Today begins with missile attacks. Apparently the 30 April date for the counteroffensive commencement was not as the Guardsman Leak had forecast.
April 30 (Reuters) - Ukraine remains in control of a key supply route into Bakhmut, a military spokesperson said on Saturday, as the head of Russia's mercenary Wagner Group threatened to withdraw some of his troops from the eastern city if Moscow did not send more ammunition.
Russian forces have been trying for 10 months to punch their way into the shattered remains of what was once a city of 70,000. Kyiv has pledged to defend Bakhmut, which Russia sees as a stepping stone to attacking other cities.
[...]
The "road of life" is a vital road between the ruined Bakhmut and the nearby town Chasiv Yar to the west - a distance of just over 17 km (10.56 miles).
Ukraine's top military command said in its daily update on Sunday that its forces had repelled 58 Russian attacks over the past day along the part of frontline stretching from Bakhmut through Avdiivka and on to Maryinka further south in the Donetsk region.
If Bakhmut fell, Chasiv Yar would probably be next to come under Russian attack according to military analysts, though it is on higher ground and Ukrainian forces are believed to have built defensive fortifications nearby.
www.reuters.com/...
2/ In my previous post on this topic, I described the rationale for measures of success & failure. I also listed five principles for their development and application. Success in the coming offensives can be measured at different levels and over different timescales.
3/ Progress will be assessed by multitudes of analysts, journalists, politicians and citizens. At the same time, some will quickly jump on short term tactical setbacks instead of waiting a few days to assess the full implications of such incidents.
4/ I propose a set of measures of success for the forthcoming offensives. Some of the measures are tactical, some more strategic or political. Together, they are a linked set of measures that can be used to assess whether the degree to which Ukrainian offensives are successful.
5/ In this thread, I have only covered measures of success. The full set of measures of success and failure are in my latest Futura Doctrina post here:
6/ Measure 1: #Ukraine achieves surprise (tactical and operational levels, some political impact – short term). Generating surprise leads to shock. Shock should lead to slower Russian decision making and responses to Ukrainian operations.
7/ While relatively easy to assess on the ground, limitations on sharing information with news organisations may make this harder to assess in the short term. It is, however, a key component for the success of the Ukrainian offensives.
8/ Measure 2: #Ukraine is able to destroy or degrade Russian tactical and operational reserves, C2 and logistics before the offensive (tactical, operational and strategic impacts – short term). The Ukrainians will want to limit the Russian’s ability to respond to their attacks.
9/ Finding and neutralising mobile Russian reserves, HQ and logistics before - and at the beginning of - the offensives will be important. Achieving this is reliant on excellent intelligence, various long range strike mechanisms, as well as air, missile and drone defences.
10/ Measure 3: Ukraine takes back its territory (tactical and operational, but with political ramifications). This might seem obvious, but this needs to be an explicit measure of success. I don’t propose a certain percentage of territory that should be recaptured.
11/ But if most of Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are recaptured, this would be a very successful outcome. And it would be good foundation for subsequent operations against Crimea and Donetsk in the future.
12/ Measure 4: Ukraine is postured to retake Crimea at the end of the offensives (Operational, strategic and political – medium term). As I have written previously, the last campaign of the war may be the campaign Ukraine conducts to take back Crimea.
13/ Therefore, the coming offensives will be successful if the Ukrainian armed forces are well placed for follow on operations to take back Crimea – either through making it untenable for the Russians to stay, or an actual military operation to seize it.
14/ Measure 5: Ukraine captures / destroys Russian forces (tactical and operational, but with political and strategic ramifications). Related to the recapture of its territory is the capture or destruction of Russian forces. The Russians have to be beaten and be seen to be beat.
15/ A successful Ukrainian offensive will also ensure sufficient Russian combat power is destroyed to prevent Russia conducting any follow-on offensives for the remainder of 2023.
16/ Measure 6: Ukraine preserves sufficient forces to continue defending some areas and conduct subsequent offensives in others (Operational and strategic – medium term). The Ukrainians will invest a significant part of their combat power in this offensive.
17/ But, they will want to do so in a way where they don’t sustain massive casualties. The degree to which Ukraine can inflict disproportionate casualties and destruction on the Russians in the coming offensives will be a an important measure of success.
18/ Measure 7: Ukraine’s supporters believe the offensives have been a success (political and strategic). For Ukraine to achieve success in its operations, and the Ukrainian people, foreign leaders and populations will need to think they have succeeded.
19/ It will not be long until we can put these measures into action. The Ukrainian military has been preparing for its offensives for some time, and they are clearly ready to force the Russians out of as much of Ukraine as possible.
20/ The aim of my two articles on measuring success and failure has been to provide some sense of ‘what victory looks’ like for
#Ukraine in the coming months. It is not an exclusive list. And none of the measures are designed to predict specific outcomes.
21/ And not all of them have to be met. But on the whole, these measures of success should provide a useful yardstick for those observing – and measuring success – in the Ukrainian offensives to come. End.
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