Levels of War
aka Is Chess Strategic?
This is the second piece building toward an interesting marriage of the teachings of John Boyd and the priorities of Charles Kenny. The first was a discussion of Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) decision cycles as described by Boyd and may be found here. The third piece making the marriage may now be found here, while two pieces discussing risk may be found here and here. A piece on war games is here.
Many of us understand there is a distinction between tactics and strategy though determining the cut may be hard when pressed to do so. Think in Chess, individual piece movement and the use of pairs supporting each other constitute tactics while the overall broad board play is viewed as the strategy. A business may view individual advertisements or sales pitches as tactics while a product theme may be seen as strategy. Then again, one product theme may be a tactic tied into a multiple product themed strategy. Think of the Disney movie, ride, toy, t-shirt, sound track, cartoon - each piece sold individually as tactics though tied in a sales strategic theme. From this we discern that tactics build to strategy though we don’t clearly delineate the two. There’s reason for this.
War is analog. Life is analog. We humans like to break ideas into bins or categories. We want to go digital. It’s easier for us to think of discrete concepts despite the real world being on a continuum or gradient. Thus we have bins for tactics and for strategy though we don’t have common understanding as to what goes into each bin. Some things may meet the criteria for both bins though need to be put in one. Doing so often excludes thinking of the thing in terms of the other.
dictionary.com defines strategy as:
1. the science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and operations.
2. the use or an instance of using this science or art.
3. skillful use of a stratagem: The salesperson's strategy was to seem always to agree with the customer.
4. a plan, method, or series of maneuvers or stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result: a strategy for getting ahead in the world.
I’d call the example in 3 a technique not a strategy. Tactics, techniques, and procedures fall in the tactical bin. Moving on with the dictionary which defines tactics as:
- (usually used with a singular verb) the art or science of disposing military or naval forces for battle and maneuvering them in battle.
- (used with a plural verb) the maneuvers themselves.
- (used with a singular verb) any mode of procedure for gaining advantage or success.
- (usually used with a singular verb) Linguistics.
- the patterns in which the elements of a given level or stratum in a language may combine to form larger constructions.
- the study and description of such patterns.
Even here we see the blurring of bins, “directing large military movements” and “series of maneuvers” versus “science of disposing military or naval forces for battle and maneuvering them in battle.” Compare the tactic’s definition 3 with the strategy’s example in its definition 3.
Those teaching strategy have trouble finding a line too. In Good Strategy Bad Strategy, Richard Rumelt writes about David beating Goliath. David’s use of a more advanced ranged weaponry with a sling as opposed to sword gets depicted as strategic. Yet a fight between two persons is clearly tactics. This is lower level tactics at that, a knight jumping to take another piece. Look at the dictionary on tactics again, “any mode of procedure for gaining advantage,” and “... disposing military... for battle and maneuvering them in battle.” Adding further confusion, Rumelt also looks at Hannibal at Cannae as example of strategy.
“Hannibal had arranged his troops in a broad arc, bulging out in the center toward the Romans. In that central bulge, Hannibal placed troops from Spain and Gaul, soldiers who had been liberated from Roman rule or hired during his march from Spain to Italy and along the Po River. On the flanks, or sides, of this central bulge he placed his Carthaginian heavy infantry.
When the advancing Romans met Hannibal’s army, the outward-arced center of Hannibal’s front line was the first point of contact. There, the Gauls and Spaniards slowly fell back, not holding the line, just as Hannibal had ordered. Encouraged, the Roman army moved forward with shouts of victory, rushing to exploit this apparent weakness. Simultaneously, Hannibal’s horse cavalry, placed on the sides of his mile-wide army, began its preplanned gallop in wide two-mile arcs around the sides of the Roman army, engaging and defeating the smaller Roman cavalry.
As the Roman legions pushed into the Carthaginian center, the original outward arc was reversed, and it began to bow inward under the pressure. As the center line bowed inward, Hannibal’s heavy infantry units, positioned on either end of the central arc, maintained their positions but did not engage. Then, at Hannibal’s signal, reinforcements moved to bolster the Carthaginian bowed-in center. The troops in the center stopped their retreat and held. Their aspect changed from that of panicky barbarians to that of hard, disciplined troops. Hannibal’s heavy infantry flanks then moved to engage the sides of the Roman army, which was now surrounded on three sides. Then Hannibal’s cavalry rode in from behind and closed the Roman’s rear as well.“
Yet isn’t this “the art or science of disposing military or naval forces for battle and maneuvering them in battle,” “the maneuvers themselves,” and “any mode of procedure for gaining advantage or success“ as define tactics? I would argue that at Cannae, Hannibal was Tactical though prior to Cannae with his employment of raids and psychological warfare, and in supporting his army, he was Operational while his decision subsequent to victory at Cannae not to press on to Rome was Strategic (yet Fabius proved the master strategist echoed later by George Washington and Ho Chi Minh (and in Simon Sinek’s Infinite Game)).
Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Publication 1 (JP-1) states:
a. General. While the various forms and methods of warfare are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives. There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. The strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of employment depends on the nature of the objective, mission, or task.
b. Strategic Level. Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater and multinational objectives. At the strategic level, a nation often determines the national (or multinational in the case of an alliance or coalition) guidance that addresses strategic objectives in support of strategic end states and develops and uses national resources to achieve them. The President, aided by the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC) as the National Security Staff, establishes policy and national strategic objectives. The day-to-day work of the NSC and HSC is accomplished by the combined National Security Staff, the President’s principal staff for national security issues. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) translates these into strategic military objectives that facilitate identification of the military end state and theater strategic planning by the combatant commanders (CCDRs). CCDRs usually participate in strategic discussions with the President and SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and with partner nations. The CCDR’s strategy is an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational-level activities within the theater.
c. Operational Level. The operational level links strategy and tactics by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and strategic objectives. It sequences tactical actions to achieve objectives. The focus at this level is on the planning and execution of operations using operational art: the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] and component commanders use operational art to determine when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and to influence the adversary’s disposition before combat. Operational art governs the deployment of those forces and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
d. Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The tactical level of war is where battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or joint task forces (JTFs). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and enemy to achieve combat objectives. An engagement can include a wide variety of activities between opposing forces normally in a short-duration action. A battle consists of a set of related engagements involving larger forces than used in engagements and normally affect the course of an operation or a campaign. Forces at the tactical level generally employ various tactics to achieve their military objectives.
The doctrine readily notes the blurring of the lines between levels creating difficulty in distinction of bins, “there are no finite limits...” This shows war is analog though we like to think discretely.
e. While the traditional separate levels of war, as shown in Figure I-2, may help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of missions, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command, campaigns and major operations then provide the framework within which the joint force accomplishes the mission; the actual execution is more complicated. With today’s constant 24-hour media coverage and easy access to the Internet by our enemies for propaganda, a tactical-level plan and resulting action can have severe operational or strategic implications. For example, an action by one Soldier, Marine, Sailor, or Airman on the battlefield at the tactical level could potentially cause significant disruption to operational and strategic-level planning. Conversely, operations at all levels can be positively influenced by pervasive media coverage, which must be incorporated in plans at all levels. In this sense, during execution all three levels overlap. Commanders and their staffs at all levels must anticipate how their plans, operations, and actions may impact the other levels (those above and those below).
While the DoD breaks our continuum into three levels, it is easy to appreciate that most civilians recognize only tactics and strategy and that they make the split somewhere between individual or “unit level” tactics and larger force tactics. Hence how Cannae was seen as strategic to Richard Rumelt. Perhaps this is understandable as Martin Dunn writes, “That we should seek to equate Clausewitz with belief in three levels of war is curious, as is the way in which we assert that he distinguished between them. His writings only refer to two levels: If fighting consisted of a single act, no further subdivision would be needed. However, it consists of a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which... are called "engagements". This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of them with the others in order to further the object of the war. One has been called tactics, and the other strategy... According to our classification, then, tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.” This, in turn, notes capacity for leaders to be dual or multi “hatted” in that one person may be working across more than one level. “If fighting consisted of a single act,” Clausewitz saw one person impacting across the spectrum. We saw this blurring with DoD’s concern particular to media impact and influence upon populations. The Air Force writes well of the three levels of war while noting actions may reach across the spectrum in others ways including kinetically. “A given aircraft, dropping a given weapon, could conduct a “tactical,” “operational,” or “strategic” mission, depending on the planned results. Given airpower’s inherent flexibility, any tactical mission with a given aircraft dropping given weapons can deliver a mix of intended effects, at all levels, from tactical to strategic.” They also use an interesting means for determining in which level an action belongs, “Airmen should not define a given level by the specific weapons used, or on the targets attacked, but on the level of desired effects one wishes to create.” I’m not sure an effects based measure is the criterion for determination though I think it a good initial point after which we could consider other factors to include complexity of actions, numbers of forces, levels of requisite coordination, domains of action, other governmental entity involvement in helping our binning.
Robert Bateman in Esquire writes about four levels of war using Tactical, Operational, and Strategic while placing a Political level above strategic. I disagree with this as politics very much plays in strategy while it can have effect upon and be effected by operational and tactical levels. We need to consider national levers of power holistically as the JP-1 tells us to think of “DIME,” - Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economy. These all can and should work together for national betterment while the glue that binds them is politics. TC 7-102 Operational Environment and Army Learning likes us to assess situations through “PMESII-PT” for political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. If politics gets assessed first, obviously it is of prime importance to those working across the levels of war. Martin Dunn weighs in on this as well and he, like Clausewitz, sees political/military integration to include operational and tactical situations, “We saw in Indochina, Vietnam, Malaya and elsewhere how Communist political and military organisations were integrated down to the local level, and local military action often was in support of political goals. Further, successful counter-guerrilla campaigns, such as in Malaya, found it desirable to mimic Communist organisation and closely coordinate military and political decision-making. Here it was impossible to successfully separate military and political aspects at the local level, let alone the national.” Perhaps Bateman echoes Liddell Hart. Dunn on Hart, “Thus Liddell Hart defined "higher" or "grand strategy" (what we might today call "national strategy") as distinct from "pure" or "military strategy", under which sits tactics.” In terms of bins, Boyd conformed with Hart in having tactics, grand tactics, strategy, grand strategy, and national goals though he very much understood the interrelationships now described by PMESII as highlighted on his emphasis for moral concerns. We should note Henri Jomini recognized six levels though presumed politics played only at the top.
The United States doctrine clearly has three levels of war.
These are our bins. Yet these get divided into sub-levels with national policy and theater strategy at the strategic level of war, campaigns and major operations at the operational level of war, and battles, engagements, and small unit and crew actions at the tactical level. These are depicted in a singular stacked column probably to emphasize one builds on the other. Engagements are the bricks that make battles which are the bricks that make operations which in turn make campaigns and so on. Again, war is analog while we like to think in discrete bins. Bins allow us ease of assignment in responsibilities while also providing means for exploration and assessment. Yet we know reality doesn’t have clear boundaries between bins. Hence I like to think of seven levels of war stacked in two offset columns almost like a hopscotch board. One would zigzag up the levels in integration and complexity while horizontal viewing shows the blurring. My levels are technical, low tactical to include individual and unit level tactics (ULT), high tactics to include fleet tactics, marine air ground task forces, combined arms, low operational and high operations with campaigns forming high operational, regional strategic and global strategy. Whole of government permeates throughout; this is not strictly military.
Think about this. Technology determines tactics. ULT should be optimized for best fight. Compromises, however, might need to be made to integrate multiple units. This is especially true if these units vary in flavor. Think about systems engineering, sometimes optimizing a part can be detrimental to the whole. Hence our overlap low tactical to high tactics. The higher tactical commander may need to impose an adjustment. A Fires center may need to phase artillery and air support. Air defense elements need to accommodate air support elements. Often the high tactical commander may also be a low operational commander. We see this with Fourth Fleet also being Naval Forces Southern Command while Fifth Fleet is also Naval Forces Central Command. These individuals get “dual hatted.” High tactics blends with low operations, hence the overlap visualized by the two columns stacked offset. There can be multiple levels of operational commanders; this reason alone is sufficient to want distinction. Operations certainly build campaigns while low operations may or may not be multi-domain (maritime, air, land, cyber, space) Of note, I like to break out information (stuff humans think about), electromagnetic (physical beeps and squeaks), and cyber (programming) as separate distinct domains - as a nation, we’re not there yet in seeing this. In this, electromagnetic is physical just as are maritime, air, land, and space. Information and cyber are not physical though they can generate physical effects. High operations are most definitely multi-domain in nature.
Strategy gets interesting as we do have regional divides and global concerns. Yet we also have seams and overlaps which can create delay and friction for more fingers in pies but hopefully ensures less slippage though cracks. DoD Geographic Combatant Commands form the basis for regional strategy though each region can impact its neighbors and the Department of State divides regions differently than DoD. We definitely need a unifying tie bringing it all together in the national strategic view. And we need to look both, as Boyd would say, deductively from national all the way down to technological while also looking integrally technical building all the way up.
We don’t pay enough respect to technology in its own right, Malcolm Gladwell hits the power of the sling as already recognized advantage to David and Goliath prior to their combat engagement. Tactically and operationally, sometimes we aren’t best using what we already have as seen through Operational Research in Blackett’s War, examples include gun sighting low tactical, where to place radars and guns high tactical, convoy size low operational, apportionment of long range aircraft to either bombing or convoy sea screening high operational. Giving technology a recognized foundational bin would help improve this both through development and in advising usage of. Technology really is upon what tactics are built while operations build upon both tactics and technology. Compare ULT versus a naval group or force using Composite Warfare Construct (CWC)*. There is a world of difference yet currently they’re in the same bin of tactics. Hannibal at Cannae really is more akin to CWC while moving an individual phalanx column is with flying an unsupported Defensive Counter Air (DCA) aka fighter patrol cap with two or four fighters. There’s a clear break with distinct level of leadership, shouldn’t we acknowledge it? Perhaps those distinct levels in planning and command illustrate this best. That CWC likely has a Commodore or Rear Admiral running it while the DCA a Lieutenant. Tactical commanders with integration of forces to battle is high tactics.
For the operational bins, look at Combatant Commanders designing campaigns while dual hatting regional strategic and high operations. Underlying Component Commanders both input to those campaigns and design operations. Before Moltke there was no recognized operational level though through most of history before him campaigns were serial; an army with a battle at a time with that being inside what a commander could see. What Moltke formalized, influenced by rail and telegraph, was an army could have multiple battles in parallel beyond what the commander could see. Nowadays such has fractured much further. Naval groups often disaggregate and re-aggregate. A company could have three disparate platoons.
War is analog. Life is analog. So what do levels really do? Again, they provide means to help understand sharing of responsibilities while providing a way to understand and assess to include appreciating interrelationships. These should be organizational tools not necessarily a decision aid. Decisions should be made where the relevant information is so as to ensure initiative gets seized or maintained. As Dunn says, “The concept of levels of war is useful teaching and learning tool. They help us explain the past, and develop our ideas for the future... Adherence to a doctrinal construct rather than the realities of the environment can result in an air of unreality. Resources and time can be wasted and inefficient structures built in search of some utopia reflecting the trilogy of levels—forgetting that they are just a tool to help us explain what we observe. If you can draw important conclusions from the existence of a particular level of war, then you should apply a test: will the same arguments hold if you do not refer to any level of war? If your case can only be sustained by using such a concept, then perhaps you are letting the doctrinal tail wag the organisational dog.” I believe the seven help provide better understanding than the three. That does not mean we need a deep hierarchy, such is situational. Levels can be multi-hatted. Governmental departments outside DoD wouldn’t have manning for such hierarchy even if such were sought. Thoughts still need to cover the spread, however. We should understand both how each of the seven levels both contributes to and is impacted by our plans or actions. As Boyd would say, the harmonizing tie across these levels is understanding intent.
With this, I want to call out a critical point from Richard Rumelt’s Good Strategy Bad Strategy in that strategy must be built on what is feasible. “A good strategy has an essential logical structure that I call the kernel. The kernel of a strategy contains three elements: a diagnosis, a guiding policy, and coherent action... Coherent actions are feasible coordinated policies, resource commitments, and actions designed to carry out the guiding policy.“ Hence Cold War containment not confrontation. Missile Crisis blockade not bomb nor invasion. If the strategic levels fail to appreciate how the five technical, tactical, and operational bins contribute to and are impacted by, then those strategies are at risk of failing the feasibility test.
Similarly John Lewis Gaddis in On Grand Strategy calls out that ends or aims are from an infinite set while means are always finite; strategy is matching ends with means. Translation - strategy is having appreciation for the limits of feasibility.
Gaddis gives us another note regarding strategy we would do well to remember, “There were, to be sure, pacts with devils in all of these: strategies, like politics, are never pure.”
As I like to “title-drop,” I’ve got some books to recommend. Some made previous mention in the above. Some will in our discussion after the list where I’ll answer “is Chess strategic?” We will also look at some other games and situations. Hopefully you’re already seeing my answer regarding Chess. Perhaps you’re thinking of other games and situations and already binning them.
Thinking Fast and Slow
Good Strategy Bad Strategy
The Arrogance of Power
The March of Folly
Be Like the Fox
Sailing True North
The Ugly American
Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations
Guns of August
How Not to be Wrong
Prius or Pickup
Blackett’s War
David and Goliath
Discourse on Winning and Losing
Ghost Fleet
Sid Meier’s Memoir!
Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed The Art Of War
1453
The Utility of Force
On Grand Strategy
Is Chess strategic? Remember the laymen see only tactics and strategy and put the line between low tactics and everything else. Though hopefully now we recognize three levels of war and fancy seven. A Chess board is a battlefield. It’s integrated pieces like combined arms. It is not integrated operations. It is no where near campaign. Chess is tactical and only tactical. A game plan is not the same as strategy. Going into a dogfight, one should have a game plan. Any mission which is by definition tactical should have a plan. Missions are unit actions. How about “Real-Time Strategy” (RTS) games like Starcraft? Again, low and high tactics. Stratego, Pentago, Corridor, Go, Tigers and Goats? All tactical. Settlers of Catan? Now you have integrated operations in a campaign. Same with Pandemic. These are operational. As is Horrified. Dominion? Seems Operational with its breadth of theme though I’d say it’s Tactical. Risk? Operational. Risk 2210 AD? Still operational. Monopoly? I’d argue Operational as you essentially set a campaign of what you want to acquire (and plan what not to get). Villainous? A race of campaigns so Operational. Sid Meier’s Civilization? Now that’s Strategic. At least it is when you first play it though play it often enough and despite the random element, it becomes mechanistic hence partially predictive and thus dropping through Operational it becomes both Tactical and Boring in play. It stays Strategic if you’re not mechanically optimizing however. In it at any given time, you need to appreciate current, near term possible, far term possible means to match to some sort of ends in which the game provides options for different ends to achieve which can be done with proximate objectives in one theme of ends to gain advantage to other ends. By not going mechanistic you keep yourself top level hence stay Strategic and have more fun playing. I think Terraforming Mars falls in the Strategic. Both Root and Everdell seem to scratch the Strategic itch though I could be persuaded to bin with Settlers. Settlers with the Cities and Knights expansion, that may cross over. Same for Racoon Tycoon. Dungeons and Dragons, that could cover the spectrum. Or it could focus in tactical to operational. Lot of fluidity in how you can play that. Not sure where we’d put The Resistance.
Time for some case studies. I’d like to look at Barbara Tuchman’s Guns of August. I bet your mind immediately went to Schlieffen. We’ll use that plan as a reference later. For now I want to look at the Goeben. Remember war is analog. Because of this we often hear of concerns for “strategic corporals” and “tactical generals.” By this we mean a low level fighter could cause severe international concern with the strategic corporal. Human tendency is micromanagement hence fear of generals not taking care to their own level and instead stepping down mucking everything up while leaving their own unaddressed. Such concerns are real though with high tactics, we see generals and admirals, particularly as brigadiers or commodores and as major generals or rear admirals, can in fact be tactical leaders. I myself voiced concern similar to tactical generals at the 2008 Tailhook convention when I asked the Admirals’ panel, “Gentlemen, with all this work on networks which should push information down quickly to the lowest level where it can readily be used, do you have concerns it may pull information up into one now thinking s/he sees it all thus enabling micromanagement?” I should also have asked how they might deal with too much information with concern for overload. Anyway, with the Goeben, we see the flip side of a “strategic corporal.” In this case, a singular tactical unit didn’t create a mess but rather, from the German perspective, saved the day with significant national strategic impact. Two things set the scene. First, the German ship was essentially trapped in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war. Second, the Ottomans were dithering; they really didn’t want to join the war. For Germany, choking off the Russians and the Black Sea was critical. The British assumed Goeben would attempt to run Gibraltar and moved ships west to intercept. They feared once loose, Goeben would turn commerce raider. Initially Goeben started westward as the British suspected. Then Goeben decided to run east. Goeben went to shelter with the Ottomans and in so doing fortified their commitment to enter the war. How’s this for moving across the levels of war?
Boyd’s ways for maneuver warfare that emphasized common understanding of intent and trust through the levels help create “strategic corporals” of this positive Goeben flavor. Understanding intent ties the levels. Persons using such understand actions at their level while appreciating effects upon other levels. In a biography of Boyd, Robert Coram tells of a marine captain preventing the inadvertent bombing of a third party embassy, “The battalion was diverted to participate in the invasion of Grenada. The battalion was led by Lieutenant Colonel Ray Smith, a maneuverist and graduate of the Fort Pickett free-play exercises... When intelligence reports told of a large building flying a curious flag, ranking officers assumed the building housed one of the Grenada revolutionary organizations. A Navy admiral ordered Smith’s Marines to attack. Historically, a Marine commander receiving such orders would have done so without a second thought. But a fundamental tenet of maneuver warfare is to give the officer on the scene the authority to make tactical decisions. A young captain under Smith’s command was not sure the building housed revolutionaries and suggested sending out a patrol. Smith had confidence in the captain and agreed. He could always call in naval gunfire to level the buildings. As the patrol approached the building, a civilian came out to welcome them. Dozens of guns were trained on the man. If he had twitched, if he had reached into a pocket, he probably would have died. He waved and said, “Gentlemen, I am glad to see you. I am the ambassador of Venezuela.”“ Imagine the strategic political consequences had such an attack occurred.
In Good Strategy Bad Strategy, Richard Rumelt cited the 1991 Gulf War with Schwarzkopf’s “Left Hook” as good strategy. We should readily see this was campaign design and operational not strategic. What was strategic was George H.W. Bush deciding not to press onward after liberating Kuwait. He stuck to his objectives without mission creep and foreshadowed Rumelt’s own view that strategy should be based of feasibility.
Now let’s take a moment and look at Schwarzkopf’s operational design. Maritime forces including amphibious elements staged to the south of Kuwait in the North Arabian Gulf. These kept Iraqi forces looking southward and essentially pinned them while land forces swept in from the west in an envelopment reminiscent of Schlieffen, Moltke, and a grander scale of Hannibal. The air offered support cutting lines of communication, logistical nodes, command and control nodes, asset attrition, and means of reinforcement. All in all a great example of operational level of war. There is a questionable “lesson,” however. The air campaign was subsequently noted as having inspired “shock and awe.” This was thought of as strategic, it wasn’t. And it was thought effective, it wasn’t in the vein advocates portray.
Shock and awe** did include tactical assets making strikes with impact that gummed up adversary response and reduced adversary capacity to fight. What advocates claim is that it instilled fear and impacted will to fight. Whenever we hear such claims, we should immediately turn skeptic. It’s one thing to hinder an adversary’s thought processes by reducing information gathering capacity, changing circumstances, reducing communication. That’s normal military stuff. As to breaking the will, it’s never happened and we should know better. Turn to Blackett’s War. We can thank Professor Lindemann for such fallacies. In 1935, there was a view to “strategic bombing” as means to destroy an adversary’s industry thus hurting downstream capacity for war. This has some legitimacy though is slower with less return on investment than direct support. Tied to the strategic bombing emphasis, however, was a hypothesis inherited from the Italians that the affected civilian population may be adversely impacted to the point of pressuring their politicians to get out of the war. Lindemann later cooked the books on the Birmingham and Hull study to sell not prove this hypothesis. In it, he suggested losing housing drove greatest impact. Such thinking has skewed military policy for the last eighty years. We should know better. It took more than mere bombardment to sack Constantinople. And over two thousand years ago, Xerxes burned Athens. The Athenians would not be dismayed, intimidated, or coerced.
This brings me to Admiral Stavridis in his Sailing True North. I’m going to copy and paste portions of his book’s first vignette while also including my notes as they pertain to Themistocles working across all levels showing mastery of the full spectrum of war:
“Themistocles, the Athenian admiral who won the pivotal Battle of Salamis, also in 480 B.C.”
“... luring the Persians into the constrained waters of the Straits of Salamis off the coast of Athens, Themistocles led the free Greeks under his command to a smashing victory over the enslaved oarsmen of the Persian foe.”
“we must all “row for freedom.” That is a powerful lesson, and one I’ve carried with me, drawing upon Themistocles over and over.”
Now here comes some forward looking procurement which is a part of strategy.
“Once in office, Themistocles quickly and forcefully began speaking out in favor of building Athens into a seagoing power. Crucially, as archon, he commissioned a defended port to be built at Piraeus (the nearest significant harbor to Athens, just a few kilometers distant)”
“His was a strategic vision coupled with a practical ability to move supporters, win public arguments, and demonstrate the long-term value in leveraging the seagoing access Athens enjoyed.”
“Themistocles, who sensed early on the power that a true, defendable harbor would afford the ancient city-state. His ability to “see around the corner” and build that harbor helped save Greece’s democracy a decade after his service as archon.”
Here we should note concerns for and use of levers of power - DIME
“Themistocles knew that the combination of Athens’s coastal location and expanding mercantile interests, plus the ever-growing threat of the expanding Persian Empire to the east, made it essential for Athens to develop a navy as a connector and protector between it and the outside world.”
“Themistocles predicted not only that the Persians would return, but that they would bring a much more powerful navy with them when they did.”
Like Chamberlain speaking “appeasement” while gaining delay time to rearm (see Fight for the Sky***); like Pelosi refusing to answer regarding Iranian regime change. Sometimes we need to say one thing to achieve another.
“As the newly appointed commander of the nascent navy he championed, he began talking up the threat posed by pirates on the nearby island of Aegina to give the Athenians a concrete reason to build a fleet without directly referencing the Persians.”
“Xerxes assembled an army of conquest from the far corners of the Persian Empire and descended on Greece from the north—and, as Themistocles had predicted, the Persians did not neglect to bring a powerful navy this time around.”
DIME again - negative diplomatic consequences
“Despite Athenian capabilities, Greece overall was initially unprepared for the onslaught. Political divisions and operational bickering between the allied city-states hampered a coherent response.”
National Strategic aims driving operational campaign design
“To counter the land invasion, the allies would hold at the strategic choke point of Thermopylae on the eastern coast of mainland Greece, where King Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans (plus a handful of other Greek warriors) would make their legendary last stand to buy time for the rest of the Greeks to assemble. Meanwhile, the Athenian navy led a blocking effort at Artemisium (a seaport on the island of Euboea, north of Athens and near Thermopylae), where they, like the Spartans ashore, delayed the Persians but could not turn them back.”
Diagnosis of the operational environment; seeing adversary’s critical enabling features.
“Themistocles, who was a strong voice in any situation, continued to advocate the idea of striking a maritime blow at the invading forces. He correctly saw that they would be overconfident in their vastly larger numbers, and also were logistically dependent on supplies and reinforcement from the sea.”
“Rather than sacrifice the inhabitants of the city under siege, Themistocles thought it better to sacrifice the city itself, and persuaded the Athenians to evacuate.”
Theater strategic Center of Gravity (COG) = the people; objective protect the people
“Themistocles argued that Athens could be rebuilt and repopulated as long as her people survived and the Persians were defeated at sea.”
“Themistocles and his crews took to their ships and sailed across the Straits of Salamis to take refuge on the island opposite the port of Piraeus. Civilians and sailors alike watched from their sheltering places in the countryside as the Persian army burned Athens and the Persian fleet gathered in its multitudes at the mouth of the straits.”
This point should count against Lindemann, Churchill, and Strategic Bombing.
“Imagine him walking among his sailors as they watched all that they knew go up in smoke and were equally unsure about the survival of their wives, children, and aged parents.”
Operational COGs = Athenian fleet versus Persian army; Persian fleet a Key Enabler for their army also attackable hence also Critical Vulnerability
Operational Objective = Destruction of enemy fleet (Athens)
Destruction of enemy fleet (desired Persians)
Deter / Block / Drive Away enemy fleet (required Persians); Persians only needed to screen / protect & support land force (pulled a Halsey@Leyte****)
Fleet (high) tactics set use of geography to turn strength to vulnerability.
“Themistocles, however, wanted to fight in the straits, where the Persians’ numerical advantage would be naturally constrained.”
Informational (psychological) Warfare like Hannibal preceding his fight at Cannae; in this case low operational level. Important effects of convincing Persians of opportunity for their desired objective without seeing the increased risk to their required objective.
“Themistocles not only set about making his case to his fellow Greeks, but also devised a scheme to lure the Persians into battle. He secretly sent a messenger to the Persian fleet to falsely tell them of a plan to retreat and urge them to attack now to take advantage of dissension in the Greek ranks.”
Similar to Russian Informational methods; this one blurs the lines across the levels. Initial effects would certainly be tactical though 2nd order operational and strategic.
“At the same time, Themistocles sent another secret mission to persuade the ethnic Greeks serving in the Persian fleet to turn on their masters in the coming battle.”
In execution down to Unit Level Tactics and individual ship action. After all, the straits are restraining precluding large group multi-ship integration. Nelson would approve*****.
“After persuading his men to “row for freedom,” Themistocles put to sea. As he had hoped, the narrows negated the Persians’ five-to-one numerical advantage in ships, and his motivated oarsmen dealt the enemy—rowed by enslaved men—a crushing blow, sinking nearly ten times as many ships as they lost themselves.”
Tactical actions Strategic Effect via impact to Operational Key Enabler.
“At a stroke, the Persian army that had so recently burned Athens found that it was cut off from resupply and forced to retreat hastily toward Persia.”
Interesting Admiral Stavridis chooses to highlight Themistocles tactical acumen despite his brilliance across all levels of war.
“It was an extraordinary victory, and one that is still studied at the Naval Academy today. It reflects not only the tactical brilliance of Themistocles, but also his character—the ability to reach deep inside himself, at a moment when everyone around him was frightened and trembling, and rally people to his cause. His combination of vision, energy, and charisma have seldom been equaled in naval history. He won a stunning victory, and the Persians retreated, allowing the Athenians—as he had predicted—to return to their destroyed homes and begin again.”
Hopefully I’ve left you with considerations regarding levels of war and thoughts towards seven versus three. Even should you stick with three, or worse, two, I’d like to close with an insight from Robert Bateman in his Esquire piece while considering what initially is not a military case. Consider Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) for a moment. This was the diplomatic effort to secure a group of free trade partners around the Pacific. In such we see DIME with the D supporting the E though it appears in an operational sense for free trade. Hidden behind that were strategic aims to create a bloc much as NATO started with economy. Cooperation in trade would have set the stage for information sharing and military cooperation en masse as means to block and deter China. Yet politicians like Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump only saw threats to U.S. jobs. Hence they killed the effort. In TPP, we see Bateman’s insight that speakers who use “tactical” and strategic” interchangeably lack experience and/or education for the conduct of international affairs. One can listen with points focused domestically though one should doubt knowledge of or concern for broader effects. Those over using “strategic” as adjective shouldn’t be trusted as competent.
* Composite Warfare Construct is how naval groups organize and fight battles. It consists of a Composite Warfare Commander or Officer in Tactical Command. Under this person are Principal Warfare Commanders divided by function. Each has assets apportioned though they can readily share as needed. These commanders work off a common picture though each focuses on specific threat areas. Typical Principals are: Air Defense, (Sea) Surface, Undersea (Submarine), Information. Often Surface and Submarine are combined. Some groups will add a Strike Commander overseeing offensive force projection. Counter-mine can get its own Principal or be in Undersea. Rare, though possible, an amphibious group could make an Amphibious Principal. The group functions by “command by negation” or “command by veto,” in which each Principal Warfare Commander directs assets underneath while reporting intended actions up. A Principal Warfare Commander does not wait for permission. Other Principals hear or see the plans and can either work around or note potential areas of friction. A Composite Warfare Commander will intervene only as needed. This allows battles presumed to have large volumes of threat, neutral, and friendly contacts and data to be fought in a manner to reduce information overload.
** Harlan Ullman coined the expression “Shock and Awe” in 1996 between the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars. Hence Shock and Awe is more commonly associated with the second Gulf War. Yet Ullman took some inspiration in his work for creating and supporting the expression based on the Kuwait Theater of Operations from the 1991 conflict, “In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary’s will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.” His examples tell nothing of leadership nor command and control nor popular political will. He further wrote on 1991 Iraq, “... Shock and Awe achieved by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the open desert. Shock and Awe was introduced in the manner that stealth aircraft penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically attacked center-of-gravity targets with impunity. Shock and Awe was also present in the degree that coalition forces owned the night and could rapidly maneuver large units in terrain thought to be foreign, imposing, and unforgiving for the predominantly U.S. forces.“ Shock and Awe Achieving Rapid Dominance does not make my recommended book list. The author also thought the atom bombs shocked the Japanese into surrender ending WWII. We’ve shown that not true both here and here.
*** Douglas Bader in Fight for the Sky: “By September 1938 – the time of the Munich Crisis – five R.A.F. squadrons had received Hurricane fighters. Deliveries of the Spitfire were only just starting. Perhaps it was as well for our future that the war did not break out then, instead of 1939 – from the point of view of Britain’s air power, the extra respite given by Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler at Munich was vital. The intervening year enabled the Royal Air Force to double the Fighter Command strength. From the total of nearly 500 Hurricanes actually delivered to squadrons and to the reserve, about three-quarters had been built in that vital year. When war started on 3 September 1939, eighteen squadrons of R.A.F. Fighter Command were equipped with Hurricanes.” ...
“The first Spitfire was in fact flight tested in May 1938. That autumn of 1938, Vickers (Aviation) and the Supermarine Aviation Works (Vickers) both became part of Vickers-Armstrong.”
“In 1938, at the time of Munich, Fighter Command of the Royal Air Force had twenty-nine fighter squadrons. Of these only five had modern equipment – i.e. Hurricanes. Pilots of the other twenty-four squadrons were flying obsolete biplanes with fixed undercarriages, insignificant fire-power, and maximum level speeds of around 220 m.p.h. This was one year before the beginning of World War II.”
“The first Spitfire to go into the Royal Air Force reached 19 Squadron at Duxford on 4 August 1938. This had a two-bladed wooden propeller and no armour behind the seat for the pilot’s protection. The rate of arrival after this first Spitfire was one a week.”
Not discussed in Bader’s book though in Blackett’s War, while fighter command modernized and rapidly grew, radar was also developed. Radar installations with coordination centers were finished on similar timelines and acted as force multipliers for the fighters. All these investments matured in the extra time provided under the guise of appeasement which by design created delay sufficient for the maturation.
**** Halsey at Leyte with his carrier force was responsible to protect the amphibious landing; instead of doing this he bit off on the Japanese northern carrier group and took to pursuit. Fortunately others were able to cover his slack as the Japanese mid group moved in from the west. The received wisdom of Alfred Thayer Mahan that fleets exist to destroy other fleets isn’t always correct. Especially true when working as a supporting entity to other forces.
***** “No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.” — Horatio Nelson
While Nelson may have sounded Mahanian, he was commanding a strictly naval force at sea. And he was speaking to individual ship captains, not a maritime component commander supporting a greater system such as a Joint Task Force (JTF) nor escort force commander to an amphibious force.