The beating up of the Democratic Party's front runner continues, at uhh, dailykos. The latest is kos's frontpa--no, now here's Georgia10 (*see end of diary), and her formulation of why Hillary's wrong for not admitting she "was wrong" or "made a mistake" when she voted in October 2002 for authorization of use of military force against Iraq (AUMF).
23 Senators and 133 Congresspersons, you see, voted against AUMF, after all. And Georgia10 characterizes all 156 as follows (original links included):
They knew that this President could not be trusted with awesome war powers. They knew that a possible invasion would be catastrophic. They knew that pre-emptive war in the Mideast would have disastrous consequences.
Just off the top of my head, and first of all, I bet the following is a much more real-world take on what they were saying/thinking in late 2002:
They thought that this President could not be trusted with awesome war powers. They thought that a possible invasion might be catastrophic. They thought that pre-emptive war in the Mideast might have disastrous consequences.
But let's examine each sentence (and its link) more closely:
1. "They knew that this President could not be trusted with awesome war powers."
This sentence is not an accurate reflection of any part of the link, John Conyers' speech opposing the resolution. In fact, Conyers never mentions President Bush's trustworthiness, but opposes the authorization on general principle:
I oppose the resolution requested by President Bush that would give him a blank check to start a war against Iraq at any time and in any manner that he chooses. This clearly is too broad. It authorizes the President to act unilaterally no matter what the U.N. decides or does. That would abdicate congressional responsibility. It is reminiscent of the equally open-ended, and ill-fated, Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964. President Bush’s requested authority also is not limited to working within the U.N. framework on peaceful measures to enforce U.N. sanctions. Finally, the President’s proposal embodies his alarming new doctrine of pre-emptive US attacks on other nations even when they pose no imminent threat to the U.S. [emphasis added]
The trustworthiness of President Bush just was not the issue then that it became later. And I don't think any major Democrats were saying the President's untrustworthiness would motivate their 'no' vote on the authorization.
But perhaps Georgia10's transformation of John Conyers statement above (which is pretty clearly about the principle of conceding Congressional warmaking powers to the President) into "they knew they couldn't trust the President" is interesting. Because, I think it may be a case of a now widespread and now 'obvious truth' being transferred back 4 and a half years and slapped onto John Conyers, no matter what he was in fact saying back in late 2002.
In the end, Georgia10 is asking Hillary to have had the excellent judgment to join a widespread Congressional distrust of President Bush that did not exist in 2002. So 2007 hindsight rules here, the hell with 2002 reality on this one.
2. They knew that a possible invasion would be catastrophic.
Huh, this one doesn't link up either. Senator Feingold, the link, doesn't say anything at all about catastrophe (Conyers did, however, I think), and nothing about 'knowing' there would be one. He worries about what could happen, and the following might be as close as he gets to what Georgia10 believes he said:
... If the right way to address this threat is through internationally-supported military action in Iraq and Saddam Hussein's regime falls, we will need to take action to ensure stability in Iraq. This could be very costly and time consuming, could involve the occupation -- the occupation, Mr. President, of a Middle Eastern country. Now, this is not a small matter. The American occupation of a Middle Eastern country. Consider the regional implications of that scenario, the unrest in moderate states that calls for action against American interests, the difficulty of bringing stability to Iraq so we can extricate ourselves in the midst of regional turmoil. Mr. President, we need much more information about how we propose to proceed so that we can weigh the costs and benefits to our national security. [emphasis added]
Senator Feingold, like Senator Clinton actually, expressed uncertainty and concern about what might happen if there were an invasion. Here's Clinton, in her October 2002 AUMF speech:
... After shots are fired and bombs are dropped, not all consequences are predictable. While the military outcome is not in doubt, should we put troops on the ground, there is still the matter of Saddam Hussein's biological and chemical weapons. Today he has maximum incentive not to use them or give them away. If he did either, the world would demand his immediate removal. Once the battle is joined, however, with the outcome certain, he will have maximum incentive to use weapons of mass destruction and to give what he can't use to terrorists who can torment us with them long after he is gone. We cannot be paralyzed by this possibility, but we would be foolish to ignore it. And according to recent reports, the CIA agrees with this analysis. A world united in sharing the risk at least would make this
occurrence less likely and more bearable and would be far more likely to share with us the considerable burden of rebuilding a secure and peaceful post-Saddam Iraq.
Both Senators recognized the great burden imposed on the U.S. by an invasion. Neither, I think, had any idea what we were actually in for: the most feebly planned for and amateurishly managed occupation in world history. But I guess they should've both known the "possible invasion would be catastrophic." Shame on both of them for not knowing that... I guess.
3. They knew that pre-emptive war in the Mideast would have disastrous consequences.
Well, zero for three then. Durbin's speech (the link above) doesn't say anything about a preemptive war against Iraq. Its focus is the 'go-it-alone' attitude he found in the President's AUMF:
...isn't there a better and more cautious and more prudent and more successful strategy we should consider--bringing in the United Nations for real inspections, unconditional inspections, enforced with military force, if they must be, including some troops from the United States, to make sure the inspectors get into the places they need to; and failing that, if Saddam Hussein stops the inspectors, that we issue an ultimatum to him through the United Nations, that if you do not allow unconditional inspections, you can expect there will be a forceful effort by the countries of the world to enforce United Nations resolutions already in place? Isn't that a far better approach than to say, we have a battle plan; we are going to attack; we will send you a note, United Nations, and let you know what happens?
Hillary had more misgivings on the UN, but basically agreed with Durbin on the advisability of bringing that institution in if at all possible. Here's her 10/2002 take:
While there is no perfect approach to this thorny dilemma, and while people of good faith and high intelligence can reach diametrically opposed conclusions, I believe the best course is to go to the UN for a strong resolution that scraps the 1998 restrictions on inspections and calls for complete, unlimited inspections with cooperation expected and demanded from Iraq. I know that the Administration wants more, including an explicit authorization to use force, but we may not be able to secure that now, perhaps even later. But if we get a clear requirement for unfettered inspections, I believe the authority to use force to enforce that mandate is inherent in the original 1991 UN resolution, as President Clinton recognized when he launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998.
If we get the resolution that President Bush seeks, and if Saddam complies, disarmament can proceed and the threat can be eliminated. Regime change will, of course, take longer but we must still work for it, nurturing all reasonable forces of opposition.
If we get the resolution and Saddam does not comply, then we can attack him with far more support and legitimacy than we would have otherwise.
In the end the President did go to the UN, for what it was worth.
In any case, on the pre-emptive war issue, Georgia10 simply has a 'facts' problem. Conyers, Feingold, Durbin, and Hillary all opposed Bush's new doctrine of pre-emption. Here's Hillary, 10/02:
My vote is not, however, a vote for any new doctrine of pre-emption, or for uni-lateralism, or for the arrogance of American power or purpose -- all of which carry grave dangers for our nation, for the rule of international law and for the peace and security of people throughout the world.
So, it would not be a stretch to say that Hillary, along with perhaps many others, believed that "pre-emptive war in the Mideast would have disastrous consequences."
So what is it, again, that she needs to say she was wrong about? Because what I get from looking at what Georgia10 links to is that the following is what even the best and most leftist thought back in the real 2002:
They thought that ceding awesome war powers to any President was wrong. They thought that a possible invasion might generate severe problems. They thought that pre-emptive war in the Mideast might have disastrous consequences.
Hillary agreed with and expressed the worries in the final two sentences. And she disagreed and still disagrees with John Conyers on the ceding of war powers to the President (and thought the issue was moot anyway since the President, even without the AUMF, could still start a war.)
Somehow, I don't see the "was wrong" or "made a mistake" in what Hillary has said, even if we decide to judge her by comparing her statements to the stated reasoning and stated wisdom of the wisest of those who voted against the AUMF. Using even that methodology, she doesn't come off badly.
To make Hillary come off badly, therefore, you still need to insinuate that powerful 2007 hindsight into your 'analysis' of 2002.
*(Not to suggest that either Georgia10 or Markos have anything but the best motives for their attacks on Hillary. (So, I hope it is obvious, this diary is NOT a personal attack on Georgia10, but on a piece of her reasoning). And not to suggest that there's not plenty of real, going-forward, stuff that Hillary can and should be attacked for.)