This is the sixth installment of a series of diaries trying to come to grips issues raised by and underlying the recent controversies at Dkos over election tampering in Ohio.
Originally, a discussion of Lakoff's work on categories followed my discussion of issue entrepreneurship. But I felt that that discussion was too underdeveloped, and the results produced did add much specificity to the points already made in discussing issue entrepreneurship. However, during the last few days another topic for clarification has come up, in the the diary "The 4-Year Old's Filibuster", which drew parallels between Bush Administration behavior and that of 4-year olds. This is the topic of cognitive developmental levels, which this diary treats.
A brief review of the series begins the diary proper below the fold.
The Series So Far:
Dairy 1: Overview.
Diary 2: What unites us--"A Fighting Faith In The Spirit of Martin Luther King."
Diary 3: Chris Bowers' analysis re the importance of growing liberalism and attacking conservatism, with a focus on "liberalizing / progressivizing the 10-15% of the population that is currently primarily reform minded and non-ideological."
Diary 4: Lakoff's analysis of the Right Wing Power Grab and the Battle For American Democracy. This should have been the unifying frame for all of us in dealing with Ohio. But we are not yet sufficiently grounded in a number of important fundamentals to pull that off.
Diary 5: Issue Entrepreneurship/The Social Skills of Democracy, explored one of those fundamentals.
This diary presents another fundamental: the ways in which levels of cognitive development shape our understanding of the world and ourselves. This sheds light on how conflicts are spread needlessly, and on how deeply-rooted conflicts can none-the-less be resolved. It also helps us understand how people may be unwittingly misunderstanding one another.
Levels of Cognitive Development
This is a vast topic, and this diary can only be considered a quick and dirty introduction. I want to present three constructs that provide a relatively easy entree into the subject. In fact, the first two can be summarized in a few tables. These are three of four constructs discussed by Thomas Jordan in his paper, Structures of Geopolitical Reasoning: Outline of a constructive-developmental approach, which I recommend highly as a more comprehensive introduction.
These constructs can help us understand the Bush Administration, international conflicts, and conflicts that arise in our own community, from simple disputes between two individuals in a comment thread to major divisions, such as arose over the Ohio election.
One lesson they teach is that the world appears very differently to different people at different levels.
A second lesson is that people at higher levels have a greater ability to resolve conflicts between different viewpoints.
A third lesson is that at the highest levels, it is possible to turn conflicts and contradictions into positive opportunities.
This final lesson is the main reason for including this diary in this series. I have already made the suggestion, in Diary 4, that we should have united ourselves in dealing with Ohio, by adopting and pressing the "Right Wing Power Grab" frame (though, I admit, the name of the frame could still be improved.) I noted that our failure to unite was due partly to the fact that framing is relatively new to us.
Here, then, is another new idea that, if deeply learned, can help us unite in the future: deep divisions can be sources of creative tensions that motivate us to create new perspectives encompassing both sides. These new perspectives can, in turn generate frameworks that meet the needs of both sides-possibly even better than they could meet their own needs via their original demands. The possibility for synergy from these new perspectives is the pot of gold at the end of the progressive rainbow.
Integrative Complexity
The first approach, integrative complexity, has a very large literature, spanning several decades. It deals with "the extent to which individuals cognitively relate different perspectives to each other. This may apply to competing opinions, ideologies, theories, interests, or any other case when different viewpoints contradict each other." As Jordan notes, there are two different approaches-one that is situational, another that assumes a constancy of developmental levels across all situations. For our purposes, however, we will set this distinction aside. There are four levels of integrative complexity: Low, moderately low, moderately high and high. The following table summarizes their distinctive characteristics.
Levels of Integrative Complexity: A Summary of Characteristics
1. Low integrative complexity
- Information is interpreted according to simple fixed rules, without considering alternative interpretations.
- Once information is processed in a certain way, it is done. There little room for reinterpretation, or new information that doesn't fit existing categories, which is routinely rejected or ignored.
- Values, opinions, assumptions, etc. are compartmentalized, allowing contradiction without awareness.
- There are strong feelings of certainty, due to low tolerance for uncertainty.
- Uncertainty is met with aggressiveness.
- There is strong reliance on external authorities.
- Behavior is highly controlled by external conditions
- There are sharp distinctions between categories, but once a threshold is reached, the subject is abruptly shifted from one category to another, and assigned a radically different set of attributes.
- Positions of the conflicting parties are perceived in either/or terms; perspectives are (implicitly) irreconcilable.
2. Moderately low integrative complexity
- Different perspectives are recognized, but remain compartmentalized, they cannot be related to and integrated with each other.
- It?s possible to develop rules for when to use one particular perspective, but once the choice is made, alternative perspectives are ignored. Thus categorizations and conclusions aren?t modified by reflecting on alternative perspectives.
- Because there is no reflection on different perspectives, the choice of which to adopt tends to be arbitrary.
- Probablistic reasoning is common-things can go this or that-but no thought is given to joint outcomes of different perspectives.
- There are reductions in tendencies toward simple good-bad dichotomies, reacting aggressively in response to different perspectives, and relying on external authorities.
- Positions of the conflicting parties are still perceived in irreconcilable either/or terms, despite the possible perception that both positions might have legitimate claims.
3. Moderately high integrative complexity
- There? s an ability to compare different perspectives with each other, so that even though one is chosen, the implications of other perspectives can still be considered.
- Flexibility in interpretations and evaluations is greatly increased, with increased openness to revision of cognitive decisions in light of different points of view.
- Varying combinations of several perspectives can be considered simultaneously, with conflicting aspects used to gain further understanding.
- One can reflect on one?s own behavior as interpreted from another perspective, and adjust one?s behavior accordingly to reach a desired outcome.
- There is an increased sense of freedom, intentional control and responsibility that comes from being able to use different principles of interpretation.
- Positions of the conflicting parties can be assessed in terms of effects on each other, so conflict resolution can consider both sides, and produce compromise solutions.
4. High integrative complexity
- Thinking is based in hypothetical reflection. Principles of different cognitive perspectives are generated mentally, and serve as guidelines in searching for new information.
- Different perspectives can be integrated within an inclusive framework that explains their functional relationships.
- Rather than avoiding paradox, it can be appreciated as accurately representing real experience-such as simultaneous needs for autonomy and dependence.
- Paradoxes and incompatibilities among perspectives can be actively used to generate new insights and frameworks.
- Positions of the conflicting parties can be assessed as parts of an interacting system, which can be systematically altered to produce a solution that satisfies all parties through a creative rearrangement of their mutual relationships.
As can be seen, there are qualitative differences between levels that are reflected in a variety of different ways. The first two levels are virtually all we ever see from the Bush Administration. Indeed, moderately low integrative complexity is often a stretch for them. Reading through the description of low integrative complexity, it's as if Karl Rove got ahold of it and mistook it for an operating manual:
"Information is interpreted according to simple fixed rules, without considering alternative interpretations."
Check!
"Once information is processed in a certain way, it is done. There little room for reinterpretation, or new information that doesn't fit existing categories, which is routinely rejected or ignored."
Check!
"Values, opinions, assumptions, etc. are compartmentalized, allowing contradiction without awareness."
Check!
"There are strong feelings of certainty, due to low tolerance for uncertainty."
Check!
"Uncertainty is met with aggressiveness."
Check!
OTOH, the last two levels describe most of the discourse on this site, and are far more characteristic of how liberals and Democrats tend to think. Moderately high integrative complexity allows us to consider contradictory viewpoints and work our compromises between them. High integrative complexity allows us to reframe contradictory viewpoints and create synergistic solutions that give both what they are most interested in achieving.
Rosenberg's reconstruction of Piagetian theory
The second framework comes from the work of Shawn Rosenberg (no relation), a researcher at UC Irvine. Rosenberg bases his approach on Piaget, but with a twist. He argues that cognitive development should be viewed as an interactive process with the surrounding social/cultural environment, and focuses on what he regards as three levels of adult functioning.
Rosenberg describes three structures of reasoning: sequential reasoning, in which there is no sense of causality, but only a tracking of events as they unfold, and at best a comparison to similar sequences; linear reasoning, in which the world is understood in terms of simple cause-and-effect; and systematic reasoning, in which the world is understood in terms of multiple causes and effects, including circular causation (feedback loops).
As Jordan notes, "In his delineation of three different modes of reasoning, Rosenberg describes the general structures of reasoning as well as the implications of these basic structures for how the individual interprets political events and structures. His main concern is to create a theoretical framework for analysing how different persons perceive, evaluate and act in the realm of politics."
Rosenberg notes that systematic reasoning is subject to dichotomization. Jordan notes, "Rosenberg also characterizes systematic reasoning as dualistic, since there is a difficulty in reconciling the general and ideal conceptions derived from deductive reasoning with the particular and real conceptions derived from observations of the concrete environment." Rosenberg said there were traces of a fourth form of reasoning that could resolve such dichotomies, but it was too rare to be studied empirically.
The table below gives an expanded view of how the levels differ. "1" refers to sequential reasoning, "2" to linear reasoning, and "3" to systemic reasoning. The breakdown into "3a" and "3b" under "Nature of Political Actions" is an example of dichotomization.
I. Fundamentals of Reasoning
Nature of Reasoning
1-Tracks objects. Reasoning is bound to the world as it appears.
2-Analyzes sequences of activity.
3-Juxtaposes relationships among actions and beliefs.
Sense of Causality
1- Largely absent: Events transpire, without much interpretation of how they come about.
2- Unidirectional: One factor acts upon another.
3- Bidirectional: Many factors act reciprocally on each other.
Conceptual Objects
1-Objects which currently are, or have been observed.
2-Concrete, observable actions, with concrete objects as subunits.
3-Relationships between actions and beliefs.
Conceptual Relations
1-Sequential order of events or a match between similar ones.
2-Subjectively defined unidirectional relationships.
3-Abstract, bidirectional relationships interposed between units.
And, more specific to our concerns:
II. Politics
Nature of Politics
1- Focuses on particular actors and present or very recent events
2- Considers causal relations and organizational structure, in unidirectional fashion.
3- Sees politics as regulated by collective rules, norms and expectations.
View of Political System
1- Concrete interactions. No sense of durable relationships, or a general context in which concrete events are situated.
2- Hierarchical structures where control flows from the top downwards.
3- A complex web of mutual relationships.
Political Players
1-Observed, concrete objects, each with its particular appearance and place in a sequence of events. No sense of them as subjects.
2-Subjects-individuals and groups-with internal drives and motivations who are the causes of action, and those targets of action whose activities are other-determined.
3-Systems of action and belief.
Nature of Political Actions
1- Specific, concrete, actually-observed speech and action within relatively short sequences of events.
2- Observable, concrete acts-whether or not actually observed-that occur in an ordered world of cause and effect.
3a-Genreal organizing forces that regulate specific interactive relationships and define the rules governing interrelationships between ideas.
3b-Particular interactions and propositions defined with regard to specific acts and general rules involved.
One particular incident reported by Rosenberg deserves special notice. Among the experiments he conducted, one topic he explored was terrorism and the Middle East. The experiments were done in the 1980s, when Osama bin Laden was a little-noticed US ally. The adversary was Moamar Gaddafi, whose name is barely mentioned anymore.
Yet, in response to the question of whether US bombing of Libya would stop the terrorism, one subject who was a systemic thinker replied:
No, I expect it will simply exacerbate the situation. If the support of terrorism is critical to Gaddafi's political position, he will continue to support it unless he is convinced Reagan might respond with a full scale invasion. Even then, he may continue his support, if somewhat more discreetly. In any case, the terrorism will go on without Gaddafi. (Emphasis added.)
Prompted with the question, "Why is that?" the subject continued:
There is a real impasse here. There is a conflict over territory, over Israel and the American position on that issue. I don't think we understand their view of the problem well at all. And we will have to if any meaningful rapprochement is to take place.
That was in the late 1980s.
Kegan's Subject/Object Framework
A third approach that Jordan discusses, Kegan's subject/object framework, is conceptually far richer and more abstract. It would be impossible to do justice to it in a single diary, even one devoted exclusively to it. Kegan presents a structured theory: what is subject at one stage [background of consciousness] becomes object at the next [focus of consciousness]). Because of this, his theory gives us a measuring stick to compare other frameworks with. The following excerpts from Jordan's overview pick out salient points for our discussion:
[Level 2]
"The crucial characteristic of the second order is the ability to perceive things, other persons, and oneself as phenomena that have durable properties, and to organize mental categories that have these durable properties....
"The person operating at the second stage can recognize that other people have other perspectives, but is not able to construct a durable relationship between the different perspectives (Kegan, 1994:23f). This inability means that one is unable to take care of the relationship, coordinating and mediating the perspectives in order to maintain a balanced relationship. The motivation is therefore linked to one's own egocentric and disconnected perspective (Kegan, 1994:39). One will try to expand as far as possible, to see how far one can go without encountering resistance from other people. The perspectives of other people are not a constituent element of one's own emotional and motivational life. One is unable to see one's own interests, intentions, and preferences in the context of the relationships between oneself and others. There is no sense of guilt, because the perspective of the other has not yet become an internal voice (a conscience)."
[Level 3]
"The core feature of the third order is what Kegan calls 'cross-categorical coordinations,' i.e. relationships between the durable categories dominating the preceding order....
"....At the third order, one does not have a self-conscious system (e.g. an ideology, a coherent world-view) for generating beliefs, opinions, values, etc.
"The third order self is inherently social: 'The self constructs a social world relationally or mutually, rather than being embedded in one point of view at a time' (Steiner, 1996:30)...."
[Level 4]
"The fourth order self is conscious of itself as a complex system with a certain distinctiveness and independence in relation to roles, norms and mutual relationships...."
"The fourth order mind is capable of creating and operating with values and ideals, relating them to each other into a system (a personal world-view or system of belief) (Kegan, 1994:91). At this level one is no longer unconditionally dependent on the values defined by the social environment: 'The fourth order self constructs its own authority' (Steiner, 1996:31)...."
[Level 5]
"The fifth order is characterized by the ability to relate systems to each other, see how they fit together. The self is identified with a decentered perspective, where the own personality as a system can be seen as a part of a larger whole, by which it is also created and transformed. Persons are regarded as systems that are partly determined and transformed by the relationships they have with each other. The internal world can be perceived as several systems which may be in conflict with each other, without perceiving these conflicts as a threat to the coherence of the self. Paradigms, philosophies, and theories can be seen as complementary perspectives. Incompatibilities between the perspectives can be used for gaining further insights and create new frameworks.
'Among the central features of this new way of thinking seems to be a new orientation to contradiction and paradox. Rather than completely threatening the system, or mobilizing the need for resolution at all costs, the contradiction becomes more recognizable as contradiction; the orientation seems to shift to the relationship between poles in a paradox rather than a choice between the poles.' (Kegan, 1982:229)."
A briefer summary of the levels, drawn from my own reading of Kegan and commentators, goes like this:
The level 2 self is characterized by consciousness of durable categories, including personal attributes such as strength, courage, loyalty, or even being "a good man" or "an evil-doers." It cannot see the world from the perspective of another and relate that perspective to its own.
The level 3 self is socially constructed, embedded in and the product of social roles and relationships. It corresponds with the mature adult stage in a traditional society.
The level 4 self is individually autonomous, capable of reflecting on, altering or even creating relationships and social roles, rather than being embedded in them. This is the autonomous self of liberal theory, the self of modernity, a self capable of abstract ideological thought.
The level 5 self is capable of reflecting on its own autonomy, and viewing itself as part of larger systems without diminishing that sense of autonomy. This is post-modern self, capable of living with contradiction, ambiguity and paradox as sources of inspiration, motivation and contemplation, rather than things to be feared, denied or defended against. It is capable of taking ideologies as objects and relating between them.
Two Specific Insights Regarding Conflicts
When conflicts reach an impasse people on each side often resort to level 2 thinking, each characterizing the other side in terms of durable categories. Internationally, Bush says: they are evildoers, we love freedom; Al Qaeda says: they are crusaders, we are dar al Islam.
Here on Dkos, hardliners on both sides of the Ohio conflict did the same: Hardline true believers say: we are patriots, who care about saving our democracy, they are sellouts, who just care about their careers, and maintaining "credibility." Hardline rejectionists say: we are patriots who care about winning back our country, they are hysterical tinfoil-hat conspiracy theorists.
None of these viewpoints allows for a level 3 view of how the perspectives of each side relate to one another-which is itself, merely a starting point on the journey toward actually resolving those differences.
At a higher level, we often have debates pitting liberals against moderates, or, less often, pitting liberals against radicals. This all makes sense at level 4, which is where ideology first emerges and is identified with. But at level 5 one is able to contemplate the relationships between ideologies. Instead of appearing as static, unified wholes, they appear as changing, conflicted systems in complex relationships with one another.
At level 5, what is seen as most important is not the right ideological position, but the overall shape of the dynamic between ideologies. For a level 5 radical, it is much more important to see a healthy, productive interchange and collaboration between liberals and radicals than it is to press for the dominance of radical ideas, by denigrating "mere civil rights," for example. (See the diary, "Winning the 'cultural war': liberalism and left radicalism", where I grumpily complain about the foolishness of pitting radicals vs. liberals, and accepting such a formulation as essentially representative of the radical tradition.)
Integrating the Three Models
As noted abolve, "Kegan presents a structured theory: what is subject at one stage [background of consciousness] becomes object at the next [focus of consciousness])." This makes Kegan's framework the logical candidate to use in seeking to correlate the different levels of the different models to one another.
Kegan and Integrative Complexity
From the above descriptions, we can
(1) Identify medium low integrative complexity with Kegan's second level:
IC: "Different perspectives are recognized, but remain compartmentalized, they cannot be related to and integrated with each other."
Kegan: "The person operating at the second stage can recognize that other people have other perspectives, but is not able to construct a durable relationship between the different perspectives."
(2) Identify medium high integrative complexity with Kegan's third level:
IC: "One can reflect on one's own behavior as interpreted from another perspective, and adjust one's behavior accordingly to reach a desired outcome."
Kegan: "The third order self is inherently social: 'The self constructs a social world relationally or mutually, rather than being embedded in one point of view at a time'"
(3) Identify high integrative complexity with Kegan's fifth level:
IC: "Rather than avoiding paradox, it can be appreciated as accurately representing real experience-such as simultaneous needs for autonomy and dependence."
Kegan: "Rather than completely threatening the system, or mobilizing the need for resolution at all costs, the contradiction becomes more recognizable as contradiction; the orientation seems to shift to the relationship between poles in a paradox rather than a choice between the poles."
This analysis reveals a gap in the integrative complexity framework-there appears to be no level corresponding to Kegan's level four. It is also unclear where low integrative complexity belongs, although it seems like it, too, belongs at level 2, along with medium low integrative complexity.
Kegan and Rosenberg
There is, however, a much stronger match between Rosenberg's typology and Kegan's, which comes into sharper focus by including quotes from Jordan's paper and Rosenberg's book:
The sequential, associational style of Rosenberg's sequential thinking is clearly matched to Kegan's durable categories. In both schemas, things are what they are because of what they are, there is no causal process involved. The relational world of Kegan's level 3 is absent in sequential thinking, as seen in the description of the view of the political system: "No sense of durable relationships..." And Jordan adds, "The sequential thinker is not really aware that the world may appear differently to other people, and he or she has therefore a limited ability to take the perspective of others."
The sequential thinker is not really aware that the world may appear differently to other people, and he or she has therefore a limited ability to take the perspective of others.
With linear reasoning, the political system is viewed as "hierarchical structures where control flows from the top downwards," a view consistent with Kegan's level three self, embedded in social roles and relationships. As further proof, Jordan adds: "A person operating with linear thinking would tend to:.... Be embedded in conventional norms and interpretations, with little ability to reflect on the over-all system."
Finally, Rosenberg himself writes (p. 134), "Finally, the linear thinker is an inherently more social animal. He thinks in terms of rules or schemas which are largely products of his social environment. Thus, he is socialized not only because his behavior is regulated by social reinforcement schedules, but more fundamentally because his very way of making sense of the world is oriented by his cultural milieu."
With systematic thinking, Rosenberg writes (p. 153), "The systematic thinker conceives if himself as an independent entity. Unlike the linear thinker he does not rely on social location or definition. He does not identify himself as a group member nor does he view himself as others see him. Instead, he regards himself in his own terms." This clearly correlates with the autonomy of Kegan's fourth level. In fact, Kegan himself could have written this passage, substituting "Level four individual" for "systematic thinker. The parallels are that exact.
Furthermore, the dichotomization problem that Rosenberg notes in systemiatic thinking is precise the sort of thing that Kegan's fifth level has the capacity to deal with, while the fourth level does not.
Coda: Where's Georgie?
The above analysis suggests that the Bush Administration operates at the lowest level of adult development, which Kegan actually identifies with early adolescence. (The transition from his level 2 to level 3 is a good deal of what teenage angst is all about.)
Maverick philosopher Peter Singer has written a book, The President of Good and Evil: The Morality of George W. Bush, reviewed here, in which he makes the argument explicit. In an interview with The Nation magazine, the following exchange took place:
(Q) You've called George Bush an ethical "adolescent." What do you mean by that?
(A) Lawrence Kohlberg argues that most people go through certain stages of moral development. Using his categories, and looking at some of the moral judgments Bush makes--not so much the substance of the judgments as the way in which he reaches his judgments--it seems to me that Bush is at a stage that is typical of adolescent boys. Most, though not all of them, later go on to a more reflective view of morality. Bush appears not to have done so.
However, Carol Norris has suggested that this is giving them far too much credit, in her article, "Stage Zero: The Moral Development of George W. Bush". In effect, Norris defends 4-years against the "slanderous comparisons" with Bush in "The 4-Year Old's Filibuster".
How low can you go?