Why Heller Matters

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Saturday June 24, 2017 · 9:03 PM PDT

2017/06/24 · 21:03

UNITED STATES - APRIL 26: Sen. Dean Heller, R-Nev., makes a statement in opposition to using Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste disposal site during the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Environment hearing on the "Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act Of 2017" on Wednesday, April 26, 2017. (Photo By Bill Clark/CQ Roll Call) (CQ Roll Call via AP Images) — I never thought I'd be calling this guy a genius. Then again, I never thought I'd be calling Trump presi . . . damn it, still can't finish that word.

I wasn’t expecting Nevada Senator Dean Heller to be the first senator to express real opposition to the Wealthcare bill. While some think this is a ploy, Jon Ralston disagrees and says it is real. Ralston knows Nevada politics like no one else, and pretty much always gets it right. What adds weight to Ralston’s view is the way Heller presented his position — in Nevada at a press conference, with the governor at his side. This wasn’t some mealy-mouthed “I have concerns” mumble while sprinting down a hallway. Could he be flipped? Sure, but he’s given his opposition in 2018 a great big pile of video clips to use against him if he does back out.

Honestly, what Heller did was genius. He really doesn’t want to be the deciding vote against the bill, and by being the first real vote in opposition, he won’t be. It’s the third real no vote who holds that hot potato.

Heller matters because this play was not expected, and he could set in motion a quick defeat for this version of the bill. When the CBO score comes out Monday or Tuesday, Collins and Murkowski are likely to say they are voting no, same as Heller — “barring major changes to much of the bill.” Collins says she is just waiting for the score before she decides, but she’s sent some pretty strong signals out already. As horrible as the bill is for everyone, it is especially awful for the old, rural and poor in their states (which is most of the population in Maine and Alaska). The blowback would be brutal for them. Collins and Murkowski were always expected to be “no” votes, which left us searching for one profile in courage on the Republican side to be that third vote. Needless to say, we’d be coming up empty.

But if Collins and Murkowski come out as nos along with Heller from that wing, there would then be seven senators who have voiced strong opposition to the bill by late Monday or Tuesday after the CBO score comes out. We know the “strong opposition” of Cruz, Paul, Lee, and Johnson is a joke — they were always going to vote for the bill after a little preening and posturing. But even if the count is not real, it gives Capito from West Virginia and possibly others (Bill Cassidy from Louisiana — a DOCTOR who was not even including in the drafting of the bill), Flake from Arizona, maybe Portman from Ohio or Gardner from Colorado -— a small window of opportunity to jump on the “I’m not voting for it” bandwagon at a moment when they will not be the deciding vote against it.

This would be a very small window, likely 12 to 24 hours — after the CBO score comes out, but before Cruz, Paul, Lee and Johnson can miraculously discover they support the bill after all. You’d have two close to equal factions against the bill if you have 5-6 “moderates” against it along with 4 ultra-conservatives opposing, same as what happened in the House. Neither will agree on changes, they are all already pissed at McConnell for being shut out of the process so he doesn’t have leverage there.

The “moderates” will be threatened like Heller with big ad buys against them, but so what? Murkowski and Collins are safe seats (and safer still for voting against the bill). Voting against it only helps the other folks in Medicaid expansion states too, given its enormous unpopularity even before anyone fully grasps how awful the Medicaid cuts are.

But even if the bill goes down in flames early next week with a CBO bandwagon, I suspect it will be a replay of the House situation where a Zombie bill comes back later this summer and manages to barely pass. Still, a delay of a couple months (or even weeks) would be huge in getting the word out on this bill and pressuring senators not to vote for it. What happens in the hours after the CBO score will tell the tale. If this version of the bill dies a quick death, it’s al because Heller got out in front of the process to provide a little safety in numbers for folks beyond Collins and Murkowski who don’t want to vote for this travesty, but are too cowardly to be the deciding vote. Now they don’t have to be.

Nevada - Delegate Mathematics (35 Dels)

Torilahure

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Thursday February 11, 2016 · 11:23 AM PST

2016/02/11 · 11:23

Nevada specific discussion of vote share and mathematics behind impact on delegate allocation of its 35 Delegates. This is part of mathematics of delegate allocation notes in the series of Delegate Mathematics stories. Nevada has mostly even number of delegates. Thus advantage is acccrued only by breaking through the next level threshholds.

Basic Data: Nevada has 35 delegates available. There are 4 Congressional Districts. So including state-wide allocations, there are 6 different delegate allocation units. The delegates are mostly 6 with one district at 5. Number of delegates available in each are as follows: 5 from CD1; 6 from CD2 CD3 CD4; and 5 PLEOs and 7 state-wide.

Nevada operates a closed caucus. Participation is open to all Democrats and anyone else who switches their registered affilitian to Democrats. Initial stage 1 Caucus takes place on 20th Feb 2016.

The general format of caucus (listed here only as a reminder to myself, and lest I forget. Ocasionally this is referred to as three-tier caucus because there are three stages of the process)

First stage (aka first determining stage): held at precint level, elects delegates to county convention. Usual rules of viability threshholds and triggers apply.

Second stage (aka county convention): held on 2nd of April, elects delegates to Congressional District/State conventions. Again usual rules of viability and threshholds apply here too.

Third stage (aka State convention): held on 14/15th May. This operates in two specifc segment elections but at the same time/place. First the delegates within each Congressional District hold a sort of closed district only part of convention. This elects Congressional District based allocation of delegates to DNC. Second the whole lot together elect State-wide allocation of delegates including normal delegates and pledged party leaders and elected officials (PLEO). Once again the threshholds and triggers apply here too.

Nevada has a series of range of precint delegate quota based on number of registered democrats and corresponding divider to calculate allocations. Nevada gives a guarentee of one delegate to every precint where there is a registered democrat. Preferential treatment which effectively weighs in favour of precints with smaller number of registered Democrats. This has an effect of awarding disproportionately larger share of delegates to precints falling under rural , under registered or sparsely populated precints. {I guess this is to encourage wider participation. This also has an effect of rewarding candidates who have wider organizational presence}. Additionally Nevada is union and shift worker friendly thus has allocated extra caucuses and arrangements to accomodate shift worker.

This being caucus the final numbers of delegates from districts and state-wide awarded while can be estimated are they are estimates only. usually they might go up or down by upto 15% on county levels and 7.5% on district/state level. Usually means the actual DNC delegate numbers might go up or down by 1 delegate than estimated.

I have grouped the Congressional districts which have same available delegates together since the same thresholds and triggers apply to them. The threshholds %s are relative to eachother. Forx example, this means that a vote results of 49-48-2 is effectively, 50.5 — 49.5. This is derived from 49/(49+48) vs 48/(49+48).

Delegate Allocation Threshholds/Triggers
Delegates Acquired out of Available	5 del cd1	6 del cd2 cd3 cd4
1 del	15	15
2 del	30	25
3 del	50	41.7
4 del	70	58.3
5 del	85	75

For 5 Delegates at CD1: First delegate acquird at 15%, second delegate at 30.%. Third delegate trigger is precariously balanced at 50%. Fourth delegate costs a whopping 70%. This 70% votes are needed to get a 4-1 split seems a bit too much of a demand on any campaign. This district very crucial as they break in favour with just with small % hovering at 50%, a whole delegate is available. A campaign that wants to maintain parity needs to achieve at least 30% support needed for 2 delegates. Goal for both Campaign is to cross the 50% and obtain a 3-2 split in their favour.

For 6 Delegates at CD2 CD3 and CD4: First two delegates are achieved at 15% and 25% respectively. Within the whole range of 41.7 — 58.3 the delegate split will be straight 3-3. The vote advantage of 16% is not going to make any difference. Interesting points are at 41.7%. and 58.3%, if candidates are hovering around either of these mark, then some extra effort would break the district 4-2 split. To get a 5-1 split is going to take a 75% support level. Even in candidates home states and districts we have not yet seen this kind of support. For an advantage a candidate has all the incentive to break it 4-2split. with 58.3% votes. To maintain parity only 41.7% is needed giving 3-3 split.

Delegate Allocations Based On State-Wide Results: State-wide results work towards two different category of delegates; 7 At-Large delegates and 5 pledged PLEO delegates. While it is the same vote share, the odd number allocations would reward state-wide winner with overall at least two delegate advantages.

State-wide Delegate Allocation Triggers
Delegates	1	2	3	4	5	6
%Vote 5 PLEO	15	30	50	70	85
%Vote 7 State-wide	15	21.4	35.7	50	64.3	78.6

For 5 State-wide (At-Large) Delegates: First delegate acquired at 15%, second delegate at 30.%. Third delegate trigger is precariously balanced at 50%. Fourth delegate costs a whopping 70%. available. Both campaigns probably have that 30% support needed for 2 delegates. Goal for both Campaign is to cross the 50% and obtain a 3-2 split in their favour. One again the state-wide winner gets an extra delegate advantage in this category.

For 7 State-wide (At-Large) Delegates: First two delegates are cheap at 15% and 21.3% votes. Within the range of 35.7% — 50% the 3 delegates each will be allocated. The fight for the 7th delegate is again precariously balanced at 50% marker to make the overall break 4-3 split. To achieve a 5-2 split votes need to be at 64.3% or higher. Once again state-wide results award an extra delegate advantage in this category too.

Next bit is my personal opinion: Most of the contest is likely to be at 58.3% trigger region for those advantageous 4-2 splits. I suspect every delegate break will go on Clinton favour. Making 3-2 and 4-2 and 3-2 and 4-3 delegate splits in applicable areas. Resulting total (22-13) in favour of Clinton

Previously covered states: Arkansas and Alabama and South-Carolina and Virginia and Massachusetts and New-Hampshire and Vermont and Georgia and Oklahoma and Tennessee and Texas

Enjoy and hopefully you will have spotted where you might tip the balance personally and like to campaign or make that extra push for your preferred candidate.

Previously covered states are all listed with the individual state links in this single document. I will be updating it as and when new states get done: All-Links-Collection-Delegate-Mathematics-Series-2016-Democratic-Primary

Currently I am running through the list of states. If anyone would like to see the mathematics for a your particular state faster let me know and I will queue it up.

Todays shout outs are for Kossacks Denver11 and family farmer and cardinal and Featheredsprite and tom 47 .

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