Evacuation From Hungnam
The Chinese Third Phase Offensive
1st Lieutenant Joseph R. Owen, Retired
Last Words
Evacuation From Hungnam
On December 8, while the UN forces from Chosin were still stuck in the mountains behind the damaged gatehouse bridge, General MacArthur ordered the evacuation of the rest of General Almond’s X Corps. Several units of X Corps set up a defensive perimeter around Hungnam and Hamhung. There were skirmishes between the pursuing PVA 27th Corps (a part of General Song’s Ninth Army), but it was too badly mauled to approach the Hungnam perimeter very closely. The Chosin survivors began arriving two days later. By December 11, they were safely within the perimeter.
What happened next was what some historians have called “the greatest evacuation movement by sea in US military history.” The US Navy had quickly assembled an armada of 193 ships in Hamhung harbor. This armada evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipment and many refugees trying to leave North Korea. Altogether, about 105,000 soldiers and Marines, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hamhung to Pusan. The last ship left in mid-afternoon on December 24. The port was then destroyed by the US Navy to deny its use to the Chinese and North Korean forces. The PVA 27th Corps entered deserted Hungnam the next morning, December 25, Christmas Day, 1950. X Corps didn’t make it home by Christmas, but they did at least make it out of North Korea.
The Chinese Third Phase Offensive
I am one of those annoying people who always wants to know what happened next. I dislike loose ends. The loose ends remaining here are the US Eight Army and the PVA Thirteenth Army. What happened to them after the battle of the Chongchon River?
While the US X Corps was being evacuated to Hungnam, the US Eighth Army was retreating south of the 38th parallel on the western front. By December 22, the US Eighth Army had set up a front. The US I Corps and IX Corps and three ROK corps were placed along the 38th parallel. They would be tested again soon. Marshal Peng and his Thirteenth Army was on their heels.
The ROK corps had suffered huge losses during the previous two months, about 45,000 killed or wounded. These losses had been replaced with raw recruits, who had little combat training.
In late December, the US Army Chief Of Staff came to Korea and inspected the troops along the front. He concluded that the ROK troops were fit only for outpost duty and not at all for defending a front in the face of a determined enemy attack. The Eighth Army wasn’t much better. It was suffering from low morale due to the defeats it had suffered and the ignominious retreat it had just completed. Most of its soldiers were not anticipating any more fighting but instead being evacuated from Korea entirely. They did not notice when the Chinese began moving into positions just north of the 38th parallel.
General MacArthur thought that the Chinese would eventually force the UN forces back to Pusan, and that they would be withdrawn from the peninsula entirely. But his days in Korea (and his days on active duty) were numbered. In May, he would be dismissed by President Truman for insubordination. His future replacement, Lieutenant General (3 stars) Matthew Ridgway was already in Korea.
After the death of General Walker, General Ridgway had been appointed the new commander of the Eighth Army. On December 27, Ridgway ordered the Eighth Army’s two corps pulled back to positions just north of Seoul to defend it should an evacuation become necessary.
The Chinese forces were suffering from logistics problems and exhaustion after their earlier victories. PVA Commander Marshal Peng advised Chairman Mao that the PVA would need at least three months before it could launch a full-scale invasion of South Korea. He needed to replace his army’s casualties. Most of his units were in critical need of rest. His troops were exhausted. They had been on the move or fighting for nearly two months without break. The units themselves needed resupply and reorganization. Mao agreed to this. He ordered a limited action. The PVA Thirteenth Army would launch an “intrusion” which was dubbed the “Third Phase Campaign.” Mao felt this would hasten the withdrawal of all UN forces from South Korea – which was, in fact, being contemplated in some US quarters – and would demonstrate China’s desire for a total victory.
Specifically, the PVA Thirteenth Army was to pin down the ROK forces still at the 38th parallel and destroy them. The Chinese were aware the the US forces had pulled back from the parallel and that only ROK forces were still there. Mao believed that destroying the ROK forces would render the UN forces further south incapable of counterattacking for some time into the future. He made a promise to Peng that after the offensive was over all Chinese troops would be pulled off the front lines for rest and refit.
The offensive was to kick off on New Years Eve. The Chinese anticipated that the American troops would not be as alert during the holiday. (They were right; many were outright drunk.) Also there was a full moon that night which would make the attack a bit easier. General Ridgway also figured that the Chinese would attack that night, for the same exact reasons.
The attack went off as scheduled. It was actually somewhat anticlimactic. The ROK units collapsed within a day. General Ridgway did not have faith that his Eighth Army in its current condition would be able to stand up to the Chinese. To avoid having his troops encircled and annihilated, Ridgeway pulled then back on January 3 to positions about twenty miles south of Seoul. The Chinese occupied Seoul on January 7, then Marshal Peng, fearful of another Inchon landing, suspended the Third Phase Offensive – but remained in Seoul.
General MacArthur actively considered using nuclear weapons in the interior of North Korea and across the Yalu in Manchuria. He felt that the blast damage and the lingering fallout would disrupt the Chinese supply lines. He specifically asked that 8 Mark-4 atomic bombs be assigned to him to use as he saw fit. This request was denied, but there were atomic bombs and B-29 bombers at air bases near to Korea during the first two years of the war. Fortunately for the world, they were never used,
Chairman Mao believed that this latest defeat, as he saw it, had thoroughly demoralized the US Eighth Army, and left them unable to counterattack. At this point, he permitted the exhausted PVA Thirteenth Army to begin resting and recuperating for a period of at least two to three months. Marshal Peng and his commanders began planning for one last decisive battle in the spring of 1951.
However, the Chinese attack and recapture of Seoul didn’t destroy the Eighth Army’s morale. It actually went a long way toward restoring the morale of the Eighth Army. The troops were angry and wanted to do something about it. On January 25, General Ridgway and the Eighth Army counterattacked the PVA, much to their surprise, with Operation Thunderbolt. But that is a story for another time.
1st Lieutenant Joseph R. Owen, Retired
Lieutenant Owen passed away on August 14, 2015, at the age of 90. Here is a portion of his obituary, along with a photo of him taken in late September, 1950, after he had been in Korea for about two weeks.
Joseph Richard Owen, 90, of Skaneateles [New York] passed away on August 14, encircled by those he held most dear: his wife of 70 years, Dorothy; his children; his brother, Dennis; his close friends; and his cherished U.S. Marines.
Born in 1924 to Margaret and William Owen-recent immigrants from Ireland and Wales.
Owen was raised in Syracuse and graduated in 1942 from Christian Brothers Academy. He left college the next year, enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps, and was soon tapped for Officers Candidates School.
After World War II, Owen returned to college on the G.I. Bill and graduated from Colgate University in 1948. He returned to active duty during the early days of the Korean War. As a second lieutenant, he helped lead rifle company Baker-One-Seven in bitter combat at the Chosin Reservoir. Ninety percent of the company's 300 Marines were killed, wounded or captured. Owen himself was gravely injured and spent 17 months recuperating in U.S. naval hospitals. Sixty years later, he was awarded the Silver Star Medal "for gallantry and intrepidity in armed combat."
Last Words
Besides the loss of North Korea, the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps reported a total of 10,495 battle casualties – killed, wounded, captured, and missing – of which 4,385 were from the US Marines, 3,163 were from the US Army, 2,812 were from South Koreans attached to American formations and 78 were from the British Royal Marines. Outside of the combat losses, the 1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties (mainly frostbite) due to the cold weather.
Major General O. P. Smith – not General Almond – is considered to have saved the US X Corps from destruction. The 1st Marine Division, the 41st Royal Marines Commando, and the Army's RCT-31 were each awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their courage and tenacity during the battle. This is the text of the Citation for the 1st Marine Division
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
The Presidential Unit Citation
To the First Marine Division
for service as set forth in the following Citation:
For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against enemy aggressor forces in the Chosin reservoir and Koto-Ri of Korea from 27 November to 11 December 1950.
When the full fury of the enemy counterattack struck both the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps on 27 and 28 November 1950, the First Marine Division, operating as the Left Flank Division of the Tenth Corps, launched a daring assault westward from Yudam-Ni in an effort to cut the road and rail communications of hostile forces attacking the eighth army and at the same time, continued its mission of protecting a vital main supply route consisting of a tortuous mountain road running southward to Chinhung-Ni, approximately 35 miles distant.
Ordered to withdraw to Hamhung in company with attached army and other friendly units in the face of tremendous pressure in the Chosin reservoir area the division began an epic battle against the bulk of the enemy third route army and, while small intermediate garrisons at Hagaru-Ri and Koto-Ri held firmly against repeated and determined attacks by hostile forces, gallantly fought its way successively to Hagaru-Ri, Koto-Ri, Chinhung-Ni and Hamhung over twisting, mountainous and icy roads in sub-zero temperatures.
Battling desperately night and day in the face of almost insurmountable odds throughout a period of two weeks of intense and sustained combat, the First Marine Division emerged from its ordeal as a fighting unit with its wounded, with its guns and equipment and with its prisoners, decisively defeating seven enemy divisions, together with elements of three others, and inflicting major losses which seriously impaired the military effectiveness of the hostile forces for a considerable period of time.
The valiant fighting spirit, relentless perseverance and heroic fortitude of the officers and men of the First Marine Division, in battle against a vastly outnumbering enemy, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
Harry S. Truman
President of the United States
Fourteen Marines, two Soldiers and one Navy pilot received the Medal of Honor, most of them posthumously. Over time, all of the UN troops that served at Chosin (who were mostly Marines) came to be known as "The Chosin Few." On September 15, 2010, the Veterans of the Korean War Chosin Reservoir Battle memorial was unveiled by the United States Marine Corps Commandant General James T. Conway at Camp Pendleton.
China was also catapulted into the status of a major military power following their victory at Chosin, but that victory came with a staggering cost. With the escape of the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps, Mao's vision of the destruction of the 1st MarDiv was not realized, and this failure caused General Song Shi-Lun to offer his resignation. Heavy casualties caused by both combat and poor logistical support destroyed much of the PVA Ninth Army. Two of its divisions were forced to disband entirely, never to be restored. Not until March 1951 did the Ninth Army return to its normal strength and become combat effective. The absence of nearly 40 percent of the Chinese forces in Korea in early 1951 enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea. Namely, Marshal Peng didn’t have the Ninth Army to help with the Third Phase Offensive.
The Korean War would drag on for another two and a half years before the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, about ten weeks before I was born. As I mentioned at the beginning, technically, the Korean War has not ended.
To quote Lieutenant Owen one last time:
The 1st Marine Division fought for two and a half years more, until the Korean War ended in a truce. Neither side could claim victory.
Think about this for a moment – North Korea on one side and South Korea and the United States on the other side are technically still in a state of war with each other. Everyone has (mostly) just stopped shooting for the last 63 years. There are about 30,000 US troops in South Korea, most of whom are near the DMZ. They, and Seoul, the capital and economic center of South Korea, are within easy range of North Korean rockets and artillery.
Can we really be sure that the regime there, in a moment of perceived threat and desperation – for example, if the Kim family thought they were on the verge of losing power, or perhaps thought they were under attack by the United States as retaliation for their nuclear tests and missile launches – might not take South Korea – and more besides – with them as they fell. I do expect that within a few years – maybe two, maybe five; not more than that – that all hell will break out on the Korean peninsula. What happens after that could be very dangerous and scary to much of the rest of the world.
I had this part nearly completed when this diary appeared here on Kos, which suggests that some future nightmare may be upon us much sooner than we thought.
Trump readying the U.S. for first-strike war in the Korean peninsula; weighing nuke deployment, by Magnifico
This is on top of earlier news today that a US Navy carrier battle group (the Carl Vinson and about a half dozen surface warships, are moving near to the Korean peninsula. A carrier battle group has an awesome amount of firepower, including, I surmise, nuclear firepower. Carrier battle groups generally travel with several attack submarines (generally Los Angeles class) which can carry Tomahawk cruise missiles, which can be nuclear-armed.
Are you shivering yet?
Previous Parts
Part 6: Into The Trap - Koto-ri To Toktong Pass
Part 7: Changes Of Plans
Part 8: The Chinese Spring Their Trap
Part 9: Task Force MacLean/Faith - A Tragedy In Five Days
Part 10: An Entirely Different War
Part 11: The Relief Of Fox Company
Part 12: Break-Out