Back when the Russians took control of Kherson, i was especially despondent because it sealed control of the approach to Crimea. At that time, i’d assumed that Mariupol would soon fall as well, making it especially difficult for Ukraine to take this area back, not to mention Crimea itself. But my thoughts about the prospects for regaining this territory have taken quite a turn over the past several weeks.
Although Russian was clearly making for Odessa in those early, hopeful days, once that goal had become lost its subsequent movements above the Dnieper have not been altogether ridiculous. They have succeeded in fixing a large Ukrainian force between Kherson, Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih for quite some time now. That has not only kept those forces from reinforcing those in Donbas, but it has provided Russia a fairly free hand in the entire Melitopol region — Zaporizhzhia Oblast — where its secret police have been busy rounding up civilians and otherwise making things safe for Novorossiya generally.
But therein lies the key — this is a region that is not especially strongly held. Most of the Russian forces in this area are either refitting or engaged in ‘security’ and the like.
Russia has been counting on that buffer across the Dnieper, as well as the eastern front line beyond the bend where the river turns west at Zaporizhzhia, to maintain their occupation of this region. That may soon change.
And it really should. As long as Russia controls this corner of Ukraine, it keeps significant forces fixed and out of the major fight(s). If Ukraine took it back, otoh, it would now be a lot less difficult to hold it. That’s because Russia no longer has thousands of troops and tanks ready to roll up out of Crimea. The bottleneck at the top of the peninsula could be covered by relatively few forces if Ukraine swept the Russians back all the way to Donetsk. And i believe that it’s now doable.
The recent Russian offensives around Popasna and Severodonetsk have drawn in quite a few of their forces, including many that had been at, or around, Mariupol. I suspect, too, that the western end of the Donbas front, towards Orikhiv below Zaporizhzhia city, has seen fewer supplies of late as more head east.
Add to that the recent Ukrainian offensive at Davydiv Brid and things begin to look very interesting, indeed. I don’t expect that the Ukrainian General Staff are counting on capturing intact the bridges at Nova Kakhovka or Kherson — although that would surely be wonderful. It now appears as though the Russians might be preparing to demolish the dam at the latter bridge, as they have opened some of the floodgates. (I wrote about that here: Who is Flooding the Dnieper River Above Kherson? on the day that it was discovered.) And the bridge at Kherson has been wired to blow for some time now. Who among you thinks that the Russians would wait until all of their forces had safely crossed before destroying the bridges?
Despite the latest Ukrainian advances, though, i’ve been wondering whether the Ukrainians themselves might blow those bridges. Why do that? To trap all of those Russians north of the river. They might do so if they also made a move on Zaporizhzhia Oblast from the other end.
A breakthrough might come in the areas south of Orikhiv and Huliaipole. Smash the front lines there and the Russians might not be able to recover. Getting in behind that entire section of the front would cause utter panic among the Russians. But mopping up the front would be just the beginning. Infantry and artillery would rush in to hold off any reinforcement from the east, allowing mechanised forces to rush beyond, making for the crossroads at Polohy and Tokmak.
Even if Ukraine does not immediately retake Melitopol or Berdyans’k, the Russians might find themselves in a huge jam. For starters, rushing forces away from Donbas has clear implications. And they cannot easily afford to move forces south of the Dnieper without giving up their buffer. That is, if they can even get them back across the river.
And there isn’t much down in Crimea that can come to the rescue. Not anymore, there isn’t.
As mentioned, Russia has been parking forces in this region in order to refit, and to provide some reserves. But how strong do any of you believe that any of Putin’s reserves are these days?
And the Russians have another thing going against them in this region: Partisans.
Nathan Ruser’s map, above, is a pretty good estimate of the control that Russia has here. For many weeks there has been some RUMINT suggesting quite a lot of partisan operations all over Zaporizhzhia Oblast, including assassinations but also bridge and train destruction. That activity might also include monitoring troop movements; locating fuel and materiel dumps for future destruction or appropriation; and even some pathfinder tasks, like ensuring the soil is dry enough over certain offroad routes.
The partisan forces would also be helpful to the infantry in gaining control of towns and cities. Which the mechanised forces could safely bypass, btw. Again, the Russians do not have a lot of strength in depth here. The Ukrainian advance would not need to besiege the cities and towns.
Fuel would be an issue, as with any other supplies, of course. But that’s why the partisans might be asked not to destroy certain fuel dumps. Nobody would want to count on using them but they’d certainly be a ‘nice to have’. Live off the land a bit, as it were. (Incidentally, the German forces that broke through the Ardennes in December 1944 were very much counting on seizing US fuel dumps as they knew that little to nothing would be following behind.)
Those many ancient T-62s that have recently been sent down there would pose more difficulties than had otherwise been present last week but they will be rather unmatched, overall. Such a tank battle would be quite something.
Russia does have a number of air defenses in the area, so Ukraine’s Air Force won’t be able to just waltz in. But then, Russia’s own aircraft might not be very helpful, either. Doing Combat Air Patrol behind one’s own lines is a fraught situation, to say the least.
And it’s not as though Ukraine would be going in blind. They have been receiving all kinds of intelligence from the US and NATO generally, including much from overhead. The following refers to the invasion of Iraq but it may as well speak of Ukraine’s forces today.
Weather satellites, spy satellites, military communications satellites, and two dozen Earth-orbiting GPS satellites charted and imaged the battlefield. Down on the ground, young soldiers drove down danger-ridden roads in armored vehicles. And because of portable access to spaceborne assets, by and large they knew where their targets lay, how to get there, and what obstacles stood in their path.
— Neil DeGrasse Tyson and Avis Lang. Accessory to War: The Unspoken Alliance Between Astrophysics and the Military
None of this is a prediction. But it’s the kind of move that i’d like to think that i’d be considering were i in charge of Ukraine’s defenses. But then, i’d have a much clearer understanding of everything that’s going on in that case, which might colour significantly any decisions about implementing major offensives such as i’ve described here.
I’m going to close with a comment from Judeling that i came across a few days ago, but couldn’t comment on because i’d been reading offline. (I’m currently living in the sticks so have rather intermittent internet when i’m in town.) I’ll paste it in full because it eerily mirrors that which i’ve been pondering for weeks.
Kherson at this point for Ukraine is a fixing operation.
Ukrainian strategy makes perfect sense to me if as I expect the major counterattack to start in mid June. Severodonetsk at this point is important because the Russians have made it so. It right now is basically the only point where Russia is attacking any of the pre-invation prepared defensive positions in strength and so where the defensive multiplier is applied in full. As long as it stands Russia will attack as they have now made it an immediate objective for political reasons and so really cannot change diplomatic stance until captured. Right now it is in Ukraine’s interest strategically to fight hard in Severodonetsk and delay that Russian victory. Tactics have to serve strategy.
Lets look a bit at the whole picture. Except for Severodonetsk Ukraine has frozen any Russian movement. Now even around Popasna they are shaping that with light counters. Everywhere along the battle trace they are probing and fixing Russian forces. Meanwhile we know of one Tank Brigade formed around 100 of the 250 Polish tanks. Which means we don’t know about the other units formed around the remainder. So there is probably another Brigade forming and lurking somewhere with the rest dispersed around to add weight to other areas of the front. Kos is correct in pointing out Melitopol as a linchpin, but it wont be approached from Kherson. Much more likely is it will be approached from Zaporizhzhia most likely through Orikhiv-Tokmak. Getting two Brigades into the same mobility friendly terrain Russia used coming out of Crimea changes the entire situation. It puts Ukraine through the partisan prepared ground right at the start. Now Russia has to pull troops in to defend and at the furthest points of their land based supply lines. It draws much of the Fleet into the Azov just as a start. Vasylivka would be the initial source of ready troops but that is easily blocked as they would have to withdraw south first. Most of the other forces available are right now doing rear area security or on the front line waiting to be rolled up from the rear. So now from the West we have the Kherson forces on the wrong side of the river closely engaged the supplies and support coming out of Crimea threatened and diverted towards defense. From the East Russia would have to pull troops out of the southern Donbas front at least.
Of all the Russian gains so far the one they really cannot afford to cede is the land bridge. Ukraine however will not actually be attacking fixed positions, for their purposes isolating them is enough. They will tend to be fighting mainly in even up engagements against Russian relieving forces. Slowly picking off smaller concentrations in detail. This is basically what they have been doing all along, the difference is mobility. As Russian forces thin out elsewhere the Ukrainian forces already there in defense push forward. The North and East slowly contract to pre-invasion defensive positions. That is the point where the longer ranged MLRS systems and others come into real play. Getting into the land bridge actually makes that even more likely to happen.
Mid June is my guess because the ships from the US will be arriving next week. KOS gave a 24 day transit time. That is normal container transit time. Actually the ships take about 7-10 days on the water to get from Savanna or Norfolk to Poland the rest of the time is about 8 days of pre and post transit paperwork and loading/unloading time and jockeying in and out of the port queue. So 2-3 weeks in reality to have ship transported equipment on line in Ukraine.
Friday, Jun 3, 2022 · 7:48:18 PM +00:00
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subtropolis
I want to clarify a couple of things. While driving back into the nineteenth century yesterday it had occurred to me that i’d left a few things unsaid. Primarily, i want to say that i have no illusions about the difficulties that Ukraine’s forces might encounter with such an offensive. War kills people. It maims people. But the status quo is untenable for Ukraine.
Which leads to my second point. This isn’t about winning the war. Not even close. Rather, it’s about wiping out a tremendous advantage that the Russians hold right now. All of those Russians in Zaporizhzhzia Oblast, and especially across the river in Kherson Oblast, are fixing in place large numbers of Ukrainians who could be better utilised in Donbas. That will continue as long as the Russians hold that territory. Indeed, those southern forces will represent a grave threat to Ukraine as long as they are there.
This isn’t about winning back “some farmland” for its sake. Far from it. Removing Russia from all of this territory would be a massive strategic victory.
However, slugging it out above Kherson — and attempting to cross the Dnieper — may take a very long time, and cost a great many lives. I think the benefits of breaking through in the east might outweigh the risks. But i’m only going on what little information that i have. Ukraine’s General Staff surely know far better than any of us which way their best road points.