... its purpose must not be to support the Iraqi government. It must support Iraq...
The International Crisis Group’s recommendations are outstanding, and deserve support by the Democratic Party leadership. So, let’s tell Senate Democrats leader Harry Reid to, in his usual unambiguous and forceful manner, reject the ISG and embrace the recommendations of the ICG. (By the way, other diaries have noted the ICG Report, most prominently Mash's, but I think mine is the first (amazingly, since the report has been out for more than 24 hours) to focus solely on the report).
The ICG Report, entitled After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq, is long and detailed, but was boiled down to the following in an ICG press release:
If Iraq can be saved at this late date, it will require three ambitious and interrelated steps: ...
* A new forceful multilateral approach that puts real pressure on all Iraqi parties. The Baker-Hamilton report is right to advocate a broad International Support Group; it should comprise the five permanent Security Council members and Iraq’s six neighbors. But its purpose must not be to support the Iraqi government. It must support Iraq, which means pressing the government, along with all other constituencies, to make necessary compromises. The government and security forces should not be treated as privileged allies to be bolstered. They are but one among many parties to the conflict and not innocent of responsibility for much of the trouble. It also means agreeing on rules of conduct and red-lines for third-party involvement. Sustained multilateral diplomacy, not a one-off international conference is needed.
* A conference of all Iraqi and international stakeholders to forge a new political compact. This is not a military challenge in which one side needs to be strengthened and another defeated. It is a political challenge in which new consensual understandings need to be reached. A new, more equitable and inclusive national compact needs to be agreed upon by all relevant actors, including militias and insurgent groups, on issues such as federalism, resource allocation, de-Baathification, the scope of the amnesty and the timetable for a U.S. withdrawal. This can only be done if the International Support Group brings all of them to the negotiating table, and if its members steer their deliberations, deploying a mixture of carrots and sticks to influence those on whom they have particular leverage.
* A new U.S. regional strategy, including engagement with Syria and Iran, end of efforts at regime change, revitalisation of the Arab-Israeli peace process and altered strategic goals. Mere engagement of Iraq’s neighbours will not do; Washington must clearly redefine its objectives in the region to enlist regional, and particularly Iranian and Syrian help. The goal is not to bargain with them, but to seek compromise agreement on an end-state for Iraq and the region that is no one’s first choice, but with which all can live.
The ICG plan directs its attentions in the right direction, at all the major parties inside Iraq, and all the major parties outside Iraq. The inclusion of the five permanent members of the Security Council is particularly smart, because China and Russia must be parties to any final arrangement (in my humble opinion).
And note, of course, that a three-state solution simply is not on the table. That is a bad idea, hear me Senator Biden!? The nation states surrounding Iraq, who would have to sign off on a grand compromise, simply will not stand for it. Way too many people at dailykos have lunged toward the three state non-solution and have been rightly told off by me (in Why not a peaceful & united Iraq, dailykos?) among others.
Finally, it will remain nonsense, but Bush will keep doing it, to continue to focus on propping up whatever current government is in charge in Iraq. As the ICG recognizes, the whole thing just doesn't work, and there needs to be an entirely new and authentic compromise on everything.
On Bush, a final note of pessimism from Robert Malley, ICG Middle East and North Africa Program Director:
There is abundant reason to question whether the Bush administration is capable of such a dramatic course change. But there is no reason to question why it ought to change direction, and what will happen if it does not.