiles were destroyed over Odesa region, and two missiles were shot down over Kherson Oblast, according to Humeniuk.
Explosions were reported in the cities of Kharkiv, Khmelnytsky, and Zhytomyr, as well as Kyiv, Poltava, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil oblasts amid a mass Russian attack overnight on March 9.
kyivindependent.com/…
Six Kinzhals were included in Thursday's attack, according to Ukrainian defense forces. Although Russia has used these weapons before, in the opening weeks of the conflict, Yuriy Ignat, an air force spokesman, told Ukrainian TV that the enemy had never fired so many of them in a single attack. Ignat said only 34 of the 81 total incoming Russia missiles were shot down.
[...]
Hypersonic missiles such as the Kinzhal are a fairly new breed of weapon that combine superior speed with the ability to maneuver to evade being shot down. Not only are they difficult to detect, but they make radical and unpredictable course changes as they get close to a target.
The Kinzhal, unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin five years ago, can accelerate to Mach 4 — four times the speed of sound — and may be capable of speeds of up to Mach 10, with a range to about 1,250 miles. The missile is also believed to be nuclear-capable.
An even more sophisticated weapon, Russia's Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, can fly at speeds as high as Mach 27, according to the Kremlin. Another hypersonic, the Zircon anti-ship missile, has also reportedly been developed, but there are no reports of the Zircon or Avangard being used in combat.
There's debate over how much of a game changer they are
The Kinzhal "is launched from an aircraft and has a shorter range than Avangard," according to James Acton, co-director of the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
www.npr.org/...
Russian forces conducted the largest missile strike across Ukraine of 2023 so far on March 9, but the attack likely only served Russian state propaganda objectives. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure with 84 different missiles including 28 Kh-101/Kh-555 and 20 Kalibr cruise missiles, six Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, six Kh-47 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, two Kh-31P supersonic anti-ship missiles, six Kh-59 guided missiles, and at least 13 S-300 air-defense missiles.[1] Russian forces also attacked Ukraine with eight Iranian-made Shahed–136 drones, which Ukrainian officials noted likely sought to distract Ukrainian air defense systems before the missile strikes.[2] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down 34 of the 48 Kalibr and Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and four Shahed-136 drones.[3] Ukrainian officials also noted that all eight of the Kh-31P and Kh-59 missiles did not reach their intended targets. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces did not have the capacity to shoot down some of the Russian missiles—likely referring to Kinzhal and S-300 missiles.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted “high precision long range air, sea, and land-based missile strikes” targeting Ukrainian military infrastructure, military-industrial complexes, and energy infrastructure supporting the Ukrainian military as retaliation for the alleged incursion into Bryansk Oblast on March 2.[5]
Ukrainian officials, Russian milbloggers, and social media footage indicate that Russian forces overwhelmingly targeted energy infrastructure across Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrynskyi, stated that Russian missile strikes once again targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure, but yet again failed to achieve Russia’s ongoing goal of destroying Ukrainian power supplies.[6] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Russian strikes hit eight energy sites resulting in power outages in some areas of the country.[7] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported that preliminary data showed that Russian forces may have used Kinzhal missiles to strike unspecified infrastructure, while social media footage showed smoke rising from one of Kyiv’s thermo-electric power plants.[8] Russian milbloggers amplified footage and reports of the aftermath of strikes on energy facilities in the cities of Kyiv, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, Odesa, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv among others.[9] ISW continues to assess that these missile strikes will not undermine Ukraine’s will or improve Russia’s positions on the frontlines.
The Kremlin likely deliberately launched missiles that Ukrainian air defenses cannot intercept to achieve results within the Russian information space despite the dwindling supplies of such missiles. Ihnat noted that Russia has up to 50 Kinzhal missiles and had used some missiles that it cannot replace. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used these scarce missiles in fruitless attacks to appease the Russian pro-war and ultranationalist communities, which have overwhelmingly called on him to retaliate for the Bryansk Oblast incident on March 2.[10] Russian milbloggers and propagandists have also criticized the Russian missile campaign for failing to make Ukraine “freeze” over the winter in late February and early March before the spring season.[11] Putin likely attempted to offset these narratives with another missile attack similar to the ones that Russia conducted in the fall of 2022, using advanced missiles to guarantee some damage in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers did not overwhelmingly support today‘s strikes, however, noting that the Kremlin needs to fundamentally change its targeting approach given that Ukraine has adapted to the established attack pattern against its energy infrastructure.[12] www.understandingwar.org/...
Prior to the invasion, the battle plan that the Russian military ultimately followed had been widely previewed in the Western press. Although the attack came as no surprise, Western military observers were shocked by the inexplicably poor performance of Russian forces.
"We realized in retrospect that the Russian military exercises that we'd studied in minutia for years weren't really exercises," George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War told Newsweek. "They were choreographed ballets with tanks."
"Exercises are supposed to stress units, to bring them to their breaking point, to help them learn new operational concepts, to help them find pain points so that they can iron them out and get good at fighting," he explained.
"That's what we thought the Russians were doing," Barros added. "But we didn't understand how hollow the exercises had been until we actually saw the First Guards Tank Army come up against a real life adversary."
In addition to poor execution, poor planning was also a factor. One of the main reasons why pre-war predictions of Russian military success proved to be so far off the mark was because the Russian military did not fight the way the Russian military probably was capable of fighting.
"Based on Russian military doctrine, we were expecting them to wage an unrelenting, 72-hour air campaign aimed at crippling critical infrastructure and destroying as much of the conventional Ukrainian military as possible," Barros said.
"Instead, the air and missile campaign lasted for only around six or seven hours," he added, "and they didn't really destroy anything of consequence before sending in ground troops, who in a lot of cases didn't seem to be expecting to meet actual resistance."
www.newsweek.com/...
The fighting in Bakhmut has captured much attention. But the real attention should be on whether the allies are setting the Zelensky government and Ukrainian forces up for success in the coming offensive, thus increasing the probability of ending the war on terms favorable to Ukraine and the rest of Europe. War costs money — money that no government can spew out forever. Helping to end the fighting this year prevents dragging things out unnecessarily.
[...]
U.S. and NATO leaders, in coordination with the Zelensky administration, should be planning and preparing for a post-fighting transition period that could last at least months — and if history is any judge, probably longer. The transition period also will include extended recovery actions before any “normalcy” is possible. Recovery will include repair and rebuilding not only of Ukraine’s civil infrastructure but also rebuilding economically, socially, politically and judicially. Recovery will have a security component as well: rebuilding Ukraine’s army; providing security guarantees to prevent Russia from future aggression; reconstituting a police force; and enforcing whatever ceasefire agreement ends major combat operations. Countries that have experienced the intensity of war, as Ukraine has, do not just turn on a dime and return to “normal.” They need lots of help.
thehill.com/…
- Russian forces conducted the largest missile strike across Ukraine of 2023 likely only to advance Russian state propaganda objectives.
- Russian forces likely advanced northwest of Bakhmut amid a likely increased tempo of Russian offensive operations in the area.
- The Wagner Group’s offensive operation in eastern Bakhmut appears to have entered a temporary tactical pause and it remains unclear if Wagner fighters will retain their operational preponderance in future Russian offensives in the city.
- Russian forces may be preparing to resume offensive operations around Vuhledar, although persistent personnel and ammunition issues will likely continue to constrain Russian forces from advancing.
- Internal dynamics within the Russian military may be driving the potential resumption of costly offensives near Vuhledar that offer little prospect of operational benefit.
- Russian authorities are likely formalizing structures to create and coopt volunteer-based military formations under state-owned energy companies in order to distribute accountability, reduce burdens on the national budget, and avoid sanctions.
- The Transnistrian occupation government accused the Ukrainian government of involvement in a claimed terrorist plot, likely as part of the Russian information operations to undermine Ukrainian credibility and destabilize Moldova.
- Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut but have not completed a turning movement or enveloped or encircled the city.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City and near Vuhledar.
- Russian strikes completely disconnected the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, from all external power sources for 10 hours.
- Ukrainian officials reported that Russian occupation authorities are preparing for a spring 2023 mobilization wave in occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that may include male teenagers born in 2006.
- Russian officials and occupation authorities are continuing efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian political and bureaucratic systems.
Eliot and Eric welcome retired Australian Major General Mick Ryan, author of The Future of Warfare, Futura Doctrina newsletter on Substack, and former head of the Australian War College. They discuss the ongoing fighting around Bakhmut, the prospects for both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries respectively in the weeks and months ahead, how this conflict might end, and the utility of science fiction for understanding the evolving character of war.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on March 9 but have not completed a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of the city. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut, within 11km northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka, and within 15km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Oleksandro-Shultyne.[39] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner Group fighters completely captured Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), and geolocated footage published on March 9 indicates that Wagner forces likely captured the settlement.[40] Prigozhin added that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Dubovo-Vasylivka.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner fighters and conventional Russian forces jointly captured Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of these claims.[42] Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces secured marginal gains in southern Bakhmut along the T0513 highway.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner fighters conducted assaults towards the western parts of Bakhmut, near Bohdanivka (5km west of Bakhmut), on northern parts of Bakhmut from Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and on the southern parts of Bakhmut from Opytne (2km south of Bakhmut).[44] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks in the eastern part of Bakhmut.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City on March 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka; within 9km north of Avdiivka near Kamianka and Krasnohorivka; and within 36km southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses near Sieverne (7km west of Avdiivka) from the direction of Opytne (3km south of Avdiivka).[47] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces retreated from positions south of Avdiivka to fortified positions in Avdiivka’s industrial zone.[48] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps captured Vesele (7km north of Avdiivka), although the milblogger claimed that the formation is a former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia formation and therefore may have meant the DNR 1st Army Corps.[49] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces cut a section of the H-20 highway near Vesele and attacked in the direction of Oleksandropil (17km north of Avdiivka).[50] www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations towards Hryanykivka (54km northwest of Svatove), Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km southeast of Kreminna).[34] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna) remains contested and that control of the settlement changes frequently, and that Russian forces retreated from advanced positions near Chervonopopivka to reconstitute.[35] Haidai also stated that Russian forces attack less frequently near Svatove than on other areas of the front.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces fought northwest of Kreminna near Ploshchanka (16km northwest) and the Zhuravka gully (18km northwest).[37] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to advance south of Kreminna from Fedorivka (33km southwest) to Vesele (31km south) and conducted ground attacks near Vyimka (26km south) and Spirne (25km southeast).[38] The milblogger also reported that Russian forces have not succeeded in advancing near Bilohorivka despite weeks of offensive operations. www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces conducted a likely HIMARS strike against a Russian transport hub in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on March 9. Russian occupation authorities accused Ukrainian forces of conducting a strike against an auto transport enterprise in Volnovakha (north of Mariupol at the N20 and T0509 intersection), and geolocated imagery shows severe damage to the building and some busses.[52] Russian sources claimed that the strike destroyed 10 civilian buses.[53] Wagner Group forces reportedly used busses to transport Wagner personnel through southern Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[54] www.understandingwar.org/...
The training of Ukrainian pilots to operate F-16 fighter jets is “important and quite necessary,” Poland’s President Andrzej Duda told CNN, saying that he believes that Ukraine’s armed forces will want to be “up to the NATO standard” and, therefore, will want to use F-16 fighter jets.
“The United States is working with Ukrainian pilots in the US to determine how long it would take to train them to fly F-16 fighter jets, three sources briefed on the matter told CNN. Two Ukrainian pilots are currently at a military base in the US having their skills tested in flight simulators to see how much time they would need to learn to fly various US military aircraft, including F-16s,” CNN reported.
euromaidanpress.com/...
Pro-Russian Op-Ed
At the start of March, the Russian plan of bleeding the Ukrainians in Bakhmut dry appears to be working. So Ukraine is necessarily withdrawing its forces from the besieged city (which according to Ukrainian officials has been leveled after months of fighting there).
Of course, Bakhmut alone is unimportant for either side. What is important about the eastern Ukrainian village is that it lies on the path to the Dnieper River. A beating heart of trade and transportation, the Dnieper is a main artery for Ukraine.
It is a geo-strategic chokepoint within Ukraine as well. For several months, fighting has occurred between Ukrainian and Russian elements battling for control of the Dnieper River islands.
Thus far, the Ukrainians have been unable to dislodge the Russian forces in the area. Should Bakhmut be pacified, as it seems it is about to be, with the weakening Ukrainian defenders being pushed back farther from the east, the real concern in the West must be for the fate of the Dnieper.
The Russians’ strategy of attrition is working and their ultimate goal is, at the very least, to hold on to the eastern Russian-speaking portions of Ukraine as well as Crimea in the south.
Pushing Ukraine’s forces out of Bakhmut would conceivably allow Russia to race toward the Dnieper and cut the region off from the rest of Ukraine. Russian control over the Dnieper would also prevent the Ukrainians from launching an ill-advised assault on Crimea.
asiatimes.com/...